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UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

UNDERSTANDING 'LIFEWORLDS' OF
MENTALLY HANDICAPPED CHILDREN

by

Chizuko Maeda-Fujita

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR
THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

DEPARTMENT OF SECONDARY EDUCATION

EDMONTON, ALBERTA

FALL, 1990



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PERMANENT ADDRESS

50-7 Hinode-cho

Kagoshima-shi, 890


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
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
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
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
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.....
Dr. M. J. van Manen (supervisor)


.....
Dr. W. H. O. Schmidt


.....
Dr. K. G. Jacknicke


.....
Dr. D. Sobsey


.....
Dr. Wm. H. Schubert (External Examiner)

Date: Aug. 28 1990

DEDICATION

To my parents,
Tadaji and Kazuko Maeda.

Abstract

The main purpose of this study is to seek ways to understand mentally handicapped children as they are as unique individuals. The two dominant perspectives on special education, the traditional and the social perspectives, fall short of seeing mentally handicapped children "as they are" since they focus on either their differences from non-handicapped children or the commonality between handicapped and non-handicapped children. Thus the fundamental question of the research becomes how to see sameness and difference in order to understand the experience of mentally handicapped children in their lifeworlds.

Lifeworlds of mentally handicapped children are explored in the form of "stories" based on my own experiences with these children, mainly because the form of story allows us to tell about particular events, particular experiences, and particular individuals in concrete situations. This epistemological concreteness of story is methodologically appropriate for the study, since as pedagogical research the study seeks to understand each child as a unique individual in his or her particular situation. The phenomenon of difference and the experience of each child are explored in the various stories through the topics "finger play," "eating," "smiling," "self-talk," "seeing and listening," and "don't touch me." An effort is also made throughout the stories to see sameness through difference so as not to overemphasize either sameness or difference.

In the endeavor of understanding experiences of mentally handicapped

children by means of stories, it is suggested that intersubjectivity is a particularly meaningful dimension of children's experience. That is, experience becomes meaningful by being lived in a shared context. Intersubjectivity also suggests the reciprocal nature of understanding. These themes of contextuality of meaning and mutuality of understanding make all the more significant and responsible our place as teachers and parents in the lifeworlds of children.

As to sameness and difference, it is proposed that what is needed is an understanding of the dialectic between individual difference and collective difference in order to understand mentally handicapped children as they are and to help them become themselves, to help them form their own identity.

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Asuka, my daughter, who has been, and still is, a source of inspiration and reflection.

And Mikio, my colleague, friend, and husband. For everything.

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Chapter 1

Formulating the Study Questions

Introduction -- Ted

I am walking with Ted, a fifteen-year-old boy with cerebral palsy. It is the third day of our summer camp in a country site far from home. Children and staff seem to be relaxed and enjoying this field trip through farm yards. It is a nice sunny day, although it might be too hot for Ted, who is, as usual, walking with his face bent down. He looks tired from walking, which I can see because he does not push me from behind, calling my name, nor does he talk to me as he did at the beginning of the walk. A fifteen minute walk seems to be a great effort for him. Ted and I are far behind the others, the last of whom I can hardly see. "Well, we can enjoy the walk ourselves, can't we?" I am not sure if I am talking to him or to myself. I try to cheer him up, talking about what I see in the fields, singing his favorite songs, or mentioning how well he has walked all the way, although he does not respond any more.

"Here they are, Ted. Now I can see everybody. Are they taking a rest? Probably. Or have they found something interesting? Let's go and see what they are doing, Ted. We are almost there." When we catch up with them, Ted sits down on his heels in the middle of the road. A very typical position. It means either he is too tired to be curious or there is nothing interesting enough to investigate. I sit down beside him and wipe the sweat off his face. He keeps silent. He drops his head. Although his eyes are open, he does not seem to "look" down. Perhaps he needs some

time of his own, in whichever way he may spend it. I leave him and walk toward his classroom teacher, who is looking down at something with several children. Now I see what interests them --- pumpkins on the farm. I join them, touching huge pumpkins, checking on how they grow from runners. A boy shouts excitedly that he has found a dried pumpkin flower. Others stand over to have a look at it. A girl is drawing in a runner, trying to find the end. Several times I look at Ted, who is still in the same position in the same spot that I left him, hardly raising his head. Meanwhile we find a huge pumpkin which lies at the edge of the road, some five metres away from Ted. "Come, Ted! Come and see this pumpkin! We've found a very big pumpkin, Ted," I call to him. At first he does not look up. I keep on calling, along with his classroom teacher, several times until he puts his head up and looks towards us. He looks at me. When our gazes meet, his face is filled with a smile, which makes one forget that he had been indifferent to his outer world until only a moment ago.

It always pleases me to see this sudden and dramatic change in his expression, from indifference to cheerful smile. And what amazes me more is that this change occurs only when his gaze meets someone else's. I smile back at him, wave to him and say, "Come Ted, let me show you something. I'm sure you would like it." Ted stands up and walks to me. He is no longer looking at me, bending his head down, but his face is filled with a smile. When he sits down beside me he says, "Ms. Maeda." I put my arm on his shoulder and look into his face. He does not see me but still keeps on smiling, repeating "Ms. Maeda." "Look, Ted. Look at what we found. What a big pumpkin! See? It's certainly bigger than your head, isn't it?" Ted, still smiling,

looks down on the ground, but not at the pumpkin. "I have never seen such a big pumpkin. Have you?" I continue. "It came here out of the field over there. I wonder how it came here." Though smiling, he still does not show any response to my words, fingering his shoe laces. "Wouldn't you like to touch it? This pumpkin is very hard, but it makes a nice sound when you tap it. It sounds very delicious!" After my talking for a while, Ted says, "pumpkin!" "Yes, Ted, this is a big, big pumpkin, isn't it?" "Big pumpkin!" he repeats. Even though he utters "pumpkin," he has not looked at the pumpkin yet. But his smile has not faded, either. I tap the pumpkin and see Ted, who, still bent down, says "Big pumpkin!" His classroom teacher who has been with us and also talked to him asks, "Why don't you tap it, Ted? Where is the pumpkin?" Ted reaches his hand forward very slowly, but his hand is not extended toward the pumpkin. His hand stays in the air, as if he has forgotten what he was reaching for. "Yeah, Ted. Where is your pumpkin?" we ask. He puts his hand down on the ground, taps there, and says, "Pumpkin! A big pumpkin!" Then slowly he returns his hand to his shoe, its most familiar position when he is sitting down on his heels. Although we still talk to him and although he is still smiling, he won't talk any more, he won't move any more.

Appropriateness of an Utterance

What could we say about Ted from this description? What kind of explanation do we seek? What do we feel is missing in this description? What about, for example, his utterance "a big pumpkin?" What could we learn from it? Some might say that we could not say anything about Ted without receiving more information about him; What are his scores of WISC or ITPA? How well (or poorly) can he

understand? How many words can he say? Does he have some neurological dysfunction such as epilepsy? Aside from such information, it is quite possible that some might see his utterance as a kind of echolalia¹; he did not even see the object when he heard the word. He failed to touch the object correctly when asked to do so. Therefore, it seems that he only repeated what his teacher said to him; without recognizing its meaning. What we as teachers need to do, therefore, is to improve his ability (or compensate for his inability) to match words to objects which are signified by them. Our instruction should be as simple and short as possible so that he will not be confused...

I remember myself having had two, very different feelings. On the one hand, I was somewhat disappointed at his reaction to my talk. Of course, I had not been expecting him to converse with me fluently. But his not having seen a pumpkin, having tapped the ground instead of the pumpkin, made me feel that I had been trying in vain to communicate what I saw and felt. At least at that moment, I also seemed to assume that a word would signify an object and therefore its use would not be appropriate if it did not signify an object. In other words, I somehow thought that Ted's use of the words "a big pumpkin!" was inappropriate.

On the other hand, I also felt that something would be left unquestioned if I understood his words that way. I could not conclude that his "a big pumpkin!" was incorrect and meaningless. The blooming smile on his face, the warm and intimate atmosphere among us, his way of saying it, all these things prevented me from thinking so. If his talk was only a reflection of what he heard and did not have

meaning, then how could we understand his smile and the intonation of his utterance? What about the time and space we shared? If words are not appropriately used as they are usually supposed to be, are they therefore insignificant or "meaningless"?

I could not, and still cannot, deny that Ted and I had a pleasant time then. Even though he did not show any sign of interest in the pumpkin which was the focus of our talk, his smile and his way of being there told (and tells) me that he had a good time. Probably it was only I, not Ted, who thought that the focus was on the pumpkin. What he was enjoying might not have been the content of our talk, but talking itself in that particular situation. And if he experienced the shared situation as pleasant and meaningful, then why do we not listen to his words as the utterance which is full of meaning for him? Why do we tend to evaluate speech in terms of the appropriateness of its contents, independently of the context, *his* context? Could there not be way(s) of understanding the speech of mentally handicapped children that might lead us closer to them, as they are, situated in the here and now?

It is not only the language that triggers those questions. Questions are waiting for us to be asked in everyday, seemingly trivial acts of mentally handicapped children.

Rhea

"Oh, Rhea!" I murmur, "not again!" It is time for physical education and all students of three junior high classes are in the school yard, forming two rather meandering lines. We are doing some exercises before we start a ball game. Just

then, I see Rhea, a eleven-year-old girl, run away from the line. This is the third time that she runs away and physical education started only fifteen minutes ago. I look rather desperately at her running toward the far end of the school yard.

Since Rhea is a student in my class, and since another teacher in my class is in charge of the whole students in physical education, it is my job to go after her and catch her. We are not very strict, of course, so we sometimes just leave her roam around for a while, hoping that she may come back to us. And even when I go after her, I try to let her go back to the group on her own rather than dragging her forcibly against her will. But that principle makes my job even harder since it is much easier to tug her back than to persuade her to join the group. Though full of energy, Rhea is eleven years old, and not big for her age.

As I walk toward Rhea, I notice her looking at me with a big smile on her face. She knows that usually somebody will come to get her. As a matter of fact, she probably ran away, expecting someone to chase her. However, that is not always the case. Sometimes, like the last time only a couple of minutes ago, she slipped away and jumped around playfully at the corner of the school yard, paying no attention to us. She had not noticed me until I spoke to her from only a few metres away. On those occasions she gets upset when we try to take her back to the group. Once in a while she sits on the ground with her serious or expressionless face bent down. That means she is determined not to go back to other students. She looks as though she were a tough, stubborn girl. It is hard to imagine, when she is in such a disposition, that she is an extremely well-behaved student in other classroom activities.

I approach Rhea slowly. I do not rush to her, because if I do, she will run further away from me. She is waiting for me to chase her. In fact, that is what her running away is all about this time; to play come-and-get-me. "Okay, Rhea. Let's go back," I say to her. "No," she replies, giggling. "Oh yes, you go back to the others with me." "No, I don't want to." Still giggling, she is ready to run away from me as soon as I make a move. "All right, then, if you say so. But we are waiting for you." I turn around and start walking slowly to the group. After several steps I feel Rhea sneaking behind me. When she is very close to me she hits me on my back, then runs away several metres. Now she is laughing at a high pitch.

"Ouch!" I cry and sit on the spot, pretending that her push was so painful that I cannot move. But she senses my pretense and watches me for a while, still giggling. But gradually she walks toward me, probably because she thinks it was too long for me to pretend, or because she abandoned the idea of my chasing her. "Are you all right?" she asks. As I keep silent, she comes even closer, bends a little forward, and touches my shoulder. "I got you!" I cry and put my hands around her. Caught by surprise, she laughs in a loud voice. She still shows some effort to slip away from me; however, that effort seems to be a mere gesture which adds more playfulness to the game.

After a while, I no longer need to hold her tightly. Yet still holding her hand a little stronger than usual just to make sure she would not run away, I say, "Okay, now, let's go back and do some exercises." She says "No, I don't want to," but the tone

of her voice, the way she says it, and the lack of resistance in her hand, make it obvious that she does not mean what she says. "Oh, yes, we go back right now." I assume the guise of a strict teacher with a firm tone of voice, yet trying to show her that I am only pretending. She laughs again. As I take her back to the group she does not shake her hand off mine, which she could do so easily because I am not holding her hand tightly any more. We walk back hand in hand, rather than my taking her back.

Rhea finally settles in the group, only to run away again after several minutes when I finally take my eyes off her. I see her run. This time I feel helpless. In a resigned way I watch the way she moves. That may be because I feel so helpless that I have come to the point of being detached from the whole situation. In any case I watch her go away from us.

Rhea seems to be running away happily this time also. I can see it by the way she moves. Although I have used the words "run away," she does not really run when she leaves us. Her movement is not fast enough to be called "running" to begin with. She does not go straight from where she was to where she wants to go, either, as people usually do when they run. She has several favorite spots to go to when she leaves the group --- at a corner of the school yard, beneath a big tree, a sand box, and the like. But she does not go straight to one of those places. This time she seems to be heading for the big tree under which there is a covering of a thick carpet of dead leaves. Yet she is not moving straight toward the tree. But I can see that she is heading there, because I know she likes the spot and because of the overall direction of her winding path.

So, I see Rhea drift away from us. As I wrote before, the speed is not fast enough to be called "running." Yet her movement gives me an impression of swiftness. "It's like a butterfly," I think to myself. Like a butterfly which flies from one flower to another. It does not go straight, it drifts slowly. Yet, because of its light movement, it gives us an impression of swiftness. Besides Rhea appears to be enjoying each of her movements. She looks happy when she drifts away, slowly yet lightly.

As I keep watching Rhea, I wonder if I should still go after her and catch her. Why does she run away from the physical education? In the classroom she is considered almost a "perfect student," not because she can do all the tasks given to her, but because she does not deviate from rules. She is a rather bright girl, of course, and that is why she is in our junior high class, having skipped the last school year of the elementary class. But what is more impressive in the classroom is her attitude. Among other students who leave their seats, look out through the window most of the time, or abruptly talk to me about something completely irrelevant to what we are doing, Rhea is an exception. She is a good girl -- almost too good, as a matter of fact. She sits in her spot quietly and does what she is asked to, but with few signs of enthusiasm. It is sometimes very difficult to detect a trace of emotions on her stiffened face. That worries me, because she looks as if she is too afraid of making mistakes to relax.

This contrast in her behavior between the classroom and the school yard

makes me wonder. Why does she run away only from the physical education? Why does she not do the same from other activities? What is the source of this difference? Above all, why does she look much happier when she runs away than she does in the classroom?

I stand up and start walking slowly toward Rhea. Realizing the happiness and liveliness that Rhea does not express in the classroom, I am nevertheless obliged to bring her back to the group. While many unanswered questions are still puzzling me, I try to focus my mind on how I am going to take her back this time.

Deviancy of Behavior

Running away is a daily happening that we special education teachers witness every so often. As a matter of fact, it is so ordinary that we do not even pay much attention to it. Or rather, since running away usually disturbs ongoing activities, it is mostly seen as a undesirable, deviant behavior. Inappropriate though it might be, Ted's utterance "a big pumpkin!" remains *his* problem, while Rhea's running away affects the entire class. Therefore, it is not only inappropriate but also problematic, disturbing, and deviant. The focus of our attention, therefore, tends to be on how to eliminate, or at least decrease, the behavior. In other words, running away is taken as a deviant behavior all together and is not pondered upon any further. And that was one of the main reasons why I ran after Rhea to bring her back to the group. Somewhere in me there was also an unreflected opinion that running away was wrong, that Rhea should join the group activity.

At the same time, however, there also was an unsettled wonder if I was doing the right thing by catching and bringing her back to the class, which made me uneasy about what I was trying to do. Running away from the physical education class is not the correct thing to do, of course. It is certainly not desirable for us teachers who are expected to teach the whole class of several children at a time. It is undesirable, disturbing to the teachers and therefore something to be corrected. That is our perception of students' running away from the class in general. Running away seems to have only negative, if any, meanings. It hardly has any meaning to be searched for. That is *our* perception in our sense making as grown-ups and teachers. But what is the significance of the experience of running away for children? For Rhea? Is it also undesirable, inappropriate, and wrong for Rhea? Is it also meaningless for her? When it is said that running away is a deviant behavior, the behavior is seen collectively, and those who do run away become anonymous. But it is Rhea who is running away. It is Rhea's running away that we are attending.

Shifting our focus from the behavior of running away to Rhea, we come to notice distinctive characteristics in her running away: She runs away from the class only during the physical education class; she has two ways of running away. On some occasions, she will leave the class slowly and heavily. She will not smile, she will not jump around, she will sit down and will not accept any interaction from others. She will look inaccessible. On other occasions, however, she floats away from the class like a butterfly. She may expect someone to come and get her and try to attract others' attention. She will smile, sometimes at others, sometimes for herself, as if she is enjoying every moment and every movement of herself. She will look happy.

Some might say that running away is a problem, that it is undesirable regardless of a child's special way of running away, and that there is no need to reflect on the meaning of the experience for Rhea. All that has to be done is to teach her not to run away. Yet, stopping to look at her closely -- her way of running away, her smile filled with pleasure, and so on -- I still wonder about unanswered questions I had when I was running after her. Is there nothing we can and need to know about Rhea in her running away? Should we assume that her running away is meaningless for her because it seems to be inappropriate or deviant for us? And if it does have any meaning for her, if we reflect on it, does her running away not tell us more about her? For example, is it not possible to see the fact that she escapes from the class only during physical education class, not negatively as a deviant behavior of running away, but more positively by saying that she *can* escape from the class, and probably can free herself, only during the physical education class? Is it pedagogically appropriate to see running away as deviant?

Particularity of Individuals and Particularity of Being Mentally Handicapped

Unique characteristics in utterances like Ted's or behavior like Rhea's tend to be dissolved into the problem of being handicapped. Explanations we seek then are focused on the deficiency of their language ability or inadequacy of behavior. When Ted says "a big pumpkin!" without even looking at a real pumpkin, that is because his cognitive skill of matching is impaired. When Rhea runs away from the physical education class, that is because she has a behavioral problem due to her developmental

delay. There is hardly any room left for considering the particularity of Ted being Ted, Rhea being Rhea, or of situations that Ted or Rhea are in. What matters only is their handicaps.

When children are not handicapped, on the other hand, they are often allowed to be unique and particular persons. Five-year-old Jeanny, for example, uses "big words" recently. She tells her mother, "Let's have an annual conversation, mommy," when she goes to bed with a picture book. She and her parent have a little talk before she goes to sleep every evening. It is a "conversation" for certain, but it is not "annual." But her mother knows that these are words Jeanny picked up from her father and from a TV program. Jeanny puts them together and uses them. Her parents do not mind and even enjoy it because they think this is one way children learn new expressions. Or little Tony. Every morning he gives his parents a hard time. He does not like his breakfast, whatever it may be. He complains about the little sleep he had the night before, about going to kindergarten, about his socks that are "too tight to put on by himself," about everything. Although annoying at times, his crankiness is taken as a part of Tony's being Tony by his parents. Tony is a night person, that is the unique and particular way he is, they think.

When a child is handicapped, he or she is seen as different. And when a child is handicapped, he or she is treated differently because he or she is different. Their perceived particularities do not lie in their being themselves or in the constellation of other attributes and behaviors, but only in their being mentally handicapped.

Fred

Fred is approaching a nearby park with his little daughter Tasha. It is a beautiful mid-summer day and Fred is hoping Tasha can play in a wading pool in the park. He is glad when he comes to the point from where he can see the wading pool to find some children playing in the pool. He can see several little children like Tasha, and their parents, playing here and there in the park. Actually he notices that there are more children than usual. He can spot quite a big group of children around the wading pool with some adults. Children from the kindergarten across the park probably, Fred thinks. He can hear their voices filled with excitement and joy as he nears. Good, he thinks, because little Tasha who has just started walking seems to be happier when more children are around. Cheerful shouts of those children tell him of their excitement and makes him walk a little faster in anticipation of the fun he and Tasha will have. "Let's hurry, Tasha. You are going to meet a lot of friends." Fred pushes Tasha's stroller slightly stronger.

As they come closer to the wading pool, however, Fred notices that something is unusual. Children seem to him to be acting somewhat strangely. Some children are playing together, chasing each other or splashing one another. But there are some other children who stay alone, just sitting in the wading pool doing nothing, or roaming around aimlessly. From a distance Fred realizes that there is something strange about the scene. He can hear the children's shouts, but they seem to be in a different language, or rather they seem not to be in any language. There is something out of the ordinary about these children's moving and shouting. This is strange, Fred thinks.

Fred's wonder comes to an end when he and Tasha arrive at the wading pool. Now he can see the children more clearly --- their faces and their movements. They are different. They are mentally handicapped children.

Fred takes Tasha off the stroller and gets her ready for the bathing. He also takes some toys out of the bag. But the excitement that he felt only a few moments ago has somehow diminished. Also, even while he is preparing for Tasha's bathing with his back facing toward the pool, his attention is directed to those children. When a boy runs in front of Fred, the awkwardness of his movements stands out to him. When another girl moves around behind him, he hears the uneven sound of her steps. Children's shouts no longer sound like those of joy and excitement to Fred. A shout has become just a noise. In everything he hears and sees, he senses something different. Holding Tasha in his arms, Fred starts walking away.

Sameness and Difference

Fred walked away because all he could see was difference. And now these children had lost their childness to him. They had become strange, unpredictable beings. Fred may even have wondered about the safety of his own child. Some might stay and let their children play together with handicapped children, while most would act the same way as Fred did. In any case, however, many of us share the shock and confusion which Fred experienced. In that sense, Fred is like us, Fred is in us.

When we come across something new, it is often the difference rather than

the sameness that strikes us. Therefore, it is in a sense natural that Fred was more sensitive to that which could indicate the being-different of those handicapped children. Once he realized that they were mentally handicapped children, he could not see them as just children, as he had done at first. Unfamiliarity and remoteness has overcome his first impression. Naive though it might have been, he saw them at the beginning simply as children, having fun in the wading pool. In other words, Fred saw them as ones like him, like "us." But then he started to see them as different from him, as "them." What he felt may not have been resentment, apprehension, or refusal but pity, sorrow, or distress. In any case, these children are no longer recognizable to him, they no longer belong to him. The pleasantness, excitement, and closeness that Fred saw and heard in these children had receded into the background of an overwhelming sense of their being different from him and from his daughter. Even their shouts, in which he heard their joy and which made him excited also, no longer carry any meaning. Shouts of joy had become meaningless noises.

Often in situations like this, we cannot but notice difference. And once we recognize difference, the attention tends to be focused on difference and we forget about the sameness against which the difference stands out to begin with.

The Research Question

What we see is profoundly affected by how we see it. And one of the main issues in terms of how we see mentally handicapped children is that of sameness and difference. That is, if it is presumed that handicapped children are different from

non-handicapped children, then the attention is focused on the difference. The research will be focused on this question: In what way are "they" different from "us?" What causes the difference? Is the difference we perceive solely in them, or is it partly due to the way we see them? Are they so different as we usually assume they are?

The main effort in this study is to overcome difference and to see sameness. It is, of course, true that Ted and Rhea are different from non-handicapped children. There are many things that Ted or Rhea cannot do and that non-handicapped children can. There also are some things that Ted or Rhea do but that non-handicapped children do not. Therefore, the intention here is not to ignore or deny the differences altogether between handicapped and non-handicapped children. Instead, what this study seeks are ways to see, through the difference, the sameness.

Chapter 2

Review of Perspectives on Special Education

As a search for alternative way(s) of understanding mentally handicapped children, ways which would lead us to the children as they are, this study also addresses the question as to why such alternative views should be necessary. At the present time, there are basically two ways of approaching a study of exceptional children. One, the dominant way, is the traditional approach, in which these children are examined in terms of their overt behavior, with the intention of correcting, as far as possible, any deviation from a set norm. The other is the social approach, in which phenomena in special education are seen as social problems. A brief review of these two approaches will be helpful for establishing the need for alternative ways of understanding exceptional children.

(1) The Traditional Perspective on Special Education

(a) The Term "Traditional Perspective"

Almost all research on exceptional children adopts what I have labeled the traditional approach. While the social perspective is well established as the labeling theory among researchers in special education and sociology, as will be shown in the section (2), the "traditional perspective" is the term I tentatively labeled. The traditional perspective is a perspective which most psychological studies, such as those in behavior modification and cognitive psychology, share. What researchers

are searching for may vary in these studies. For example, studies in behavior modification concentrate on human behaviors which are observable, whereas cognitive psychologists are more interested in cognitive processes which are not directly observable. But these two approaches share the same epistemological assumptions: That human reality exists "out there," independently of individuals; that it is possible to establish an objective form of knowledge which is value free. With these assumptions, studies are focused on establishing theories which would meet criteria of measurability, replicability, and predictability. Habermas categorizes forms of knowledge into the empirical-analytic, the historic-hermeneutic, and the critical social sciences and writes on the empirical-analytic sciences as follows:

In the empirical-analytic sciences the frame of reference that prejudices the meaning of possible statements establishes rules both for the construction of theories and for their critical testing. Theories comprise hypothetico-deductive connections of propositions, which permit the deduction of lawlike hypotheses with empirical content. The latter can be interpreted as statements about the covariance of observable events; given a set of initial conditions, they make predictive knowledge. However, the meaning of such prediction, that is their technical exploitability, is established only by the rules according to which we apply theories to reality. (Habermas, 1971, p.306)

Therefore, what I call "the traditional perspective" may be classified as an empirical-analytic approach which, according to Habermas, incorporates technical cognitive interests.

But Habermas' contrast between empirical-analytic and critical social sciences cannot be applied to the distinction between the traditional and social

perspectives in this review as the term the "social" perspective might suggest, since, as will be seen later, the social perspective also shares the same epistemological assumptions with the traditional perspective. The term "traditional" perspective, therefore, is chosen both to avoid the contrast with technical and critical perspectives in Habermas' sense, and to distinguish the traditional perspective from that of humanistic psychology.

(b) Questions Concerning the Traditional Perspective

There are, however, some assumptions under traditional approaches which may need to be questioned. First, in these studies, there is focus on aspects and functions such as attention (selective attention, attention span, etc.) (Hagen, 1967; Phelham, 1981; Phelham & Ross, 1977; Samuels & Miller, 1985), memory processing (short and long term memory, retrieval function, etc.) (Healy & Nairne, 1985; Torgesen & Kail, 1978), motivation (Buck, 1985; Mogenson & Phillips, 1976; Olds & Fobes, 1981), communication skills (Bloom, Russel & Wassenberg, 1987; Landry & Loveland, 1989; Roberts, 1989), and so forth. A study may then select one of these aspects and try to show how some children are different, or deficient, in relation to the performance of children in a control group, that is, of non-handicapped children.

It may also be assumed in the research that, when selective attention is the focus of a study, children taking part in the experiment are, for example, fully "motivated" to the task. The manuals of instruction accompanying such tests usually try to ensure that there is uniformity in procedures and conditions under which the test is given. Or similarly, when memory processing is at issue, it may not be

questioned whether children are paying attention to the task or not, or whether they are motivated or not. A study always deals with a particular aspect, assuming that all other aspects are "controlled." As a result, suggestions for education or, as researchers themselves often call it, "training" or "treatment," based on results of testing, deal only with diagnosed symptoms and observed behavior.

But selective attention, memory processing and the like are only aspects of a child, and the whole is not simply the sum of parts. In addition, and perhaps more importantly, a child is not isolated from the outer world but constantly interacting with it, influencing it and being influenced by it. Each aspect is closely interrelated with each other, and the measured or observed ability is not always consistent or apparent. A three-year-old girl could memorize a telephone number and address immediately if these belong to her best friend, while it might be hard for her to memorize a series of seven numbers if she is asked to do so by an experimenter in a laboratory². For her, her friend's phone number is not just a row of numbers but has a definite meaning. And this meaning becomes meaningful, as Mishler (1979) says, only in a particular context to which she herself is directed. It would not be incorrect to claim that there is a system of memory processing through which all information is processed and stored. But that system works only when a piece of information pertains to the system. And it is not memory processing itself or any other individual aspects but a person interacting with the world who chooses which information needs to be attained.

The second point to be raised is closely related to the first. Research in the

traditional frame is most often conducted under conditions which are far different from, and removed from, the actual situations in which children typically live (Hurlbut, Iwata & Green, 1982; Remington & Clarke, 1983). There are scores of research studies based on experiments in laboratories and, although there are some studies which are conducted in more natural settings such as classrooms or homes, they usually isolate under controlled conditions a limited number of variables for observation and analysis. This is in order to produce findings which can be taken as replicable, predictable, and valid. Lately arguments have been made to emphasize the importance of research in natural settings, especially in the realms of communication skills and interpersonal relationships. In the former case, this is mainly because, although children were trained to acquire communication skills in the experimental or training settings, they usually do not use those skills spontaneously in natural settings; this is a problem of generalization (Morris & McReynolds, 1986; Snyder & McLean, 1976; Warren & Rogers-Warren, 1980). Considering this problem, some studies have been directed at improving children's communication skills in more natural environments in addition to the training in the laboratory (Halle, 1982; Sobsey & Bieniek, 1983; Welch & Pear, 1980). Yet, as Carr and Kologinsky (1983) show, many of these efforts have been carried on within the framework of behavioral modification, as if we could teach children how to be spontaneous by means of behavioristic training.

In the case of interpersonal relationships, the nature of the phenomenon to be studied requires research in natural settings, since the characteristics of interpersonal relationships can only be seen in actual interpersonal activities.

Therefore, although there are studies on children's relationships with other children or mothers which are observed in experimental settings, many studies have been done at home, in classrooms or play grounds. Yet, even in these cases, items to be observed are set up in advance, and utterances and/or behavior of the subjects are categorized according to a ready-made classification. For example, categories that Nisbet, Zanella and Miller (1984) used in their study on conversations among handicapped students and a non-handicapped peer include: "Mean length of utterance in morphemes and words, distribution of utterances by word and morpheme length, distribution of number of utterances per speaking turn, type-token ratio for words in the first 50 utterances, numbers of questions asked, numbers of topics initiated, and the amount of time spent talking." Siegel, Conningham and Van der Spuy (1985) apply behavioral categories such as "interaction," "question," "solitary play," "dominance," "commands" and "compliance" to analyse interactions of language-delayed and normal boys. In Befera and Barkley's (1985) study, interactions of hyperactive and normal children with their mothers are analysed in terms of "mother interacts," "mother questions," "child responds," "mother shows no response," "mother praises," "directs," "child interacts," and so on. Such categories have been standardised and adapted by many other researchers, and each category has detailed criteria by which every behavior can be correctly classified. We could probably see from the data gathered according to these categories, as researchers in fact indicate, that in conversation handicapped children tend to spend more time listening than asking questions or initiating the talk (Nisbet, Zanella & Miller, 1984); that normal children initiate interaction more frequently than handicapped children (Siegel, Conningham & Van der Spuy, 1985); and that

hyperactive children and their mothers tend to act more negatively to each other than normal children and their mothers (Befera & Barkley, 1985). But could we know what is really going on in a conversation only by the length or numbers of utterances? Is frequency of interaction the most important thing that we need to know about children's play? And could we understand, by knowing the frequency of ignoring or negative responses, what a mother and her child are actually experiencing during their interaction?

In their study of free-play interaction of mothers and their physically handicapped, premature and healthy infants, Wasserman and Allen (1985) say:

In the present investigation mothers of such handicapped young children [with "facial or orthopedic deformities of varying severity" (p.382)] were likely to show some evidence of detachment, reflected by increasing ignoring during what was supposed to be free play session.

Considering that mothers were specifically asked to play with their infants and toddlers and know they were being observed and videotaped, sustained maternal non-attention seems a surprising behavior. (p. 385, emphasis added.)

Apart from the implication of this statement that researchers themselves admit that an experimental situation is different from natural settings, and that they expect mothers to play "better" because they know they are observed, this statement evokes profound questions concerning experimental research. For example, what are we really trying to know? What could "ignoring" mean? Is there only one kind of ignoring? It seems, according to this statement, that when a mother ignores her child it is just a simple act of refusal: She does so because she does not want to play with the child. But is that really the case? Is there not a possibility that her apparent ignoring is the expression of her embarrassment, helplessness or sorrow?

Or is there not a possibility that she may seemingly ignore her child precisely because she knows that she is being observed?

It might be too harsh to blame the researchers for not being sympathetic and thoughtful. As they indicate, the study could provide a base for further support for mothers of handicapped children. Yet, simplification of actual human activities by categorization can produce misleading interpretations.

This leads to a third point of questioning: The reduction (or "ignoring") of individual uniqueness. Since the criteria of acceptability for these studies are their validity and predictability, they require large numbers of subjects. Those subjects are categorized all together into groups such as normal preschoolers, hyperkinetic boys, or multiply dependent children and the like, and each child in a group becomes anonymous. There is no room for considering unique individuals in their unique situations.

The fourth point is that one of the main foci of research is on identification of dysfunction, which is directly related to the diagnosis and classification of various types of handicapped children. As can be seen already, much research on exceptional children is conducted in order to make clear the differences between handicapped and non-handicapped children, and diagnosis is done on the basis of the findings of these studies. As research has become more detailed and specified, the number of classifications has been increasing. Even "mentally handicapped" is not accurate enough and is divided into sub-categories such as mildly, moderately, profoundly and

so on. Furthermore, in addition to labels referring to behavioral manifestations such as hyperkinetic behavior, perceptual disorders, conceptual disorders, social dyspraxis, catastrophic behavior, learning disorders and so forth, there are some labels which are constructed on biological and neurological grounds, namely, brain injury, cerebral palsy, organic behavior disorders, psychoneurological disorders and so on. Experimentally oriented researchers too are inclined to raise questions when faced with these enormous numbers of categories. For example, Kirk (1975) asks:

Actually, what does it mean to say that one of these children is brain injured? labels we give children are satisfying to us but of little help to the child himself. We seem to be satisfied if we can give a technical name to a condition. We think we know the answer if we can give the child a name or a label --- brain injured, schizophrenic, autistic, mentally retarded, aphasic, etc. (p. 8)³

Furthermore, what seems to be more problematic is that, from a diagnostic point of view, all of these labels emphasize the difference and the significance of difference tends to be that of deviation. So from the traditional perspective, understanding of these children is understanding of what is lacking and what is different. Research intends to find out what is different and what is lacking, upon which further detailed labels are then constructed.

Some might say that clarification of labels is needed in order to give more suitable and effective treatment to children. But even though it be the case that certain treatments may be effective in particular ways, there still remains a question about the process of diagnosis. There are studies which point out that

around 40% of elementary school children suffer from hyperactivity and one-third suffer inattention (Schulz, 1974; Werry & Quay, 1971). Ysseldyke, Algozzine and Epps (1983) indicate that 88% of low-achieving students enrolled in regular classes could be identified as learning disabled and, more importantly, that 4% of learning disabled students did not meet any of the criteria for classification as learning disabled⁴. On the basis of their study they discuss how inadequately the classification of learning disabled children has been defined. As we will see next, this arbitrariness of diagnoses is one of the main issues that the social approach addresses critically (see also Ysseldyke, 1986)⁵.

(2) The Social Perspective on Special Education

(a) Overview

The social perspective on special education, which sees exceptionality as a social problem, derives from the sociology of deviance. Sociologists who apply this perspective to deviance do not agree with assumptions that the problems of deviance are those of individuals seen as deviant, and that the nature of deviance is consistent through time and place. Their basic view is that deviance is a norm which is imposed on certain people by other members of the group to which those people belong. Becker (1963) says that "deviance is *not* a quality of the act the person commits, but rather a consequence of the application by others of rules and sanctions to an 'offender.' The deviant is one to whom that label has successfully been applied; deviant behavior is behavior that people so label" (p. 9). Similarly, Erickson (1964) says that deviance is "not a property *inherent in* certain forms of behavior;

it is a property *conferred upon* these forms by the audiences which directly or indirectly witness them" (p. 11). Therefore, sociological research within this perspective, which is called "societal reaction" or "labeling theory" perspective, emphasises the importance of study on "the social audience" (Erickson, 1964) and/or "process by which persons come to be defined as deviant by others" (Kitsuse, 1964), rather than forms of deviant behavior as such. Along with this perspective, research has been conducted to examine, for example, the tolerance of society for deviance, mechanisms of the labeling process, changes in the notion of deviance, people's perception of the deviant, and so forth. The realms of studies for deviance research include mental illness, racial discrimination, homosexuality, drug addiction and delinquency (Becker, 1963; Bursik & Webb, 1982; Kitsuse, 1964). The social perspective of researching mentally handicapped people is basically an application of this labeling theory perspective (Bartel & Guskin, 1980).

In one of the most intensive studies on mental retardation within this orientation, Mercer (1973) asserts the need for a social system perspective as opposed to the more traditional clinical or medical perspective. From a social system perspective, according to Mercer, "mental retardate is an achieved social status and mental retardation is the role associated with that status," and a mental retardate is one who "occupies the status of mental retardate and plays the role of the mental retardate in one or more of the social systems in which he participates" (p.27). Therefore the term "labeled retardate" is used to imply that mental retardation is a product of the social system:

If a person does not occupy the status of mental retardate, is not playing the

role of mental retardate in any of the significant others in his social world, he is not mentally retarded, irrespective of the level of his IQ, the adequacy of his adaptive behavior, or the extent of his organic impairment. (pp. 28,29)

From this perspective, Mercer's study of mentally retarded people in a city near Los Angeles, a study designed to "comprehend the nature and extent of mental retardation in an American community" (p. 38), shows how unstable IQ scores are as a criterion of diagnosis, that classification of mental retardation is closely related to ethnic prejudice. The study also argues that who is defined as mentally retarded depends on who is doing the defining and upon the procedures and norms used.

Carrier's (1983) critical review of learning disability theory also represents a social perspective. Carrier, who refers to Bourdieu's notion of symbolic violence and Bernstein's descriptions of restricted and elaborated codes, claims that learning disability theory is derived from a misconception of social factors concerning the identification of learning disability. He points out:

The way learning disability was conceived and research was carried on led educators and the government to the fallacy of affirming the consequent: assuming that because A (neuropsychology) causes B (the signs of learning disability), all causes of B are the consequence of A. The alternative sociological causes of B are ignored because unauthorized. This helped the legitimacy of American education and through it the American social hierarchy. (p. 952)

In addition to these studies conducted within a sociological framework, there are also studies by researchers with psychological backgrounds from the social perspective, for which Sarason and Doris (1979) provide a good example. Their basic assumption concerning mental retardation is not very different from that of

sociologists within the labeling theory perspective; that mental retardation is quintessentially a social rather than an individual concept (p. 39). But their main concerns are slightly but fundamentally different from those of sociologists. That is, while the latter tend to focus on social systems and/or the social mechanism of the labeling process, Sarason and Doris are more concerned with the actual process of diagnosing and segregating the mentally handicapped. They present a number of cases in which they were actually involved when they urge that diagnosis is "more than description, test score, and labels," that it is "a socially sanctioned and valued process" (p. 57). Citing Joseph Heller's novel *Something Happened*, which is about the father of a severely mentally retarded boy called Derek, they say:

What about Derek? What kind of *person* is he? We are told next to nothing. It is as if no one inside or outside the family ever focused on Derek as a human being deserving special thought and attention. From the moment Derek's condition is "diagnosed," the world seemed to give up on him. (p.61)

Of course, as their primary concern is with the social aspect, Sarason and Doris do not discuss in depth questions about mentally handicapped individuals. Yet, this concern for individual cases seems to lead them to emphasise a "transactional model" as a research perspective, instead of focusing only on social structures.

On the whole, it can be said that the social approach to special education has raised critical issues regarding mental retardation. It has called into question the very notion of mental retardation as deviance, the notion which traditional approaches have taken for granted -- assuming there exist various causes of mental retardation independent of social, cultural and historical factors, and that what is

needed is to identify each of these causes in order to make diagnosis more precise and objective. As a matter of fact, one has tended to assume, as Sarason and Doris say, that "if an infant or young child is labeled as mentally retarded, he has 'it'." Therefore, the "it" becomes the focus of interest and all other factors fade into background (pp.25,26). Of course, researchers working within a social perspective generally do not deny the existence of deviance (e.g. mentally handicapped people) as a whole, except for some cases such as learning disability (Adelman,1989; Coles, 1989) and the like. As Sarason and Doris emphasize, the issue is not "to label or not to label." It is "the failure to recognize the arbitrary feature of labels and to assume uncritically that labels are more revealing of the labeled than of the labeler that leads to problems" (p. 12). In this sense a social approach urges us to reflect on fundamental questions which might otherwise be left unexplored. Why do we diagnose particular people as mentally handicapped? Why do we need "special" education for them? Who is it for? Although there are some points to be reconsidered as we will see next, this "sensitizing function" (Scheff, 1974, p.445) of the social approach should not be overlooked⁶.

(b) Questions Concerning the Social Perspective

Bearing this sensitizing function in mind, however, some matters still need to be addressed. The first point is about research paradigms. Although social researchers claim that their basic assumptions are different from those of traditional researchers, this does not mean that their research paradigms are different. On the assumption that the label of deviance is imposed by other members of society, researchers then posit some propositions which are derived from the

assumption. For instance, in studies of mental illness within the labeling theory perspective, one argues that hospitalized patients tend to espouse unfavorable attitudes toward mental illness, that patients' attitudes toward mental illness become more unfavorable during the course of hospitalization, that patients are less favorable in attitude toward mental illness than nonpatients, and so forth (Weinstein, 1983). After positing these propositions, tests and/or interviews are conducted, using standardised scales, in order to examine the accuracy of the propositions. And with the results of tests and interviews, the discussions go back to the question of the appropriateness of the assumptions as well as the propositions. In other words, research should provide objective data to evaluate the consistency between propositions and the assumptions and the accuracy of the assumptions. The main concern, however, seems to be the validity (or invalidity) of the hypothesized theory and its assumptions and propositions, instead of the people who are tested/interviewed. Labeled people are reduced to anonymous subjects for the sake of objectivity and the validity of the studies in question. As far as the implicit research paradigm is concerned, therefore, the social perspective shares with the traditional perspective the same basic epistemology.

The second point to be addressed is that the main concern of the social perspective is directed to society. As has been seen, research is focused on aspects such as tolerance of society to deviance, people's perception of the deviant, and so forth, in order to clarify the mechanism of labeling. Although it might be too harsh to say that, in this perspective, a society is seen as a system existing independently of the actual lives of individual members, it is undeniable that little attention has

been paid to those who are labeled (Weinstein, 1983). Indeed it could be said that although the perspective is broadened from the level of the individual to that of society, it still assumes the viability of a labeling mechanism whereby "deviants" can be believed to exist in society and that it is possible to explain that mechanism without taking into consideration those who are labeled. Borrowing Kuhn's notion of paradigm (1962), it could be said that there is no paradigm shift between traditional and social perspectives in terms of methodology.

This leads to the third point to be reconsidered concerning the social perspective: The issue of particularity. The social perspective tends to overlook (1) the particularity of the mentally handicapped among other deviant groups, and (2) the particularity of individuals within the spectrum of mental handicap itself. Let us examine the issue of particularity of mental handicap first.

Studies from a social perspective are usually done in one of the basic "categories" or realms of the discipline, such as mental illness, mental retardation, delinquency and so forth. But in each case what is usually involved is the application of labeling theory. It could even be said that, in a sense, studies in each realm are intended to examine the consistency and accuracy of the labeling theory. As a consequence, the language used in almost all the studies is more or less the same across realms, even though findings of studies may be expressed with different technical terms corresponding to a particular realm. In other words, there is a tendency from a social perspective to see all the labeled people collectively. Yet it is not hard to imagine that the modes of suffering from being labeled are different in

different groups -- mental illness, racial minority, physical handicap and mental retardation. But, from a social perspective, these differences tend to be dissolved under the collective category of the labeled.

This tendency of dissolving differences becomes more evident with regard to the particularity of individuals within a group of the labeled, for instance, within the category of "mental retardation." Mercer says, as has been seen, that mental retardation is a *role* imposed by a society, and people so labeled *play* the role. Seen from this view, however, the experiences of mentally retarded individuals are reduced to role playing as if their lives were nothing else but (social) "acts." As Edgerton (1984) says, "research which examines the effect of labeling in the totality of a person's life over a substantial period of time is altogether lacking."

In summary, the following points can be made: (1) By emphasizing the connection between the labeled and the process of labeling, the social perspective has brought to light a basic inadequacy in the traditional perspective. (2) But at the same time, the social perspective also tends to fail to enable us to see "being different" as it is. When we think of individual mentally handicapped persons, it seems undeniable that being mentally handicapped is a part of one's self, even though it might be a role imposed by a society to play. If we say that there is no difference between mentally handicapped persons and non-handicapped persons and that only the label of mental retardation creates this apparent difference, then it would become difficult for us to see the suffering of mentally retarded people, a part of whose being consists of being mentally retarded. Sarason (1983), who sees the issue of mental

retardation as a moral issue, raises the question of how we want to live with each other:

If we respond to the handicapped as if basically different, we rob them *and us* of the experience of similarity and commonality. We can no longer allow schools to segregate children and educational personnel, based on conceptions that are invalid and morally flawed. (p. 258, emphasis added.)

This remark is a warning to the traditional view of mental retardation which tends to see the handicapped as different. And yet, we also need to resist a denial of difference.

(3) Summary

(a) Need for Alternative Approach

As I have argued, traditional and social perspectives on mentally handicapped children need to be reconsidered. We might say that the most important issue is that both traditional and social approaches fall short of understanding, in a deep sense, the lifeworld of mentally handicapped children. In the traditional formulation, they are seen as objects to be diagnosed and corrected so as to conform to behavioral norms; and, in the social formulation, they are seen as groups of children who are assigned the label of mental retardation. It seems as if researchers with a traditional perspective see mentally handicapped children through a microscope, while researchers with a social perspective see them through a wide angle lens. By doing so, on the one hand, a particular characteristic (being different) has become the only criterion of identification and, on the other hand, particularity, a part of which is being mentally handicapped, fades into commonality. The issue here appears to be the notion of being different or our way of dealing with the notion of being different.

However, to admit difference and to raise the question of how to address that difference are not the same thing. Generally speaking, to perceive differences does not imply the value judgement. We perceive yellow and white as different, but we do not necessarily conclude that white is better than yellow. But when difference is perceived among human beings, the difference tends to be incorporated with value judgement. Even color, whose difference is usually value free except for one's preference, comes to be a potential source of value judgement when as concerns the skin. Difference between handicapped and non-handicapped people seems to be one of those differences which social values could be easily placed on. Therefore, it is the question of how to address differences, rather than to admit them, that requires our reflection. Instead of viewing being different in an all-or-nothing way, we need to try to see it as it is. We cannot say that being different is all that matters, because it is only a part of one's self, although it might be a significant part. We cannot say, either, that there is no difference, because it is hard to imagine that being mentally handicapped has nothing to do with one's being oneself. As reflected in the anecdote of Ted -- where the meaning of his utterance for himself is at stake-- it is not sufficient to explain his "inappropriate" use of language as being due to insufficient language ability which might, in turn, be attributed to his having cerebral palsy. Neither is it appropriate to see him as if his being mentally handicapped had nothing to do with his being. He is not a handicap itself, neither is he a (non-handicapped) boy. He is a boy who is mentally handicapped as a part of his being. Without either overemphasizing or eliminating being mentally handicapped, we have to look for a perspective which enables us to see being mentally handicapped as a condition which

forms a part of one's self, one's being oneself.

The issue of being different, or of how to cope with being different, is not uniquely an issue for special education. It could be said that the notion of being different has been one of the central issues for all human beings who live in societies with others. For the issue of difference faces us everywhere in the difference between an ethnic minority and majority, between women and men, the poor and the rich, the physically handicapped and the able-bodied, the blind and the sighted, and the like. Besides, we are all different from each other in some way or another. In this sense, I deeply agree with Sarason (1982) and Blatt (1981) when they say that the issue is basically the question of how we want to live with each other. But as being mentally handicapped is different from being non-handicapped, it is also different from being deaf, or from any other modes of being handicapped.

(b) Possibility

Speaking as if he were a blind person, Blum once said, "I am not 'special,' I am not 'normal,' I am blind."⁷ In putting it this way, Blum expresses the difference of being blind and, at the same time, the particularity of that difference. It is this self-awareness which enables one who is suffering from being different to understand oneself as "a pariah" who "accepts the fate of exclusion not as a social disadvantage but as an essential feature of the kind of person he is and what his life means in all of its essence; it is what gives meaning to his life" (Blum, 1982, p. 79). From this perspective, the helping professions would emphasize the experience of the sufferers, or assist the sufferers in educating themselves to help

themselves, thereby respecting the sufferers' point of view. In other words, those who surround sufferers could and should help them tell their own stories. What Blum puts forward here is certainly a stronger way of addressing being different than either (1) "the culture of medicine" (which assumes what we call the traditional perspective), where the pain of the suffering might be relieved by medicine or technical tools, but where the meaning of suffering is left unquestioned," or (2) "social work" (which assumes what we call the social perspective), where the "sense of unity of opportunity masks from the thoughtful subject the irreducible experience of his own particular disability which in his heart of hearts he knows contributes to his being the particular person he is" (Blum, 1982, p.77). Although Blum's argument might sound a bit strong (for instance the term "pariah" might give us the impression that he is overemphasizing the matter of being different), nevertheless what he suggests seems to point to a need for us to hear the stories of those who suffer, to hear their voices, the voices of suffering. This is a compelling call for a new orientation to research in special education.

There are, in fact, some studies which do try to listen to the stories of mentally handicapped people. An anthropologist Edgerton (1967) conducted research on ex-patients of a state institution to "examine some of the ways in which mentally retarded persons manage their lives and perceive themselves when left to their own devices in a large city" (p. 9). Through the field research consisting of "friendly and informal interviewing," participant-observation, and interviews with friends, relatives, neighbors and employers, he shows us their "life experiences," especially how "they perceive and manage their relative incompetence." In a study

on persons labeled retarded in a group-home, Heshusius (1978) observed and interviewed eight adults and presents us how they live and think about their lives. In another study, Heshusius (1984) interviewed a learning disabled person and tells us what being learning disabled means to him. Bogdan (1986) calls for the need of a "sociology of special education" which "looks critically at the underlying logic of special education and practices" instead of a "special education sociology" (p. 334). He approaches research with the use of first person histories, materials "through which clients, in their own words, reveal their view of personal experiences, organizations, and other aspects of the world in which they live" (Bogdan, p. 352). Bogdan and Taylor also interviewed two institutionalized mentally handicapped persons, and let them speak about how they live, how they see their experiences, and how they feel about being called mentally retarded (Bogdan & Taylor, 1986, 1982). Adding to these studies by researchers, there is a text written by women with disabilities (Compling, 1981). Although the voices we hear in this book are mostly those of physically disabled women, they speak about their past, their future, their lives. In all these studies, what is most telling is how these handicapped people have come to terms with being different, or rather, with being treated as different. And we can see in their stories how badly needed is an alternative perspective which can see their being different as neither their only specific individual identity nor as a mere social label.

There is need to be deeply thoughtful, however, when the sufferer is severely mentally handicapped. How might severely mentally handicapped children tell their stories? How could we, as teachers and researchers, know what might be required to

help them tell their stories? Many of these children have profound limitations in terms of language use. Therefore, they do not tell their own stories in ways that we usually do and usually expect others to do. It is hardly possible to interview severely mentally handicapped persons to explore how they perceive the world, how they experience everyday activities, and so forth. It is often impossible, or at least extremely difficult, for these children to express themselves with language at all, and this inability makes it especially difficult to get close to their lived world.

Is the problem insurmountable? How could it be possible to get closer to others without talking with them? Van den Berg presents a suggestion on this matter when he says:

If we want to gain insight into another person, his condition, nature, habits or disturbances, we should not inquire first about his introspectively accessible, subjective account of his observation. ... We get an impression of a person's character, of his subjectivity, of his nature and his condition when we ask him to describe the objects which he calls his own; in other words, when we inquire about his world. Not the world as it appears to be "on second thought," but the world as he sees it in his direct, day-to-day observation. (van den Berg, 1972, pp.38,39.)

Although it might be overwhelmingly difficult to ask severely mentally handicapped children to tell their own stories, it would not be impossible to inquire about their worlds. Of course, again, they would not say how they see and interact with their outer worlds if they were asked to express such matters linguistically. But there could be ways of inquiring into their worlds without asking them to express themselves directly. For this we need to attend closely to how they see and interact with others and the things in their worlds. The world here is not the world which

exists independently of a person. It is the world in which one lives, and which is closely related to one's own being. It is the world as "our home, realization of subjectivity" (van den Berg, 1972). It is the world, the life world, through which we show ourselves as we are. This is what van den Berg means when he says, "If we are describing a subject, we must elaborate *on the scene in which the subject reveals itself*" (van den Berg, p.40, emphasis added).

Chapter 3

Methodology

The main part of the research for this present study is based on descriptions and interpretations, or "stories," of mentally handicapped children whom I have met and with whom I have interacted. I taught at a private school for mildly to moderately mentally retarded children for five years; visited a special class for autistic children for six months as a volunteer; and visited a daycare centre which provides mainstreaming child care for children with various disabilities for seven months. All children who appear in the stories, including Ted and Rhea, are individuals whom I met and eventually came to know closely in those places.

In order to explore the lifeworlds of mentally handicapped children, it seems natural to interact with them in actual and concrete situations, that is, to participate with them in their lifeworlds. Usually manifestations of the children's intentions towards others and the world are very subtle, and often what they actually say or do is not what they really intend to do. A boy might retract a gaze when he recognizes a person. A girl might push her friend down instead of touching her softly when she wants to play with her. When a child runs away from you, that might be precisely because he or she wants you to chase him or her. When you carry a boy and let him sit on your lap, and when he does not do anything else but sit still, you could still catch a glimpse of how he experiences the situation by feeling the relaxation (or tension) of his body, even though he may not hug you (or may not escape from you).

All these subtle but significant signs would become clearer when one actually interacts with children by becoming a part of their lifeworlds.

The incidents in each story are seemingly trivial, everyday routine events, such as eating, seeing, smiling, sleeping, and so forth. In the stories, efforts are aimed at unfolding everyday experiences of mentally handicapped children as they are lived by them. Through descriptions and interpretations of the children's actions, my main purpose is to try to understand them as they are. But, as an example of pedagogical research, this study will also be concerned with the process of understanding, what I, as a teacher and researcher, understand about and with these children and how I have come to understand them as such. For that purpose the stories will also include descriptions about myself; what I did to, for, and with them, how I felt, as well as what the children did.

(1) Acknowledging the Active Involvement of a Researcher

Researchers who are deeply concerned with current trends in special education research, particularly with its approach to mentally handicapped children, sometimes employ the saying, "Beauty is in the eye of the beholder" (Blatt, 1987; Sarason, 1981; Taylor & Bogdan, 1977). Indeed, *what* we see is deeply influenced by *how* we see it. This is even experienced in our everyday lives. A dog may be seen as an adorable creature to pet for a child but also as a terrifying animal from which to run away. A piece of contemporary music can be experienced either as fascinating

art or as an unappreciable flow of sounds. A rock on a hiking trail may fascinate a girl for its complexity of colors and patterns while for other hikers it is just a rock. And of course, to a geologist the rock speaks about the earth's history. Or, a teacher may consider a hyperactive boy as a destructive, problem student while another teacher may regard him as just full of energy. So we know that what we see is influenced by the way we see it, at least in our everyday lives. The same thing can be said about the relationship between what we know and how we know it, and between what we understand and how we understand it. As a matter of fact, how to recognize and deal with this relationship between form and content seems to be one of the critical differences between the following research perspectives.

Terms employed by researchers to contrast these two perspectives may vary, such as quantitative versus qualitative paradigms (Bogdan, 1986; Stainback & Stainback, 1984), experimental versus ethnographic research (LeCompt & Goetz, 1982), empiricist versus hermeneutic methods (Packer, 1984), realist versus idealist views (Smith, 1983), or Newtonian mechanistic versus holistic paradigms (Heshusius, 1989). The ways in which the contrasts are presented also vary in these studies. Overall, however, it is possible to say that from the behavioral scientific perspective, the methodological concern is how to eliminate the influences of how we see things over what we see, whereas from the human science perspective, the basic starting point is to acknowledge the reciprocal relationships between what we see (or know) and how we see (or know) it. Interestingly enough, those researchers who call into question the compatibility of these two perspectives and urge us to reflect carefully on their differences consider the issue of the relation of

the knower to the known as one of the fundamental differences (Smith, 1983; Smith & Heshusius, 1986).

Research, as a process of inquiry, consists of three parts: a question (an interest), an answer to the question, and a procedure to pursue the answer. Presumably research starts when one has a question to which one desires to know the answer. One then applies and follows a procedure which will hopefully lead one to an answer to the question. The procedure, a method, serves as a guiding line for giving an answer to the question. But sometimes a method frames the kind of question and answer one seeks. For example, a researcher might collect data on the frequency and length of utterances in order to know the nature of children's communication skills, because a method requires the data to be mathematically measurable. Or another researcher might conduct interviews according to pre-determined questionnaires, because the method he or she has chosen requires the results to be standardized. In other words, the method chosen influences the way researchers see and deal with research objects. Here a form of research--how a research procedure should be and what kind of knowledge is accepted as an answer -- restricts the kinds of question a researcher would raise. A methodology not only formulates the inquiry procedure of a research project. It also affects in a fundamental manner, the way we are as researchers--what we see, how we see it and from what vantage point we view the phenomena. Therefore, although a methodology tends to be seen as a series of techniques to be followed as if it has nothing to do with the point of view of a researcher, it deeply affects the stance the researcher takes in the process of researching.

The Dutch ethologist Nico Tinbergen provides an example of how a researcher is involved in the process of observation:

As to how the observer tries to reach his aim: in order to recognise this suspected orderliness in the apparent chaos, he has to try to give equal attention to "all" he sees -- to notice (and record) ideally, "everything that is happening". In practice, this is of course impossible. *Fortunately, it is not desirable either.* Modern philosophers of science recognise that no observer takes in outside happenings randomly and without bias. If observing is to lead to scientific understanding, *it has (like that of the artist) to be selective and therefore restricted.* (Tinbergen, 1983, p.24, emphases added.)

We can see, in this description, the active involvement of an observer. For Tinbergen, an observation is not seeing and recording everything; an observer is not a neutral spectator assuming an indifferent attitude. His favorite expression is "watch and wonder" (Tinbergen, 1974). He knows that even an observer cannot see things (persons) without wondering. And more importantly, he also knows that that wondering of an observer is the starting point of a study, because the "selective and restricted" observation is derived from this wondering. What is necessary, then, is to make explicit the involvement of the researcher in his or her research, to acknowledge the position he or she takes in the research, rather than pretending his or her non-existence⁸.

When Giorgi (1970) proposes the necessity of including the concept of "approach" in science instead of discussing only the methods and contents of psychological works, he also calls for the need to acknowledge the place of a researcher in researching.

By establishing the category of *approach* we mean to take into account the researcher himself in the enterprise of science. By approach is meant the fundamental viewpoint toward man and the world that the scientist brings, or adopts, with respect to his work as a scientist. (Giorgi, 1970, p.126)

He then stresses the importance of the dialogue among approach, method, and contents (pp.128-130). In recent studies on methodology, Heshusius (1989) is also concerned with the place of a researcher (knower), introducing us to the concept of paradigm-as-metaphor:

Paradigms describe who *we* are in our epistemological makeup. Understanding paradigms is a "knowing that we know how we know" (Ogilvy, 1986, p.14). It demands a self-consciousness of ourselves as knowers, an understanding that we, as knowers, are *part of* the paradigm. (Heshusius, 1989, p.403)

We know, as mentioned before, that what we see or know is profoundly affected by how we see or know it from our everyday experience. Giorgi and Heshusius, in their methodological arguments, call for a need to put a researcher as knower onto the horizon of the whole picture of researching.

To take into account explicitly the active involvement of the researcher, the role he or she plays in the process of researching, is particularly appropriate and required for the present study, because the main part of the research for the study is based on my actual interactions with mentally handicapped children. In most of those interactions I was both a teacher and a researcher. There my place in the research is

threefold: an observer, an interpreter, and one of the participants in events that happen to and around the children.

As an interpreter it is apparent that I as a researcher am in an effectual position: One characteristic of interpretations in the study is that I interpret the whole situation of which I myself am a part. As an observer, whose capacity is mainly to describe the whole situation, it is possible to claim myself to be a neutral bystander observing and recording the situation from outside. However, I would like to make explicit my involvement as an observer as well for two reasons. First, as Tinbergen says, even in the case of apparent neutrality of an observer, there still exists his or her influence on the process of observing and recording. It seems to be more candid to admit that the researcher influences a study, rather than pretending that influence does not exist. Second, as in the case of an interpreter, I as an observer observe myself as a participant as well as the children. Here, again, it might be possible not to acknowledge my part if my position as a participant were that of, for example, a tester or an interviewer of pre-structured interviews who keeps a distance from the subjects and tries to remain neutral. I am, however, both an observer and a participant at the same time, and the way I am as a participant is not exactly the same as that in case of so-called participant-observation.

qualitative researchers study subjects in whom they have no direct personal or professional stake. The participant observer or interviewer conducts a study as a neutral figure, with no personal alliances or axes to grind. (Taylor & Bogdan, 1977, p.198)

In contrast with the non-personal and neutral position of a participant observer, I willingly admit that as a participant observer I am personally committed to the lifeworlds of the children. As will be seen in more detail in the next section, my personal involvement is derived from the nature of the present study as a pedagogical study seeking pedagogical understanding. The kind of understanding sought for in pedagogical inquiry is concerned with particular children whom we as teachers, parents, and researchers teach, learn from, or live with face-to-face in particular situations. In pedagogical situations, we are part of children's lifeworlds and they are part of ours. As such, we cannot remain as bystanders observing them from the outside without commitment.

communication would be impossible if it should have to begin in the ego, a free subject, to whom every other would be only a limitation that invites war, domination, precaution and information. To communicate is indeed to open oneself, but the openness is not complete if it is on the watch for recognition. It is complete not in opening to the spectacle of or the recognition of the other, but in becoming a responsibility for him. (Levinas, 1981, p.119)

One's openness to the other implies the possibility of one's changing through communication with the other. This must be true in my close interactions with mentally handicapped children, too; through my interactions with children, I change as well as they do. This is another reason why it is necessary to take myself into consideration through the process of my researching.

Of course, my being a participant, observer, and interpreter at the same time does not assure the validity⁹ of interpretations of the children. As far as we see children with our point of view, there always remains a danger; a danger of

confusing an interpretation of children's lifeworlds with an explanation.

All revealing belongs within a harboring and a concealing. ... Freedom is that which conceals in a way that opens to light, in whose clearing there shimmers that veil that covers what comes to presence of all truth and lets the veil appear as what veils. (Heidegger, 1977, p.25)

It is not an easy task to realize not only what is revealed (children) but also what reveals (myself), since, as Heidegger says, as far as I am what reveals, I also am what veils. What is needed would be continuous questioning with openness (Levinas) and freedom (Heidegger) by asking: In what ways I have tried to understand children's lifeworlds; how I have come to be interested in particular aspects; why I think that I have understood them; and how I have changed through the process of revealing.

(2) Research Implication of the Pedagogic Stance

is it ever possible to observe a child, closely and to see the child's experience in a pure way? Outside of our relation to this child? Is it possible to describe a child, and his or her lifeworld, in a fashion that is disinterested, that lacks orientation? (van Manen, 1990, p.136)

Van Manen defines pedagogy as "the activity of teaching, parenting, educating, or generally living with children, that requires constant practical acting in concrete situations and relations" (1990, p.2). In pedagogical relations children are not

anonymous objects to be taught, brought up, or educated. They are children with names, unique characteristics who live in particular environments with other people. These are the children with whom we, as parents, teachers, doctors and the like, live in our everyday lives, to or for whom we are required to do something. When a toddler is crying because of a cut on her knee, her father is called, almost unreflectively, to attend to her. When a boy has difficulty learning subtraction, his teacher goes to help him. The important thing is that, in pedagogical actions such as these, a toddler's father is not just taking care of the cut on her knee, but attending to her as a person, the teacher's attention is not just to the student's difficulty in math, but to the student as a person. Facing a child in need, one attends to him or her before one thinks how to help, even before one feels to want to help. In this sense, the pedagogical way of being resembles what Levinas calls the-one-for-the-other:

The word *I* means *here I am*, answering for everything and for everyone. Responsibility for the others has not been a return to oneself, but an exasperated contracting, which the limits of identity cannot retain.
(Levinas, 1981, p. 114)

For Levinas, a person is essentially a being as the-one-for-the-other, who exists for the other and who admits the other's uniqueness as "alterity," or otherness. Here responsibility is incarnated as an essence of one's being (Lingis, 1981). Pedagogical actions or pedagogical ways of living seem to be a manifestation of one's being as the-one-for-the-other.

Pedagogical understanding, therefore, is concerned with uniqueness of children in unique situations. It is interactive understanding which develops through actual and active relationship between an adult and child. It is applied or practical understanding because it is concerned with unique children and with how we can be more thoughtful and tactful in unique situations (van Manen, in print, pp.83,84). So there are not only unique children but also adults as particular beings within pedagogical understanding. Pedagogical understanding of a child is closely knit with understanding of an adult who is trying to understand the child, on the basis of which the adult acts on and with the child. This point leads us to recognize the mutuality of understanding. To become pedagogically thoughtful through the process of understanding children, one needs to be reflective and thoughtful. Throughout the efforts to understand mentally handicapped children, a researcher needs to understand himself or herself and his or her relationships with the children.

(3) Story as a Form of Researching

In the next chapter, the lifeworld of mentally handicapped children will be explored in the form of stories. But before we read the stories, let us think about the form of story.

While I was writing the parts of the following chapter, I asked my friends to read some of them, seeking their comments. One of my friends, upon reading, said, "I like your story." My reaction to her comment was a mixed one. I felt encouraged, of course, to hear that she liked my writing. At the same time, however, I was a little

confused, since I was not quite certain about how to take her identifying my writing as "story." Probably I was both disappointed and satisfied. Disappointed because I somehow felt she underestimated my work: Do you call it a story? But I worked so hard to write it. This is not just a story, this is my research! But satisfied as well, because the term "story" seemed to grasp the intention of my writing. It certainly seemed to fit the style and content of my writing.

It was long after this small incident had been forgotten that I finally chose to call my writing "stories." While I now have no reservation about calling my writing "story," some clarification of the notion of story might be needed.

As my own reaction to have had my writing called "stories" may indicate, the form of story has received little, if any, appreciation as a way of researching. Why, then, stories? The dictionary defines "story" as follows (*The Concise Oxford Dictionary*, 1982):

1. past course of person's or institution's life;
2. account given of an incident or series of events;
3. piece of narrative, tale of any length told or printed in prose or verse of actual or fictitious events, legend, myth, anecdote, novel, romance;
4. main facts or plot of novel or epic or play;
5. facts or experiences that deserve narration;
6. (colloq. or childish) lie, fib; liar.

It is not hard to recognize the contradiction between the fifth and sixth definitions, and that this ambivalence might be the source of unwillingness of researchers to

recognize stories as a form of researching. A story may be about a fact or experience that deserves narration, but it could also be a fiction, a lie, without a ground to support its actuality. For a study to be scientific, it must be based on hard data which can be confirmed as factual.

It is possible, of course, to criticize such a claim by putting into question the very notion of facts and reality, as we have seen previously: Facts are inextricably intertwined with values and human reality is dependent on the constituting activities of one's mind. Furthermore, there are researchers who call for the form of art, including stories, to be integrated as a form of researching into the field of special education (Blatt, 1984; Heshusius, 1988). While I support the claim by Blatt and Heshusius, stories presented in the present study are based on what actually happened, what I actually experienced with children. Identifying my writing as "stories" by no means suggests their being fabricated. Rather, the reasons for employing the term "story" lie elsewhere.

The first reason is because my writing on these mentally handicapped children consists not only of descriptions of what actually happened, but also of their interpretations. In this sense the term story is used in order to distinguish my writing from so-called scientific data collected by a researcher from the outside.

The second reason is related to the narrativity of stories. To use the term "story" is to indicate that the writing is *my* account of these children, that events surrounding these children are told by me. As the dictionary definition says,

narrative is a "tale, story, recital of facts, especially story told in the first person." Therefore, by calling them stories, it is intended to make it clear that they are told from my point of view.

The third is related to the second reason mentioned above. One of the definitions of a story reads, "facts or experiences that deserve narration." While all the words used in the definition support the application of the term "story" to my writing which is in my account ("narrative") of children's "experiences," the focus here is on the word "deserve." Indeed one tells a story because an event, or a series of events, deserves to be told. But adding to that, it seems to be worthwhile to note that one tells a story, because *one thinks* an event deserves to be told. A story is told when someone (usually a narrator) thinks it deserves to be told. Here again, I, as a researcher come to the scene. Why did I choose to tell stories about particular events or experiences? How have I come to consider them as deserving to be told? By recognizing the word "deserve," these questions concerning the active involvement of the researcher are taken into the scope of the research.

It might seem that the second and the third reasons unnecessarily overemphasize the role of myself as a researcher. But putting myself as a researcher into perspective is not meant to be an act of self-assertion, stressing the ownership of the stories, like a little child crying, "This is mine!" On the contrary I am fully aware that by naming my study "stories" with an intention of including my role into the research, I place full responsibility on myself.

The last reason concerns the nature of stories, that is, the concreteness of stories. A story tells us about particular events, particular experiences, and particular persons in concrete situations. In this regard a form of story is suitable for one of the main purposes of this study, that is, to see the particularity of mentally handicapped children. Story also has special strength as a form of researching. Van Manen says that "anecdotal narrative allows the person to reflect in a concrete way on experience and thus appropriate that experience. To anecdote is to reflect, to think" (1989, p. 232). What is suggested here is that the concreteness of stories is not only for persons told in stories but also for those who tell, and those who read, stories. This characteristic makes a form of story particularly relevant to the present study as pedagogical inquiry into the lifeworlds of mentally handicapped children. Pedagogy is interested in particular children in particular situations. The concreteness, the sensitivity to the particularity of stories would provide us with opportunities to reflect pedagogically.

Stories find their power in the concreteness of what is told which, in turn, invites both writers and readers to reflect in a concrete way. And yet, the power of storying does not lie only in concreteness. Stories encourage us to reflect further, in more general terms.

Anecdote particularizes the abstracting tendency of theoretical discourse: It makes it possible to involve us prereflectively in the lived quality of concrete experience while paradoxically inviting us into a reflective stance vis-a-vis the meanings embedded in the experience. The important feature of anecdotal as well as hermeneutic phenomenological discourse is that it simultaneously pulls us in, then prompts us to reflect. (van Manen, 1989, pp.247,248)

This tension or "paradox" between the concern for concreteness and the urge for more general reflection prevents the act of theorizing from becoming either too abstract or too grounded in the concrete. Here, as van Manen says, "the stories are examples or topics of practical theorizing" (1989, p.247).

The term "story" reminds me of a short anecdote cited by Merleau-Ponty:

A story is told in a children's book of the disappointment of a small boy who put on his grandmother's spectacles and took up her book in the expectation of being able himself to find in it the stories which she used to tell him. The tale ends with these words: "Well, what a fraud! Where's the story? I can see nothing but black and white." For the child the "story" and the things expressed are not "ideas" or "meanings", nor are speaking or reading "intellectual operation". The story is a world which there must be some way of magically calling up by putting on spectacles and leaning on a book. (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p.401)

While it is indeed possible, as this small boy experienced, that a story may become nothing but printed letters in a book when situations and contexts of story-telling are lost, it is also possible that a story can create a world in which persons or events are brought into life through full actual contexts. It is my hope to present stories in the next chapter in such a way that events around mentally handicapped children, each of them a particular human being, are disclosed with their particularity and contextuality.

Chapter 4

Lifeworlds of Mentally Handicapped Children:

Stories

"Finger Play"

Matthew Plays Finger Play

The bell has just rung to tell us that a lunch break is over. But our class stays outside, because the next session is for exercise. Some students are still playing, which teachers admit to by not telling them to gather. Others are asking teachers what we are going to do for exercise. I notice Matthew is still sitting alone on the grass, his back facing toward me. But I can tell what he is doing from the distance. I can see it from the position of his hands and the slow movement of his head; he is doing that finger play or, so called finger flicking. I saw him flicking his fingers a little while ago while I was playing with other students. So he has not yet come out of the world of that magical fascination.

I approach him, not having a clear idea of what I am going to do. I do not want to stop his play ruthlessly. Doing so seems to me somewhat unfair to him -- I do not know why he indulges in the finger play so often, nor do I understand what it means to him. Might it be totally meaningless, disturbing, ritualized behavior, as many researchers suggest? If so, what is that enthusiasm that Matthew shows? How could

he concentrate on the meaningless behavior for such a long time?

At the same time, though, I do not want to leave him alone and let him remain absorbed in that isolation. Something tells me that playing with others is preferable to playing alone. I would like him to know that playing with others is also fun. But how? What I do to him may be only to interrupt him after all, falling short of providing the opportunity to let him know that playing with others is fun. But it is time to get ready for the exercise and I had better tell him anyway.

I sit down very close to him with my legs crossed as he does. He shows few signs of recognizing me. "Hi, Matt. How are you doing?" I say to him, pushing his shoulder with mine. Matthew looks at me. He neither looks pleased nor angry, nor even surprised. He looks at me very briefly, right into my eyes. Then, without giving me any chance to talk to him, he turns his gaze to his fingers which are held up slightly above his head. Rejected, or rather ignored, by him, I lose my words. I lie down with my head on my arm and look up at Matthew. I am going to see how he plays with his fingers, for although he does not let me be with him, he does not seem to mind my staying beside him.

He is looking up skywards with his eyes half open. Between the sky and his eyes he holds up his fingers of both hands. Fingers move in the air, close to his face, twirling and twisting each other, overlapping and being overlapped by one another. Sometimes, very slowly, Matthew's head moves sideways, yet his regard is fixed on a certain point. But where is that fixed point? What is he looking at? I sit up half

way to see what he is looking at. I still cannot be sure what he is looking at or whether he is looking at anything at all, but it is not likely that he is looking at his fingers. I lie down again and look up toward his fingers for a while. His otherwise rather clumsy fingers twist and twirl in various ways at various speeds. At one moment fingers twirl very quickly, fingers of one hand chasing, and being chased by those of another hand. After a short while, then, the movement becomes very slow, and each finger twines with another, interweaving various patterns while fingers are moving slowly. "How can you do that, Matt?" I mutter, maybe to myself. Then I wonder, "Could I do that?" I sit up next to him and try to imitate his fingers' movements. I put my hands just above my head so that I can look at them very closely, and move my fingers.

Although we do not face the sun, it is too bright to keep my eyes wide open. With my eyes half closed, I look up at my fingers which are making patterns with the background of the blue sky. The sky I see through my fingers changes its patterns and brightness according to the finger movements. This is interesting, I think. "Is this how you do it, Matt?" I ask Matthew, who has a glimpse of me and goes back to his finger play again, without showing any interest in what I am doing. I continue to flick my fingers for a while. "Don't you think I am doing well?" I ask him again, which receives the same lack of reaction from him. I feel uneasy about his ignoring me this time. What am I going to do if he won't stop his finger play?

It is always extremely difficult to have Matthew stop his finger play by himself. The most usual way is to interrupt him. Since Matthew, when interrupted,

shows little resistance on most occasions, teachers tend not to think of ways of letting him stop his finger play by himself. Are there not other ways to let him stop his finger play? Is there not anything which seems to him more interesting than finger play?

I give it one more try, asking Matthew, "Hey, Matt, is it how we play?" this time pushing his arm with mine. Another glimpse and no words from him. "You tell me, Matt. Is this how?" I put my fingers in front of his face, pushing his fingers away from there. Now his fingers stop the movement and he says, "No-o-oi" looking at me. He turns around to face me on his back and starts his finger play again. "I'm sorry, Matt. You didn't like it, did you?" I talk to him in a low voice, putting my hand on his shoulder from behind. His finger play continues. After looking at him play for a while, I look into his face over his shoulder with my hands on both his shoulders and say, "Okay, Matt. It's time to exercise. Let's go to the others." He utters a sound which expresses his unwillingness to stop his play. I move around so that I sit in front of him and touch his fingers as gently as possible, nonetheless in order to interrupt him. "I know you like it, but you can't do it forever, Matt." Matthew stops his finger play, looking straight at me. "Ms. Maeda," he says, holding my head with both hands. While letting him put his forehead on mine, I hold him and say, "Did you have a good time, Matt? I think you did, but now it's time for some exercise. Are you ready?" I stand up and offer him my hand, which he takes, and he stands up too.

Finger Play -- Stereotyped?

Matthew's finger play, which is usually called "finger flicking," is categorized as "stereotyped, repetitive movement" (Wing & Ricks, 1976; Rutter, 1977). It is one of the typical characteristics of autistic children, which, as Rutter (1977) says, can also be observed in some non-autistic mentally handicapped children like Matthew¹⁰. Since Kanner's (1943) identification, finger flicking is a form of behavior well known among teachers and researchers in the field of special education. Finger flicking is a rather familiar phenomenon in a sense that, when we find this term in the diagnosis or case reports of children, we can almost immediately picture how they are engaged. But, it is also an unfamiliar phenomenon for the following two reasons. First, because the term "stereotyped, repetitive movement" does not offer sufficient understanding of the movements. The term tells us that a certain behavior is categorized as "stereotyped and repetitive," and that it is typically seen in most autistic and some mentally handicapped children. But it does not tell us why some children do it, what is the meaning of these movements for these children, or how we can help them stop the movements. Second, this finger flicking -- as well as other stereotyped, repetitive movements -- gives us the impression of inaccessibility -- the being-different-ness -- of these children. When we face a child who is engaged in this almost endless and isolated behavior, we often feel lost, not knowing how to make contact with him or her. We may know what these movements are called, how they are categorized, but we do not know what the term means, nor how to cope with the children. Or worse, since we know how to classify what these children are doing, it tends to be assumed that we know them. Since these are "stereotyped and repetitive" movements, further attention would be

unnecessary. The finger flicking, we conclude, should be stopped because it is stereotyped, therefore meaningless. As a matter of fact, many studies have been done in order to develop various treatment techniques of decreasing stereotyped behaviors (Dunlap, Dyer & Koegel, 1983; Gallagher & Berkson, 1986; Kern, Koegel & Dunlap, 1984; Koegel & Koegel, 1989; Luiselli, 1981; Watters & Watters, 1980). In short, the very term of "stereotyped, repetitive movements" tends to prevent us from further reflection.

Returning to the example of Matthew, it is obvious that Matthew's finger play, consisting of more or less the same movements of his fingers, is "repetitive." His finger play is done in such a particular manner -- hand position, finger movement, upright posture, and so on -- that we can tell from a distance that he is finger-playing. In this sense, it may also be characterized as "stereotyped." But why, then, does he repeat his finger play for such a long time? Why does he do it in a particular manner? What is he experiencing during his finger play? In other words, how is it meaningful for him? The name "stereotyped, repetitive movement" does not seem to answer these questions.

Adding to its repetitiveness and almost endless continuity, there does not seem to be a particular purpose in Matthew's finger play, either. Rather, the activity itself seems to be an end in itself. All these characteristics make the finger play appear unfamiliar and strange. But these characteristics do not exclusively belong to "stereotyped, repetitive movements." Swinging, for example, has similar characteristics.

Chris Plays Swinging

Chris says she wants to swing. After having played on the playground for more than an hour? I think. But after a moment I hear myself telling her, "Okay, Chris, if you want to." Indeed, there is no reason for not letting her swing, I convince myself. It is Friday today and a summer day is long. So why not let her swing as much as she likes until she says "No more," and see how long she will swing.

Chris asks me to give her a push. At the beginning she talks to me, "More push! More!" "Give me a big push!" She swings up and down, saying, "Look! I am higher than the trees!" Through her back I push, I can feel her energy which goes high up and down in unison with the movements of the swing. "Up I go, up I go to the sun!"

After a while she talks no longer. She does not mention how high she is, how much fun it is to swing, which she repeatedly did at first. She just enjoys the movement of herself and, perhaps, the movements of the world which are brought through her own movement. Every now and then she hums or talks to herself in a low voice. I cannot hear what she is talking about, but that does not bother me. The talk is for herself. I should not squeeze myself into her own world, by asking her what she is talking about, or if she is having a good time. A pleasant tension in her back, her legs which are pumping up and down in accordance with the movement of

the swing tell me that she is absorbed in swinging, and that is all I want to know.

Eventually, Chris turns her face and tells me, "I want to get down now." "Okay, Chris. I'll stop the swing." I do, and she gets down from the swing. "Shall we go home, then?" I ask. She, holding my hand, replies, "Yeah." After thirty minutes of swinging, she seems to be quite content.

Finger Play and Swinging -- Are They Different?

There seems to be some similarities between finger flicking and swinging. As to the finger flicking, on the one hand, it is said that; it is the repetition of the same movement; it is aimless, because the activity itself is its end; it is, therefore, stereotyped. As to swinging, on the other hand, it may well be said that swinging is the repetition of the same to-and-fro, up-and-down movement, and that the activity of swinging itself is its end, if it were possible to discuss the end of children's play at all. Yet, no one would venture to say that it is stereotyped, not to mention its being meaningless, mainly, perhaps, because swinging is such a common play among children.

In addition to the repetitiveness and the self-ended-ness, there are other aspects which show similarities between these two activities. One is that both finger flicking and swinging commit body movement. There is, of course, a difference in terms of its degree, that is, while the body movement in swinging is gross and dynamic with the engagement of the whole body, it is fine and subtle in finger

flicking. Nevertheless, remembering that Matthew was moving not only his fingers and hands but also his body and head, it is not likely that flicking and twiddling fingers are the only aspect that matters in finger flicking. It is more likely, instead, that a sensation which is felt inside the body is also an important factor in finger flicking. Through the gross movement of the whole body in case of swinging, and through the subtle movement of the upper body in case of finger flicking, children feel the sensation inside their bodies. Just like they sometimes enjoy the dizziness after spinning themselves, so would they engage themselves in the inner sensation which is brought about according to the body movements. In doing so, they are listening to their own bodies through their movements, be it gross or subtle.

The second similarity between finger flicking and swinging refers to the world. That is, the change of the world which is brought about by the body movement seems to play a significant role in both swinging and finger flicking. This seems to be apparent in the case of swinging. As a child swings up and down the world she sees changes. Things which are not usually seen -- tree tops, roofs, the sky, and so forth -- come into view. Even grown-ups, to whom a child always has to look up, stay below her feet. Besides, all these things change their appearances as she repeats the up-and-down movement. The child puts her head up or down at times as if trying to add more changes to what is viewed. In the case of finger flicking, on the other hand, the change of the outer world seems to be less dynamic, therefore less obvious. A standing point (or, in Matthew's case, a sitting point) from where the outer world is viewed remains more or less the same in the case of finger flicking, as opposed to the case of swinging. Body movements are not the kind of movements that bring a drastic

change into one's view. The change, instead, is brought about through a flicking of fingers in front of the eyes, one's view points.

As described above in Matthew's finger play, children who are engaged in finger flicking are not looking at their twirling fingers. Rather, they are looking *through* their fingers. Although it is hard to tell what exactly they are looking at through their fingers, it is pretty certain that they are not looking at particular objects such as trees, houses, streets and the like. It is more likely that they are attracted with the act of seeing through the ever changing patterns woven by their fingers. In other words, what is important for them is the act of seeing through and changing, by twirling their fingers, that which they are seeing through, rather than what they are seeing through their fingers. Speaking for Matthew, he twirled his fingers slightly above his head because what was attractive for him was not the twirling of his fingers but seeing through them. If he was interested in only flicking his fingers, he would not have had to put them above his head. Also Matthew was annoyed when I put my fingers in front of his view because the change must be made through his own effort. I agree with Bettelheim (1967) when he describes "twiddling" as follows:

The twiddled fingers, as they move in front of the face, have the effect of blurring the vision of reality. The result is that whatever the twiddling child sees, he sees as if through a self-created screen. Reality, if seen at all, flickers by in a discontinuous manner, but a discontinuity that the child himself creates. Watching his eyes, as he stares at his twiddling fingers, suggests that he is peering, so to say, through a filming veil he has superimposed on what is actually there. In lieu of an unbearable reality he creates a private one whose visual appearance he controls through the speed of his twiddling. To some degree it is thus an effort to reshape reality and make it bearable. (pp. 167, 168)

Although Bettelheim's account may sound a little too explanatory, especially when he interprets the world as "unbearable" and twiddling as an effort to "reshape reality" and make it "bearable," it nevertheless seems to cast the light on an usually overlooked aspect of finger flicking, the aspect of changing the world of a child with an effort of himself or herself¹¹.

Chris swings up and down, pumping her legs in accordance with the movements of the swing. In doing so she feels the inner sensation of her body and enjoys the change of the outside view. The movements might appear to be monotonous to us adults, but probably that is because we have forgotten the excitement of swinging. Perhaps, for Chris, each swing may seem to be a new, fresh movement every time. Or she may live a time of timelessness, for she is a pendulum which creates her own time. While swinging she, in a sense, becomes the swing and gives herself to the repetitive, yet rhythmic to-and-fro, up-and-down motion of the swing. Who would be distressed at the repetitiveness of the movements and raise the question of stereotypy in swinging? Would it not, then, be possible to see Matthew's finger play in the same way as we see Chris' swinging?

When he flicks his fingers in front of his face and moves his head and upper body slowly, Matthew is captivated with the ever changing patterns of light and shadow made by his own finger movements and attends to the subtle sensation which comes from inside his body. His finger play may appear to be odd and strange to us. But its being odd and strange to us cannot be the reason for regarding his finger play

as meaningless to him, too. Matthew, too, might be experiencing each movement of his fingers and each change of patterns as new and fresh in a flow of time of his own, just like Chris is while swinging. Probably what finger play means to Matthew would be what swinging means to Chris, however strange the finger play may appear to us, however familiar swinging to us, and, therefore, however different the finger play may appear from swinging. And once it becomes possible to see his finger play from this point of view, there opens a possibility of, at least, wondering if it would be sensitive to interrupt the finger play forcibly.

Finger Play and Swinging -- Are They the Same?

Thus far I have tried to present a way of viewing the finger play which is different from seeing it as a "stereotyped, repetitive" movement. This way of viewing would make it possible to see the positive aspect of the finger play. It would, I believe, change a way of responding to it from relentlessly interrupting to, at least, a hesitant pondering.

Yet this pondering forces us to go further. For instance, it has become possible to see Matthew's finger play in more a positive manner by reflecting on its similarities to swinging. But are these two activities really the same? Is there not a difference between them?

As far as the activities themselves are concerned, there seems to be no significant difference between finger play and swinging; repetitiveness,

self-endedness, body sensation, and the like -- in short, what children are experiencing during the activities. But there is a difference.

For example, I felt uneasy when Matthew ignored me and continued his finger play, while I was quite comfortable even when Chris was absorbed in swinging and talked to herself. That is because I was afraid Matthew might not come out of his own world of finger play whereas I knew Chris would come out of her own world of swinging at any time.

While swinging, Chris is so absorbed in swinging that sometimes she may forget about the world outside her, including others. But this isolation is not endless and can be broken by herself very easily. Chris would respond to others when she is talked to. She would even swing with another child, talking to each other, or competing to see who can go higher. She can stop swinging when she is asked to or when she finds something else which seems to be more interesting to her. In short, she is ready to come out of her own world of swinging to *our* world. Although sometimes she may go into and stay in her own world, she can be ready to come out of there. She is basically open to the world with others.

Matthew's finger play lacks these features. He does not play finger flicking with others. When someone tries to interact with him, he ignores it as far as ignoring is possible. If he cannot ignore the interaction, he responds by refusal, again as far as refusal is possible. He does not come out of his world of finger play easily, and even when he does, it is not because he is ready for coming into our world.

His world of finger play seems to be too isolated to leave any space for others. It was this overwhelming isolation that made me feel uneasy and inclined to interrupt him.

In a sense, a difference between finger play and swinging is a difference between *Matthew's* finger play and *Chris's* swinging. That is, a difference is not derived from the difference between these two activities, but from the difference of ways of being in the world of Chris and Matthew; being open and being isolated. For this reason it is doubtful if Matthew would enjoy swinging in a way Chris does, whereas it is not difficult to imagine Chris telling me how beautifully her view changes and even teaching me how to flick finger while finger-playing, if she actually does finger play.

Schachtel (1959) sees human development as an ongoing process of emerging from a state of embeddedness in the "sheltering and nourishing environment"(p. 69) to the open world where one encounters others. Although being embedded in an environment, which satisfies one's need and protects one from danger outside the environment, is secure and comfortable, one's openness to the world inevitably leads one to emerging from the embeddedness into the world where one encounters others and becomes more fully oneself, trying to "become capable of interest in and love for the larger and richer world"(p. 14). Schachtel designates what makes one emerge from the embeddedness as activity-affects, which "establish an effective emotional link between the separate organism and the environment, so that the organism will be able to engage in those activities which will satisfy his needs, develop his capacities, and further his life"(p.31). He sees this activity-affect, for example, in

a baby's attentive looking ("an expression of interest"(p. 26) and in an infant's eager trial to learn to walk.

The concepts of embeddedness-affect and activity-affect are developmental concepts in two respects. First, in the development of the infant and child there always is a shift from massive predominance of embeddedness-affect to increasing significance of activity-affects. Second, if man continues to grow mentally, i.e. emotionally and intellectually throughout his life, as some people do, then at each significant step of such development a similar shift will occur, while conversely, if he regresses a shift from activity- to embeddedness-affect will take place. While the early shift from embeddedness- to activity-affect always occurs, although in individually widely varying degrees, the later shifts depend to some extent on man's own decisions within the margin of freedom which he has. (p. 76)

Schachtel's notion of embeddedness seems to offer an explanation of Matthew while he is finger-playing. At the least, it seems closer to what Matthew is experiencing during his finger play than the term "stereotyped, repetitive movement." It also seems to imply the possibility of seeing this seemingly not-normal activity in the continuity of more acceptable ones, because, according to Schachtel, one always has a possibility of emerging from a state of embeddedness.

Another implication is that, although everybody at times needs the security and warmth of embeddedness, being embedded in a comforting world of one's own may not be the ultimate and truly desirable way of being in the world. Through the process of trying to see Matthew's finger play in an alternative point of view, it has become possible to notice the meaning that finger play has for Matthew, which consequently urges us to reflect on our response to his finger play. But it does not necessarily mean to leave him alone. Park (1967), remembering her life with her

autistic daughter Elly, writes:

Existing among us, she had her being elsewhere. As long as no demands were made upon her, she was content. If smiles and laughter mean happiness, she was happy inside the invisible walls that surrounded her. She dwelt in a solitary citadel, compelling and self-made, complete and valid. Yet we could not leave her there. We must intrude, attack, invade, not because she was unhappy, for she was not, but because the equilibrium she had found, perfect as it was, denied the possibility of growth. 'A terrible arrogance, for what had we to offer her? Which of us could call ourselves as content as Elly was? The world we would tempt her into was the world of risk, failure, and frustration, of unfulfilled desire, of pain as well as activity and love. There in Nirvana, why should she ever come out? Yet she was ours as well as her own, and we wanted her. (p. 12)

These "intrusions, attacks, invasions," however, need to be based on understanding of children's ways of being, of experiences, instead of relentless ones, imposing values and ways of being of our own.

"Eating"

Karen at a Lunch Table

"Okay, everybody, it's lunch time! Go to the washroom and wash your hands, please!" Jane calls out to children in the room. Karen, who has been playing on the peg board with Sandy, a special needs worker at the daycare centre, rushes to the table and looks closely at what is on the table. "No, no, Karen. Go and wash your hands first, please," Jane says when Karen's nose almost touches the biscuits. "Now you know what's for lunch, so go wash your hands and let's start eating!"

When Karen comes out of the washroom she moves around the tables and looks for a lunch mat with her name on it. Sometimes she finds it by herself and sometimes Jane, Sandy, or a child in the room tells Karen where to find it. Today Tina, who happens to be sitting next to Karen, calls out, "Here, Karen. Your spot is here." Karen looks up at Tina and goes straight to her seat. There are some other children who have not been seated yet; Karen is not the only one who cannot find the spot quickly; nor is she the last one to be seated.

Eventually all the children are seated at the table and the lunch begins. Karen, sitting between Tina and Sandy, is eagerly but patiently waiting for the soup to be served. She does not avert her gaze from Jane who is serving the soup.

As soon as the soup is served, Karen reaches for the spoon and tries to start eating. She takes a spoonful of hot soup and tries to bring it to her mouth. "Be

careful, Karen!" Sandy grabs Karen's arm. "It's very hot, Karen. You have to wait and blow it, otherwise you are going to burn your tongue." Explaining to Karen, Sandy takes Karen's hand with a spoon to the bowl and starts stirring the soup with her. "Blow it, Karen." Karen imitates Sandy and blows the soup a couple of times, but she cannot wait any longer and tries a sip. "No, Karen!" Sandy cries, but it is too late this time.

"Boy, it was hot, wasn't it?" Jane talks to Karen from the next table when she sees Karen inevitably push most of the soup she took out of her mouth. Her remark seems to ease the tension between Sandy and Karen, who are looking at each other without a word. "She doesn't feel pain very much, and it's dangerous because she may easily get burnt by eating a hot stuff." Sandy talks to Jane while wiping Karen's chin with a cloth. She then talks to Karen, "Why don't you try a biscuit?" She hands Karen a piece. Karen takes it and has a bite off it. Almost immediately after the first bite she tries to have another. Sandy interrupts her just in time. "No, no, Karen. You don't take another bite when your mouth is full. You wait until you swallow what's in your mouth, otherwise you may choke." She keeps her from eating by putting her hand on top of Karen's. She lets go of Karen's hand with the biscuit in it only when Karen swallows what was already in her mouth.

"Try some carrots too, Karen. They are good." Sandy hands a stick of carrot to her. Karen, somewhat reluctantly, tries a bite but puts it on the dish. "You don't like it? It's good for you, Karen." Sandy then says, probably to herself, "and you'd better practise to chew the tough stuff, too."

Meanwhile the soup has become cooler and Karen is now busy eating it. A spoonful of soup is followed by another spoonful, then by a bite of biscuit.... Sandy interrupts Karen from pouring one mouthful of food after another into her mouth, by putting her hand on Karen's and/or by talking to Karen not to rush. But Karen manages to put some extra food into her mouth. Naturally some of the food comes out of her mouth. Together with her drooling, the table is becoming rather messy.

Brad, a quiet and sensitive boy who is sitting in front of Karen, is staring at Karen. Surprised, but apparently without any value judgement, he seems to forget to eat. Fred, on the other hand, chuckles in amusement and cries admiringly, "Gee, the soup is coming out of Karen's mouth!" Tina, one of the oldest children in the room, turns to Karen and speaks to her calmly, "You don't eat that fast, Karen. Your mouth is too full." Of course there are some other children who show apparent disgust. One even murmurs, "Yuck!"

These various reactions of other children make Sandy protective. She stops having her lunch and concentrates on Karen's eating. "Don't swallow before you chew it, Karen," "First you swallow what's in your mouth and then you have another bite, okay?" "Wipe your mouth, please, Karen," "Don't eat so fast, Karen. The soup may be still hot," Sandy continues.

After a while when passing by, Jane says with a chuckle, "My! You made a mess, Karen!" "That came out of her mouth, Jane," Fred says, pointing to the food on

the table in front of Karen. "Did it? She must have eaten too fast. But you'd better watch out too, Fred. I see a lot of crumbs on your mat!" Laughing with other children, Karen now reaches for the dessert. "Use the spoon, Karen. And one mouthful at a time." Sandy's voice follows.

Meal Time -- for a Training or...

As a special need worker who is appointed to work with Karen and another three children with special needs, Sandy is aware that self-feeding is one of the areas that Karen's training programme puts an emphasis on. Periodical case reports and assessment reports show concerns about Karen's feeding problems: the less mature pattern of sucking and swallowing liquids instead of gulping and swallowing them; sucking and munching solid food instead of chewing it; drooling, rapid eating, and so forth. Sandy also knows that these problems, especially the poor feeding (chewing) pattern, derive from the mild form of cerebral palsy which mainly affects the muscles around her mouth and her tongue. Sandy was recommended, along with teachers at a school for hearing impaired children which Karen attends, to work towards separating the tongue movement from the jaw, to place sticky food on the bottom lip or between the cheeks and gums in order to stimulate lateral tongue movements, to use the toothette sponge dipped in tart/sour foods to stimulate a sucking pattern (up and down movement of the tongue), and to check before giving successive mouthfuls to make sure Karen has swallowed.

Sandy has followed these recommendations by an occupational therapist: she

has put peanut butter between Karen's cheeks and gums; she has had Karen wait to eat until her mouth is empty; she has encouraged Karen to try tougher food to let her chew. Putting peanut butter inside Karen's mouth, which Sandy occasionally does during training sessions, is not very hard since Karen does not seem to be bothered and even appears to enjoy having some extra snack although she sometimes has a hard time licking it off inside the cheeks. Letting Karen try tougher food is not problematic either in a sense, because Karen simply does not eat more than two bites of it. Like other staff members in the daycare centre, Sandy does not force a child to eat what she or he does not want to. Therefore this training does not last long. But lunch time is different. Since Karen cannot wait and tries to eat as much as she likes in the way she likes, she tends not to listen to Sandy.

Sandy is aware that she has two conflicting feelings about Karen's behavior at table. On the one hand, she, as a conscientious special needs worker, would like to carry out the recommendations. After all, it is better for Karen to be able to eat properly and it is *her* job to teach her to eat properly, she thinks. On the other hand, however, she is not totally convinced that it is all right to turn the lunch table solely into the training situation. Shouldn't the meal time be pleasant? She sometimes asks to herself.

Sandy remembers lunch time at the school that Karen attends from Monday to Thursday. She remembers how Kelly, a teacher's aid assigned to work with Karen, conducted the self-feeding skill training. Kelly, sitting right next to Karen, always kept an eye on every movement of Karen and never allowed her to do anything

inappropriate. Almost on every motion of Karen's, Kelly said something like "Don't eat it yet." "Chew it Karen." "Don't eat too fast." "Don't use your fingers, Karen." At one moment she took Karen's lunch away from her when Karen tried to put the food into her mouth too soon.

In a sense Sandy was impressed with the way Kelly conducted the "training." Kelly was more rigorous and consistent than Sandy is about Karen's behavior at the table. Probably I should be like Kelly too, Sandy thinks.

Yet, Sandy also remembers, with mixed feelings, what Kelly said after the lunch time while she was having her own lunch in a staff room. "Lunch time is the hardest part of the day for me. I can't take my eyes off Karen. Not a moment to take a breath." "No time for you to have your own lunch, is there?" Sandy asked. "Oh, no. And I don't feel like eating there. It's so messy" Other teachers nodded understandably. Sandy kept quiet.

Some of the differences between Sandy and Kelly may derive from the difference of the setting. For example, most staff members have lunch with children at a daycare centre while teachers retreat from the classrooms during the lunch break at school. But still, Sandy is bothered remembering that Karen did not smile even once during the lunch time. Or, the entire class was so quiet for that matter compared to the centre. At the centre, Karen is more lively and relaxed, together with the chattering children. (Children at the school cannot talk, of course. But what Sandy is mentioning is not the amount of sound, but an atmosphere.) The only

time Karen said something was when the lunch was taken away from her. We should enjoy the meal, shouldn't we? Sandy wonders.

Although she is not firmly positive about the strict self-feeding skill training, it does not mean that she sees no necessity for it. Karen had better learn to eat in a proper manner for her own good, Sandy thinks, especially when she recognizes various, and mostly negative, reactions of other children to Karen's manners. One does not eat for others, to be sure, therefore, one does not have to be timidly worried about others' regard. But there are at least some basic manners to be followed. And if Karen's eating behavior is one of the barriers between her and other children, that is what Sandy thinks she has to work on.

And then, Sandy thinks about Jane. Jane is candid and openhearted. Her sense of humor has lightened the otherwise confusing situations like today when Fred mentioned the food that Karen spit. Sandy might have told him "Don't say things like that, please. That is not very nice," or just ignored him, herself feeling embarrassed and also making others at the table embarrassed. It is true that Jane can be more tolerant of Karen's problems because she is not in direct charge of Karen's training. But it is also true that Jane's attitude makes other children accepting of Karen, by letting Fred realize that he also makes a mess like Karen, for instance.

Hovering between these ambivalent points of view, Sandy asks herself: What am I doing at the table for Karen? Why am I doing what I am doing?

Eating as Self-feeding

Why indeed, as Sandy asks, is it necessary to teach handicapped children self-feeding skills? Let us listen to the researchers first.

The self-feeding skill training is one of the areas in which the efficacy of behavior modification procedures was demonstrated with mentally handicapped persons (Reid, 1983). There are two main reasons for it. First, self-feeding skills and independent dressing skills have been two major concerns for teachers and researchers as well as parents, because these two self-help skills have been correctly regarded as one of the most important skills for handicapped persons to be mastered for the sake of their independence. Second, from the research method point of view, self-feeding skill training has a natural reinforcer, the food. "From the perspective of reinforcement procedures, the training of proper eating is almost unique in that no special search for a suitable reinforcement is necessary because the terminal component of the eating sequence is the ingestion of food. Similarly, a penalty for improper eating is necessarily available, namely, the interruption or postponement of the food delivery" (O'Brien, Bugle & Azrin, 1972, p.67).

Numerous research studies have been conducted since the 1960's in order to develop practical programmes on self-feeding skill training and also to examine the methodical accuracy of research procedures. Few researchers mention the rationale for the need of self-feeding skill training any more, mainly because, I suspect, it has

been well established as a common and firm research area. But we can find some researchers who propose a rationale for why we need the research in this area. For example, Reid (1983), in his review on behavioral research on self-help skill training, says: "Just as in normal development, in which self-feeding and at least basic self-dressing skills are the first self-help behaviors to be acquired, so too, it is important to teach these two sets of behaviors to mentally retarded persons. Without such skills, mentally retarded persons can exert only minimal independence in their daily environments" (p.213). As to the more specific (and Karen's) problem of rapid eating, Favell et al. (1980) say that "rapid eating presents a serious problem for most of these individuals. Not only is it socially unacceptable (for example, the client may be excluded from eating opportunities such as dining in a restaurant or participating in family-style meals, which require a certain amount of eating etiquette), but also may result in health problems such as vomiting or aspiration" (Favell, McGimsey & Jones, 1980, p.482).

As a whole, the self-feeding skill training is aimed at "promotion of independence and increase of social acceptability in addition to management of behavioral disturbance," as Sisson and Dixon(1986) summerize (p.333). What about eating then? What is eating? What meaning does eating have in our everyday life?

Eating Together

Everybody eats. Everybody sits at the table usually three times to eat every day.

Eating is such a common and familiar thing that we usually do not stop to reflect on it seriously.

It may be possible to talk about eating in terms of physiology: Eating is a physiological process of taking sufficient nutrition for the body. But we soon realize that there is something more than merely the nutritional aspect of eating when we think about a baby who is crying out of hunger. Might it be enough to give the baby a bottle of milk? Probably. But most parents carry the baby and give him or her a bottle. It seems more comforting and natural to see a baby being held and fed than a baby holding a bottle and having milk by him or herself in the crib. A baby appears somewhat relaxed in a grown-up's lap. And grown-ups also prefer eating with others to eating alone. When one lives alone, it is probably at meal time that one realizes one lives alone.

Buytendijk (1974) calls our attention to the significance of eating together. First he shows us that even in the feeding behaviors of animals we can see that the mutual being together during feeding usually strengthens its intensity, that the way in which food is offered is of importance to many animals for the eagerness with which it is eaten (Buytendijk, 1974, pp.137,-138). Then he concludes; "the disposition to food-intake does not depend exclusively on physiological factors, but also on situational circumstances"(p.138). "The joining together for the meal is," Buytendijk continues, "primarily a repetition of the affective relations between the child and his mother. The relations are more complex later and they have a changing, sometimes uncertain or ambiguous influence on being-hungry and on

appetite"(p.143).

It seems that it is not the act of eating itself but something else surrounding it that gives eating its meaning. It is not only the act of eating itself but having food with someone that we enjoy. The significance of having or rather sharing the food with someone is found in the Last Supper. We also know that the Greek word "symposion," from which the word "symposium" is derived, originally meant to eat and drink together. Bettelheim describes the importance of eating together.

In the book about the Orthogenic School for emotionally disturbed children and adolescents, Bettelheim(1985) writes about an incident that occurred between a patient and a staff member who worked closely with him. The patient woke up one night during a staff meeting and wanted the worker to come to him. The worker left the meeting and attended to the patient. When the worker returned to the meeting half an hour later, he reported that the patient had had a bad dream and had been upset but now had settled down and was sleeping again after the worker had interpreted the dream and told the patient some of the meaning of the dream. After having let the worker realize, by asking him questions, that it was not the contents of his interpretation of the dream but his having been together with the patient that had eased his loneliness and anxiety, Bettelheim asks:

would he not have liked it even better if this person [who attends to him and is emotionally close to him], after somehow soothing him, had offered him something to eat or drink? Would it not have been even more reassuring to talk about the dream as they were eating together, if that was what he wanted to talk about? (Bettelheim, 1985, p.328)

When we enjoy the meal, we also enjoy the conversation and an atmosphere at the table. When we appreciate the food, we also appreciate the one who prepared it for us. When we are at the table, we share not only the food but also the time together. And even a small child realizes it at times, like Chris does.

Chris' father is away for a few days. She misses her father, of course, especially when she goes to bed without having a good-night hug from him. But she seems to manage the situation quite well. She enjoys playing with her mother who spends more time with her. Having just started to attend a kindergarten, she is busy with what is going on there, which also diverts her attention from the absence of her father.

On the third evening when she is having supper with her mother, Chris mutters, "Gee, Lisa must be lonely." "Oh?" For a moment her mother does not quite understand what Chris is talking about. "Lisa, mommy. She has supper ... oh, not just supper, but breakfast too. She has breakfast and supper like this every day. Just Lisa and her mom, you know."

Lisa, Chris' friend at kindergarten, lives with her single mother. Since she suddenly realized that she had never seen Lisa's father after many visits to Lisa's place, Chris has known that Lisa does not live with her father. But it was not until this evening that she really caught the glimpse of what it meant for Lisa to live with one parent. And she understood it through imagining the dining table at Lisa's.

Furthermore, Lisa was not the only person that Chris was thinking about; she was thinking about her father. It is suggestive that her father's absence struck her most strongly at the supper table.

Sameness and Difference

Dr. Reed is a renowned scholar in his field. Everybody in the field respects his presence. His numerous publications have been cited as references in many academic papers and his lectures attract a large audience. His arguments are straight and full of confidence, although not everybody agrees with him. But no one can ignore the significance of his work.

When he is at the table, however, it is the way he eats that attracts people's attention. His table manners are, to say the least, disturbing. Clattering noises are all around him, with a dish, fork and knife. He does not seem to care about his mouth being full when he has something to say. And when he talks the food spills out of his mouth onto his clothes, on the table, and even onto the plates of those who sit next and opposite to him. Instead of discontinuing the meal, the pace of his eating accelerates as he becomes more involved in the conversation at the table. He sometimes forgets about the knife in his hand and waves it in the air. Those who accompany him cannot help notice all these things and find them rather annoying, even repulsive, but no one dares to show how he or she feels, trying to concentrate on what he says instead of how he eats.

Although his manners at times become the topic of conversations among colleagues, they are treated as a lighthearted joke and never become a serious issue. As a matter of fact, as expressions to describe how he eats, such as "amazing," "impressive," or even "gargantuan," imply, Dr. Reed's table manners are recognized, and more importantly admitted, as a part of the way he is, his way of being. His way of eating has never been seen as a serious problem. On the contrary, not only is it admitted as the way he is, it is also taken as personal style which makes him special, along with his scholarly eloquence. In short, his scholarly status seems to make his poor table manners trivial or even something to be "admired."¹²

The story of Dr. Reed might sound too extreme. However, it is very likely that his story reminds most of us of a few people we know --- a friend who eats rapidly, another who constantly changes his seated position, or another who concentrates solely on the act of eating without listening nor talking. And yet, we do not regard these persons as different, not to mention the feeding problems. Rather, we mostly tend to let those behaviors go by or just shrug our shoulders. Or we may even enjoy them as the opportunity to catch a glimpse of these people's personalities as in the case of Dr. Reed. After all, we all eat and we all eat differently.

Of course it is not my intention to argue that there is no need for self-feeding skill training to handicapped children. It would be undeniable that it is much better to eat properly. Dining out, for example, is not as trivial a matter for the families with handicapped children as it might sound. And life would become much enjoyable if they can go out together as a result of the improvement of their self-feeding skills

and table manners. The sense of self-independence would also improve when a child becomes able to feed himself or herself. Furthermore, for some handicapped children it is even vital to learn some forms of feeding skills: for those who do not chew or swallow the food on their own, being able to eat is a matter of health or even life and death; for those who may choke easily with a small piece of sausage, eating can simply be dangerous.

However, except for those extreme cases, these issues are generally concerns for all parents, regardless of their child being handicapped or not. And that is why we parents teach our children how to eat properly. In this sense self-feeding skills training for handicapped children is based on the same expectation, or hope, for the children of us all as human beings.

And yet, there is a difference between the self-feeding skill training for handicapped children and teaching non-handicapped children how to eat properly. The former is training, rigid and steady, detached from the context of everyday life. The latter, on the other hand, is more flexible and inconsistent, and is always done in the context of actual meal time, usually with a warm and pleasant atmosphere. It rarely occurs there that skills become the only concerns. Perhaps that is because parents unconsciously know that feeding skills or table manners are not all that matter, that there is something more to eating than merely eating with proper skills and manners, or taking sufficient nutrition to live. Even when parents remind their children of their manners, they also watch their children, not only the inappropriate manner. When a mother complains about her daughter's manners, her concern is

with her daughter, not with manners themselves.

As has been mentioned several times, there is nothing wrong with teaching children, handicapped or non-handicapped, how to self-feed and how to behave at the table. However, there is nothing wrong with it only as far as we, as parents, teachers, and researchers, do not lose sight of children who also experience a meaning of eating together.

"Smiling"

Jeffry

"One fine day in early spring," sings Jeffry. Singing, he looks up to me. I remain neutral. "One fine day in early spring," sings Jeffry again, this time pulling my hand, and stretching himself up a bit toward me so that I do not fail to recognize him. I look down at Jeffry who is looking straight at me, smiling an anxious smile. "You sure like the song, don't you, Jeffry?" I say. But my remark does not satisfy him. "One fine day in early spring," Jeffry sings again. He now moves to the front of me and almost clings to me. Now I cannot avoid the serious regard in the middle of his anxious smile, and I know what this serious regard requires of me. "One fine day in early spring," I sing. Now the tension fades away from his body. He goes back to my side, holding my hand, and goes to the next phrase. "I played a funny trick." "What are we going to do for the recess, Jeffry? I think I'd like to make a big castle in the sand box. What do you think?" I ask him. He repeats the same phrase. "I played a funny trick." "We need some twigs and grasses to decorate our castle, don't you think?" I keep my part of the talk. And so does Jeffry. "I played a funny trick," sings Jeffry, again clinging to me with the same anxious look. "Or maybe we can make a pond beside the castle, because it's very hot today. Don't you think ... " "I played a funny trick," Jeffry interrupts me. I give up. "Okay, Jeffry." I say and sing, "I played a funny trick." Then Jeffry sings the next phrase. "Out in the yard behind the house." "Out in the yard behind the house," I follow. Jeffry goes on to the next, and this time I sing *with* him. Now he stops singing, pulling my arm, trying to stop me singing. "What, Jeffry?" Without answering me, he repeats the same part.

After him I sing the same phrase. Then he sings the next part followed by me, and then he goes

When we get to the playground, I ask him, "Well, Jeffry, shall we make a castle?" He stops singing, lets go of my hand, and leaves me for a spot some metres away from the playground, without looking at me. There, on the spot, he stays for a while, hanging around a bit until he notices his classroom teacher coming toward the playground and hurries to her. I see Jeffry take her hand, looking into her face from her side. I know what he is going to do with her. He expects his teacher to sing a song with him, phrase by phrase, taking turns. I turn my eyes away from him, looking for someone to play with. I find Lisa turning around the manhole near the tennis court, handling her braid. I approach her.

After a while when I am sitting in the shade with Lisa, I notice, at the corner of my eyes, Jeffry walking toward us. When he comes within my reach, I ask "Hi, Jeffry. Would you like to take a rest with us?" But instead of answering my question and even before he sits beside me, he starts talking. "They had a beautiful garden of their own." There we go. The story of "the adventure of Care Bears."

His story telling always starts abruptly without any notice. Occasionally, like this time, it begins even before we settle down for the story. When I first met him I had no idea of what he was talking about, let alone his intention or expectation. The more he talked, the more I was confused. And the more I was confused, the more he got upset. It was not until he said, "Turn the page now," that I realized he was

repeating the story to which he had listened on a cassette tape. And once I realized that he was telling me a story, it did not take me long before I understood what he expected me to do. He wanted me to repeat exactly what he said. Since then every time I visit the school, what we do at the recess with his initiative has been either singing a song or telling a story. And we have to follow his rule strictly; he goes first, and I repeat what he sings or tells. He tries, with great patience, to let me follow the rule whenever I do something against it. I try, too, to find a way out of this ritualized routine, not only because it does not interest me very much but also because it is not likely that this way of interacting with others would help Jeffry make his world larger and richer. But, so far, whenever I try, our interaction ends up with either my giving in to his rules or his giving up the interaction itself altogether.

Today, too, I try, once again, to alter this routine. Instead of repeating the sentence which Jeffry uttered, I turn it into a question: "Oh, did they have a beautiful garden?" Jeffry, now sitting beside me with his hands on my lap, repeats, "They had a beautiful garden of their own." "How wonderfull But where did they have a beautiful garden, Jeffry?" He looks down and keeps silent for a while. Then he looks up at me again, this time with his serious smile, and says, "They had a beautiful garden of their own." "What did they grow on their garden, I wonder," I continue my side of the effort, too. "Tomatoes or cucumbers? Could be watermelons that we've just had." His face, which was getting closer and closer every time he repeats the sentence, almost touches mine now. I can feel his anxious bewilderment and tension in him. I cannot continue any more. I give in. "They had a beautiful garden of their

own," I repeat. Tension goes away from his face which now has retreated a little. But a story goes right on. "They grew flowers there." I knew that, Jeffry, I think to myself. I knew you would say that next. That's why I asked you what they grew on the garden. I wish you had only said that right after my question ... I am brought back to the reality when I hear him repeat, "They grew flowers there." "Ah! Flowers! That's what they grew! I should have known!" He seems to be aghast for a moment at my response. Now this is my turn to bring my face close to his. I whisper to him, "Their garden must be very, very beautiful with lots of flowers!" He drops his head down and starts pulling the grass. Perhaps I am pushing him too much.

After a while he looks up at me again and says, "They took a train and went off to the adventure." "Ohh!" I say and look at him eagerly, trying to show him that I am listening to his story. "They took a train and off went to the adventure." "Wow! What happens next?" "They took a train and off went to the adventure," says he again. His eyes follow mine so that I do not fail to see him. This time I cannot take the elevating tension any more. "They took a train and ..." I repeat. Then he goes to the next sentence, which I repeat, followed by his next sentence, and the story goes on.

Karen

Karen holds my hand and takes me to the book area of the room. "What are we going to do, Karen?" I ask. She points to the book shelf, looking at me with a smile. "Oh,

would you like to read a book?" I ask again. She answers, "Yal" "Okay, Karen. Which book would you like to read?" I ask. But I did not have to, because she has gone to the book shelf already. She carefully looks through each shelf with her hand which helps her weak eyesight to find her favorite book. After she picks one she comes back to me with a book under her arm. Then she takes my hand and invites me to sit on a couch, tapping the seat looking up at me. "Are we going to read a book on a couch?" "Yal" Karen smiles. "Okay, Karen." She lets me sit first, assisting me with her hands on my side to make sure I sit in the right place, then she sits down right beside me. When we both settle down properly, she hands me a book, with the utterance which sounds like a short "ah!" "Which book did you pick, Karen? Oh, 'Baby Animals.' Let's see who are there." I open the book and start reading, or looking at the pictures, since there are no words in the book. "What's this, Karen?" I point to the giraffe on a page. "Giraffe," she signs, looking at me. "Right, Karen. It's a baby giraffe. Even a baby giraffe has a long neck, doesn't it?" "Yal" She says, turning the page. When she finds a kitten on the next page, she looks up at me and signs a "cat," vocalizing "meowl"

While reading, she keeps on talking with signs and vocalization and her beautiful smile. Each time we finish a book, she takes it back to the shelf and brings another one. Sometimes, especially when the sentences on a page are too many for her, she does not listen to me. She starts looking around to see what other children are doing or turns the page before I finish reading. Yet our reading and talking go on. She imitates a bark when she sees a puppy, she roars and paws me upon finding a lion on a page. She points towards the outside through the window and signs "snow" when

we see a girl with an umbrella in the rain on a page. Sometimes when I stop reading in the middle of the sentence, she continues after me with the sign. Although this happens only when we read her favorite and therefore familiar book whose sentences she knows very well, she likes this turn-taking. At some point, she moves from her spot to climb up to my lap. She rearranges my position as well as hers to settle down comfortably. She may not be listening to a story I am reading, she does not even seem to be looking at a picture, resting her head on my chest. But when I stop reading, she points to the page uttering "ah, ah!" "Would you like me to read some more?" She replies, "Yal"

After having read several books, she stands up, takes my hand and leaves the book area with me. But before long she lets go of my hand and, without looking at me, hurries to a table where other children are drawing. She finds a spot, calls a teacher and somehow lets her know what she wants with signing, pointing, vocalization and so on. She starts drawing. I watch her draw.

Later, Karen comes to me in the block area when I am making a house with some children. "Hi!" she says to me with a big smile and sits beside me. She joins us making a house with blocks, putting a block on top of the roof and so on. Sometimes her effort results in rather destructive effects and some children complain about it, but she keeps on trying to participate.

After a while when she is satisfied with or bored of the play, she takes my hand and tells me to stand up by pulling my hand. "No more blocks, Karen?" I ask.

Replying "Yal" she takes me away from the block area and sits down on the floor. Then, by patting the floor in front of her and looking up at me, she tells me to sit down there. We sit facing each other with our legs crossed. There is nothing for us to play with; no books, no paints, no blocks. Just two of us facing each other. She is smiling at me, probably with anticipation. "What shall we do now, Karen? What would you like to do?" I ask, smiling back to her. "Sing," she signs. "Singing? Do you want to sing a song?" I ask. She, smiling even broader, says, "Yal" "Okay. Which song shall we sing? You choose one, Karen." I tell her even though I know her answer. "Sun" she signs. We start singing; I sing with my voice and Karen with signing. "Come on, Karen, you sing, too." I say to her when she stops singing and listening to me, smiling. Then she starts singing again. She signs some words of the song --- sun, cloud, trees, please and so forth --- with me. She knows where to "sing" these words and signs them at the right place.

From time to time I stop singing just before a word she can sign. "Mr. Sun, Sun, Mr. golden Sun, hiding behind the ... " and I wait, stretching the last note. Karen immediately signs, "tree." She knows this is a game, and sometimes even waits expectantly for me to stop singing. She listens to me eagerly, nearing her smiling face with anticipation, just like an infant, playing peek-a-boo, waiting for her father's face popping up from behind the couch. And as soon as I stop singing, she signs the word.

Signing is not the only way of her singing. A glowing smile, cheerful regard, and the upper body that moves with the rhythm of the song, in other words, her

whole body is singing, too.

Language Use

Although we can recognize some similarities between Jeffry and Karen as we will see later, there are apparent differences which seem to surpass those similarities. One of the most striking differences would be that of language use by Jeffry and Karen. Jeffry can speak what he heard on a cassette tape clearly enough for us to understand him without much difficulty. On the other hand, Karen does not speak much mainly because of neurological and physiological impairments. She has been learning American Sign Language instead, and her main mode of communication is signing. However, apart from the difference of modes of communication, the linguistic performance of Jeffry and Karen is not at the same level as is quite apparent from the descriptions above. That is, Jeffry can say complete sentences while Karen's talk consists mainly of one word sentences. Her vocabulary is more limited and her signing is not clear enough for everyone to understand it. Therefore, in a very conventional sense, Jeffry can talk fairly well, while Karen cannot talk very well. Jeffry shows higher linguistic ability than Karen.

And yet, Jeffry does not "really" talk, while Karen does. From what Jeffry utters it is obvious that he could talk, but he does not talk. Jeffry is capable of talking but does not communicate, while Karen does communicate in spite of the limitation of her language skill. It is this unbalance between what they could do and what they actually do that strikes us. Heidegger writes as follows;

To say and to speak are not identical. A man may speak, speak endlessly, and all the same say nothing. Another man may remain silent, not speak at all and yet, without speaking, say a great deal... The essential being of language is Saying as Showing [letting appear, letting be seen and heard]. Its showing character is not based on signs of any kind; rather, all signs arise from a showing within whose realm and for whose purposes they can be signs. (1971, p. 122, 123)

In this sense, Jeffry speaks but does not say much, while Karen cannot speak very well but says a great deal. This difference of relations between speaking and saying invites us to reflect on communication. But before moving into the topic, let us see the similarities in Jeffry and Karen, because they also show us some aspects of communication.

Repetition and Turn Taking

Although not as obvious and impressive as the difference is, the similarities between the ways Jeffry and Karen interacted with me are interesting to reflect on in terms of communication. Those similarities are repetition and turn taking. However, it would be worth noting that similarities here are not so simple because they are, as will be seen, interwoven with differences in these two children.

The first similarities between what Jeffry does with me, or rather what he wants me to do, and what Karen does with me is repetition of more or less the same activities. In Jeffry's case he not only wants me to repeat what he says, but also

repeats the same pattern of interaction. In a sense his interaction with me consists only of this double bound repetition. Karen also enjoys the repetition of the same interaction: she likes to read the same book and to answer the same questions; she asks me to sing the same song every time we meet; she wants to sing the song together again and again; she likes to play a little game while singing as described before. In fact, repetition is one of the most familiar phenomena seen in small children's activities. A baby in the crib drops her small toy to the floor, carefully watches how it falls, asks her father to give it back to her, then drops it again, watching it fall with great interest, then calls her father again. A boy puts his blocks into a box one by one, puts the cover on it, opens it, takes blocks again one by one, only to start the same play all over again.

When the repetition is done between two or more persons, it becomes a form of turn-taking. A nine-month-old girl enjoys giving a little toy to her mother and taking it away again. She also likes to play catch with her parents. A child learns to "take turns" riding a rocking horse with his sibling and/or friends. Even conversation is a form of turn-taking. Or rather, turn-taking in small children's play nurtures the possibility of verbal communication in its full sense. That interpersonal activities of both Jeffry and Karen show this turn taking, therefore, seems to imply the possibilities they have for further enrichment of their being.

However, although patterns of Jeffry and Karen's play can be categorized into the same terms of repetition and turn-taking, their content (or quality) is quite different. In turn-taking between Karen and me, the rule is by no means rigid. Of

course, there are certain ways we read or sing to make our reading and singing our own. Namely, I stop at certain points where I know she wants me to stop, she wants me to sit facing her while singing, a certain way of singing is required to tell her when she signs, and the like. But these rules are flexible and I can, for example, when imitating the sounds of animals while reading a picture book, change the way I imitate them sometimes by just making a sound and other times with body movements. What seems to be more important when I make these changes is that Karen also changes her responses. She can act differently according to the change of other person's acts. There is a reciprocity in the play between Karen and others.

In Jeffry's case, on the other hand, it is hard to notice either flexibility or reciprocity in his interaction with others. Rules are too rigid to make any small changes. He would not respond to a change from another person. The interaction would never proceed unless others follow his rules.

This difference in terms of flexibility and reciprocity in the shared characteristics of repetition and turn-taking seems to show the essential difference between Jeffry and Karen in their interpersonal relationships, of which language use is one of the aspects. In other words, that Jeffry speaks but does not say much, while Karen cannot speak but says a great deal does not derive only from the difference of their language use but from that of their ways of interacting with others. Behind the difference of the ways they *speak* lies the difference of the ways they *are*.

I am inclined to point out here, however, that Jeffry's way of communicating

with others should not be totally rejected as being of little value. Although Jeffry's interpersonal activity is rigid and strict, it should not be forgotten that this is his only way of communicating with others. It is what he desires. It would certainly be preferable if Jeffry's communication could become more flexible and tolerant of any changes, and that is the main reason why I have tried to alter the procedure in one way or another, as described above. But trying to change his way of interacting does not mean to deny and stop it. Whatever form it might take, communicating with others is far better than not communicating at all¹³.

Smiling

Smiling seems to disclose ways of being too. And here, again, the contrast between the way Jeffry smiles and Karen smiles is remarkable.

It is not quite clear if Jeffry is really smiling when he seems to be smiling. His facial display is almost identical to that of a smile, which led me to describe his expression as "smiling." But the resemblance ends there. There does not seem to be any mode of emotion involved which we usually see in smiling such as happiness, pleasure, expectation, or even shyness. Besides, his eyes are not smiling, which made me inclined to use the adjective "anxious" or "serious." Above all, when he smiled at me, it did not make me smile back at him. I could not smile back at him in a way I would do with other children. Or, perhaps it would have been easier for me to respond to him if he had not smiled at all. What was troublesome was that only his face displayed an expression of a smile while he himself was not smiling. Or it might

be that Jeffry was smiling a smile of his own; a smile which may not be seen as a smile in a conventional sense, and yet contains something essential that makes a smile a smile.

It is only too natural for us to smile back when we meet a smile from others, especially from small children. Studies on smiling have been conducted from various perspectives, such as the neurological and physiological basis of the smile (Rinn, 1984), the cognitive development of smiling (Sroufe & Waters, 1976), and ethological and/or phylogenetic studies on the smile (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1970, 1972; Kockard, Fahrenbruch, Smith & Morgan, 1972, van Hooff, 1972). But Bowlby's (1969) identification of the smile as an expression of attachment which nurtures the social bond between an infant and mother has never been denied.

Like Karen's glowing smile, a smile in a child's face shows openness and basic trust of a child to the world, and lets us adults become open to a child, too. Sometimes we may also recognize vulnerability in a smile, perhaps because we feel, in the smile, that trust to others and the world is too innocent and could be hurt too easily. Nevertheless even that vulnerability makes us feel responsible for the child. When Karen smiles, her smile shows expectation, trust and openness, which makes me irresistibly smile back to her. In her smile we can see her openness, her way of being in the world.

However, what the smile implies is not only that openness, or trust. In his article on the smile, Buytendijk (1947) lets us recognize ~~shyness~~ and ambivalence

as essential to the smile. When a person smiles, Buytendijk says, he or she is in an ambivalent situation between his or her anticipation of what is going to happen and what will actually happen. Smile is an expression of that ambivalence. Plessner (1970) also sees ambivalence in the smile; ambivalence of one's being as having a body (physical body) and at the same time as being a body (lived body). These insights seem to help us understand Jeffry's smile.

When Jeffry smiles, or when he shows a facial expression which looks like a smile, he looks extremely anxious and serious and we can feel the tension in him. Probably he may be too concerned with following his rules strictly, and the doubt that others may not follow his rules makes him anxious. Between anticipation and doubt, between trust and anxiety, he is ambivalent. Thus comes his smile -- a deadly serious smile. Jeffry's smile, therefore, is an expression of his being, just like Karen's is an expression of hers.

Communication is not just an exchange of information. It is based on an encounter, "the discovery of a 'Thou,' who engages with me in a relation, and who, so to speak, enters the threshold of my inner life and whose own life reveals itself to me" (Buytendijk, 1947, p. 6). What is communicated there is not information, but ways of our being. Language as verbal communication and smile as non-verbal communication are not just tools for communication, but modes in which one's way of being is disclosed.

Anthony

Anthony, an autistic boy, is now learning how to read simple sentences. He works on a textbook with his teacher. The work proceeds as follows:

Anthony: (reads a text) A dog met a cat on a bridge.

Teacher: Who met a cat on a bridge?

Anthony: A dog met a cat on a bridge.

T : Who did a dog meet on a bridge?

A : A dog met a cat on a bridge.

T : Where did a dog meet a cat?

A : Where did a dog ...

T : Where did a dog meet a cat?

A : A bridge

T : Where did a dog meet a cat?

A : A dog met a cat on a bridge.

So, obviously Anthony can read. He can read aloud, too. Therefore, he can, of course, speak. Yet he hardly speaks spontaneously. When he does speak, it is basically because he needs something. "Give me some water, please," he asks when he is thirsty. "I want to go to the bathroom," he says when he needs to go. When told to do so by his teacher, he can greet me. "Good morning, Chiko." "Good bye, Chiko." He can even say "Thank you, Chiko," when I give him a sticker as a token for his work. And he utters all these perfect sentences in a whisper. He whispers so softly sometimes that you need to strain your ear close to his mouth.

Sometimes Anthony gets panicked, then his real voice can be heard through screaming and crying. It is by no means pleasant to hear him cry or scream, but in a peculiar way it is also, in a sense, relieving because it is almost the only time he stops whispering and expresses himself with his real voice.

Other than occasionally screaming or shouting, Anthony is a very quiet boy. He spends most of his free time, such as recess, staying away from teachers and other children. And those are the times when he smiles. He smiles, sometimes even laughs, while jumping around and clapping his hands. And his smile fades away when somebody gets close to him. Therefore, his smile is basically for himself. At least, I have never seen him smiling at others.

My last visit to the school coincides with a field trip. We go to a park and a swimming pool just beside the park.

I am with Mike in the pool when I bang into Anthony, who is turning around, jumping and clapping, with a smile. "Oh, sorry, Anthony. I didn't see you," I apologize. Anthony does not reply, but he does not stop smiling, either. "You look very happy today, Anthony. I bet you like swimming." I talk to him and receive no response as usual, neither positive nor negative. A teacher who is close to us tells me, "Anthony likes water very much. He loves to be thrown away in the water." Then she turns to Anthony and says, "Do you want Chiko to throw you into the water?" He comes to me. "Say, 'please, Chiko,'" a teacher says. Anthony whispers, "Please, Chiko." "Okay, Anthony." I hold him from behind (that is how he wants me to hold him), lift him up in the air, and throw him away. I see him in the water moving his limbs, and recognize a smile on his face. When he finally stands on his feet, he comes back to me and, turning his back on me, whispers, "Throw me away, Chiko." We repeat the same thing again and again until he comes to me from behind and whispers, "Carry me, Chiko, please." I carry him on my back, make several

spins, and shake him off into the water. He loves that, too. We repeat this time and again, too, and everytime he climbs onto my back he whispers, putting his hands around my neck, "Carry me, Chiko, please." He is smiling when he speaks, although the smile does not seem to be directed to me, because he does not look at me when he smiles and when he asks me to carry him.

Through five months of my visit to the school, that was the only time I heard Anthony spontaneously say what he wanted. It should be noted that he spoke neither because he was thirsty, nor because he needed to go to the bathroom, but simply because he wanted somebody to do something with him. That was also the only time I saw Anthony smile while he was talking. There seemed, at least to me, to be a shared situation. The talk was much like a whisper as usual. The smile was not directly addressed to me. He did not even appear to see me once, either. It might also be that what he wanted of me was to do something *for* him rather than *with* him. In this sense it might be possible to argue that Anthony was still using me as a tool to obtain what he wanted, instead of interacting with me as a person. Yet, however softly he whispered, and however vague his smile was, he whispered on his own will, and his smile did not fade away when he came to me. Besides, I did recognize the difference in Anthony. For the first time, in the swimming pool, I felt it was possible to communicate with him, share the experience with him. And in that situation occurred his spontaneous whisper and his smile.

"Self-Talk"

I am lying in my bed, looking at the darkness, with my three students. At nine o'clock in the evening, I am not yet sleepy at all. After the long trip from the city where we live, I am tired and should be sleepy. But I am not. This is the first night of our one-week summer camp during which I will spend almost all the time with my three students. What if somebody does not sleep the whole night? What if Ted or Ken has a seizure? Those thoughts probably keep me wide awake. Besides, although I have known them for quite a long time, I have never stayed with them at night. This is a new experience for me. And it is also a first time for my three students to spend such a long time with me.

A few minutes ago I announced to them it was time to go to sleep. I turned off the light in the room. The romping and chattering which had filled our room until then now ceases and silence seemingly pervades the room. But I know that no one is sleeping. It is a surprise that everybody is quiet even though they are all awake. I thought they might fuss around, at least for a little while, until they finally go to sleep.

I hear Ken, a thirteen-year-old boy with Down syndrome, turn over. He whispers to Aki, another thirteen-year-old boy with Down syndrome, who is lying next to Ken. Aki says in a low voice, "Ssh Ken, I'm going to sleep. You sleep, too." All right, Aki will sleep soon, I think to myself, surprised at the response of Aki who is usually very active, outgoing, and at times a little mischievous. Ken, rejected by

one of his best friends, turns over. I guess he needs more time to fall asleep.

Meanwhile, Ted, a fifteen-year-old boy with cerebral palsy, begins to talk to himself in his usual tone. "Bath, bath, I took a bath with Mr. H. I took a bath with Mr. H." "I like mommy.... I like daddy...." With his big eyes wide open, he fingers his pillow case. The tone of his talk is exactly the same as how he talks at school when he says, "I like Ms. Maeda," to me. It seems that, whereas Ken and Aki are aware of the specialness of the night — the first night of the summer camp, its being a sleep time when we had better stay quiet, sleeping with people whom they don't usually sleep with, and so on — Ted does not care about it very much.

Ted's self-talk continues after a short intermission. "Tim, Tim!" He calls Tim as if he were here. Tim who? I am a little confused. I know, I think to myself, that Ted and Tim are good friends. But Tim is not here. Is Ted dreaming? Then Ted says, this time, "Ken, Ken!" Ken turns half way around toward Ted and asks, "What, Ted?" Ted does not answer. He does not even change his posture with his back toward Ken. "What did you say, Ted?" Ken whispers again. Ted laughs under his breath but does not answer Ken. Ken lies down again. Ted calls again, "Ken! ... Ken! ... I like Ken!" Ken turns his head toward Ted, but says nothing.

Eventually Ken begins talking to himself in a low voice. "Nagano, Nagano, we are now in Nagano. The train will depart in five minutes ... " His intonation is just like a conductor's announcement in the train. So you are remembering our long train trip from Tokyo that we had today, Ken, I think to myself. It must have been an

exciting experience for you. You like taking the train to school. You have learned by heart the names of all the stations you pass everyday, haven't you? ... I close my eyes, hearing Ken's passenger-conductor talk. It takes me back to our trip, too. My attention to the three students slips away for a moment and takes me back in the train.

Suddenly Ken's talk is interrupted. "Tokyo, Tokyo, ..." Ted announces. His way of saying "Tokyo" mimics the announcement we hear at the station or on the train. But this unusually rapid and appropriate response surprises me. Ken seems to be surprised too, because he stops talking to himself. Were you listening to Ken? Do you want to join our trip, Ted? I look at him. He is lying toward me, still fingering his pillow case. His eyes are open but he is not looking at me nor at anything else.

After a while Ken starts his self-talk again. Ted also says, "Tokyo, Tokyo, ..." However Ken does not seem to care about Ted any more and continues his trip. So does Ted, sometimes laughing in a low voice. Are they disturbing Aki? I wonder. I feel Aki has not fallen asleep yet. But he does not say anything to anybody and lies still, as if he is also sharing this situation with Ken and Ted.

I feel I am getting sleepy, too, hearing their self-talks. Don't I have to go to the staff meeting? But that thought leaves as quickly as it came. I am half awake and half asleep. Lying still with my eyes closed, I no longer try to observe them nor to interpret their talks. My being a teacher in charge of this group no longer seems

terribly important. I no longer care who is talking nor who is laughing. I am simply a sleeping person who shares this situation with my three students. I am falling down, down, down to sleep....

The Tone of Self-Talk

Self-talk is common among the small children we observe in everyday life. They frequently talk to themselves when they play alone. I once saw Karen "talk" to herself by signing "dog," while she was reading a picture book alone. Even adults, at times, talk to themselves. But what is self-talk? What would Ted's self-talk tell us about his way of being?

One characteristic of Ted's self-talk is the way he talked. That is, his tone of voice and the way he talked were not different from how he talked when he was awake. His voice was neither louder nor lower than usual. When he said, "Tim!" or "Ken!" there was little difference between them, although Ken was in the same room while Tim was not. Besides, the way he called them was not different from how he called me "Ms. Maedal" at school, either. The only time his way of talking changed was when he said "Tokyo," of which I will say more later.

This consistency between Ken's usual talk and self-talk is rather remarkable when we remember his self-talk. When he was self-talking, Ken's voice was low as if he was whispering, which was quite different from the way he talked when he was awake. Even that evening while he was self-talking, the tone changed when he asked,

"What, Ted?" "What did you say, Ted?" In other words, Ken's self-talk is different from his usual talk whereas Ted's self-talk is almost identical to his usual talk, which may suggest that Ken is aware of the difference of situation while Ted is not, or at least he does not care about the difference.

The Contents of Self Talk

The next characteristic of Ted's self-talk is its content. As we may easily suspect, Ted's utterance "I took a bath with Mr. H." is a reflection of what he did that day. Taking a bath with a different, yet favorite, person in a different bathroom must have been very impressive to Ted. It is quite understandable, therefore, that this talk about having taken a bath was the only talk that I had not heard before. On the other hand, "I like mommy ...," and "I like daddy ..." are the expressions I had often heard at school. So is his calling of "Tim!" or "Ken!" As a matter of fact, mentioning his liking somebody (such as his family members, teachers, friends) and calling somebody were the most common topics of Ted's talk at school.

In any case, the common feature of those self-talks is that they have nothing to do with the particular situation of going to sleep. This feature itself, of course, would not make Ted's self-talk special, since the self-talks of Ken, and probably those of most people, are not directly related to the situation in which self-talks are made. Rather, what is remarkable is that in Ted's self-talk, all these topics were uttered without any relation to each other. At one point he might talk about his mother, but a moment later he might suddenly call Tim, and, after a short

intermission, talk about having taken a bath. It is as if Ted were uttering what flashes into his mind at each moment. And that was why I, and probably even Ken, were surprised when we heard Ted announce "Tokyo! Tokyo!"

It was obvious that Ted's "Tokyo!" was influenced by Ken's self-talk which mimicked a conductor's announcements. The way Ted talked, too, was so appropriately an imitation of a conductor that I, or anybody else, would not fail to recognize it. This was also a reflection of what he had done that day, just as his talk of having taken a bath was. In this sense Ted might not have talked of these things if we had not had the train trip that day. Nevertheless, it is undeniable that Ken's self-talk had an influence on Ted's "Tokyo," considering the perfect timing and his imitation of a train conductor.

The Gaze of Self-Talk

During his self-talk, Ted's eyes were open. But he was not looking at anything in particular. He did not close his eyes until he finally fell asleep. Ted is not the only child whose eyes remain open in bed. I have seen many children at a daycare centre who kept their eyes open in their beds at nap time. They stayed still and quiet, with their eyes open, without looking at anything in particular. It is not usual, on the other hand, for us grown-ups to keep our eyes open when we go to sleep. It would be extremely difficult to fall asleep if we did not close our eyes. We do so deliberately to go to sleep. But small children do not. It seems that children do not try to fall asleep like we adults do.



Generally, visual perception is more voluntarily controllable than hearing. It is easier to cut the channel of visual stimuli than that of auditory stimuli: We only have to close our eyes not to see. Merleau-Ponty, who sees the body as an intertwining of vision and movement, "the map of the visible" and "the map of the 'I can,'" asks:

We see only what we look at. What would vision be without eye movement? And how could the movement of the eyes bring things together if the movement were blind?" And he continues asking, "if it were only a reflex? If it did not have its antennae, its clairvoyance? If vision were not prefigured in it? (1964b, p. 162)

Seeing is, according to Merleau-Ponty, a deliberate action of human consciousness. That is why we close our eyes when we go to sleep, trying to shut off the outer world. But it is not only the outer world that is shut off. By closing the eyes we also shut off the activities of our minds. We try to give ourselves to sleep by shutting off the outer world and our activities. But why do small children have to close their eyes if they are not trying to sleep, if they do not have anything to be shut off, and if their visions are not "prefigured" any more in the process of falling asleep?

It is true that the faculty of vision is more deliberate than other senses. Small children also see things attentively while they are fully awake. But when they are falling asleep, the deliberate control over vision seems somehow to slip away from them. Probably the distinction, or "the wall," as Merleau-Ponty says, between

the self and others, which is being formed in the process of their development, becomes less clear when they fall asleep. Between being awake and being asleep, their self becomes more undifferentiated; there is a loosening of the boundaries between self and others, between the individual and the outer world. Small children do not (or cannot) look at things any more, yet they do not (or cannot) voluntarily close their eyes either. Between being awake and asleep hovers the world in which the child lives as a more clearly defined self and the world in which the child's self is less differentiated.

It seems that it is this undifferentiation that we see in Ted's way of self-talking and its contents, as well as his open, yet unfocussed eyes, when he falls asleep. And it is not only Ted who shows these aspects in falling asleep. "Non-handicapped" children, too, seem to go through the same sequence of subtle states from undifferentiated to more clearly defined self, which can be observed, again, in the process of falling asleep.

(Un)differentiation of Self and Others

I hear Asuka, my two year old daughter, crying for me in her bed. It is about ten minutes after I left her there, having read her a bed-time story. Her voice is not very loud but miserable enough to have me go and see her. I approach her bedroom, feeling that she is looking at the door expecting my appearance. "What's the matter with you, Asuka?" I ask. Crying even louder, she replies, "I *can't* sleep."

Asuka said that she could not sleep, which means that she had tried to sleep but failed. It had never occurred to her before that sleep can be elusive, although she sometimes did not sleep at the time her parents expected her to be sleeping. She had never before minded that she did not fall asleep, and the only thing that she minded when she did not fall asleep was just to wait for sleep to visit her. Being unable to sleep was not a problem for her. Sometimes she might be able to sleep, and sometimes she might not. But that was not her problem. But now, this evening, sleeping has become something to be sought after. She finds it worrisome not to be able to sleep. She cannot wait any more and tries to give herself to sleep. Now, being unable to fall asleep has become her problem. Lying beside this little girl, who is now sleeping with stains of tears on her cheeks, I talk to her in my mind, "You are growing up, aren't you?"

When she was smaller, I used to stay with her in her bed, which gave me the opportunity to watch her falling asleep. At first, she would play with me, tapping my shoulder or face, or climbing up to my stomach. Then, crawling away from me, she would turn away from me with her back toward me, fingering her favorite blanket. Sometimes I would expect that she was about to fall asleep. But then, after a while, she would turn around to me suddenly and try to play with me again, this time with her blanket in her hand. Her eyes would tell me that she was very sleepy, yet she tried to be with me, as if she wanted to fall asleep with me, or as if she wanted me to fall asleep with her. She would hover between her own world of sleep and the world she shared with me. And finally, she would enter into her own world of sleep, leaving me, yet still feeling me beside her.

She used to spend most of her time with me. She shared her world with me and others most of the time she was awake, although this "sharing" was not based on a "genuine communication," but on a state of "pre-communication," wherein "the other's intentions somehow play across my body while my intentions play across his" (Merleau-Ponty, 1964b, p.119). Only when she fell asleep did she have her own world, even if she was unaware of it.

It is impossible for us to fall into the world of sleep with someone else. In that sense we all have to fall asleep alone. Asuka had been simply unaware of it until the evening when she cried, "I can't sleep," probably because she had not even had a strong sense of the self-others differentiation. It had not been until that evening (when Asuka was two years and seven months old) I found her crying that she somehow noticed the difference between herself and the outer world of others. And once she noticed it, she could no longer be naive; she could no longer wait for sleep to fall upon her as she used to. Indeed, as she herself said, it was not that she *didn't* sleep nor *wouldn't*, but that she *couldn't*. From this point of view, we can recognize her cry of "I can't sleep" as a landmark along the way of her development; a landmark between a state where "the me is both entirely unaware of itself and at the same time all the more demanding for being unaware of its own limits" and a state where "me ... is a me that knows its own limits yet possesses the power to cross them by a genuine sympathy that is at least relatively distinct from the initial form of sympathy" (Merleau-Ponty, 1964b, p.120).

Of course Asuka is still a long way from maturity. About six months after that evening, she said, "Leave the door open. And you will come to me when I feel lonely, won't you?" when I was leaving her room after a bed-time story. She smiled when I assured her, then turned around toward the wall, fingering her blanket. She did not need my physical presence and could fall asleep with the assurance of my absent presence.

Now she is six years old and shows other interesting aspects of the process of falling asleep. She does not like going to bed like most children. There are nights when she cannot sleep easily even though she is willing to, but sometimes she wishes for sleeplessness, trying to be awake until her father comes home or until Santa Claus comes with a present for her on Christmas Eve. Through the experience of those evenings, she seems to have been learning how to cope with the process of falling asleep. Now she is very aware of her going to sleep.

And yet, basically, she still waits for sleep to visit her, instead of deliberately trying to give herself to sleep, because, for one thing, just like Ted, she does not close her eyes until she finally falls asleep. For us grown-ups it is almost impossible to fall asleep if we leave our eyes open in the bed. But for Asuka it does not seem to be difficult to wait for sleep to come with her eyes open. And this is when she, at times, talks to herself, again, like Ted. It is as if she hovers, when falling asleep, between the world she knows more clearly and the world where distinctions between herself, others, and things are less rigid.

In any case, although going to sleep is one of the most common events of our everyday life, we can see, in the process of falling asleep, phases of developmental change especially in terms of the self-others differentiation. Awareness or unawareness of going to sleep, widely opened eyes, and the self-talk all seem to indicate a way of one's being in the world.

In a sense "self-talk" is a strange expression, because people talk to themselves only when they are not aware that they are talking, that is, only when they are unaware of themselves, others or the world. A girl who is talking to herself, playing with her dolls, would become shy if she noticed that her parent came to her room and found her self-talking. As adults we would also be surprised if somebody asked about or answered to our self-talk. We have been unaware of ourselves until then. Thus, it would not be inappropriate to see Ted's self-talk as an expression of his way of being, an undifferentiated state between self and others.

Some might say that if even adults are unaware of themselves when they talk to themselves, then it might be that Ted's self was not clearly defined only when he falls asleep, just like Ken or Asuka, or any other small children. It is true that Ken engaged in self-talk that evening and Asuka, now at age six, still does. The point here, though, is not the fact that Ted talks to himself, but rather, the manner in which Ted talks and what he talks about.

His way of self-talking is identical to that of his talking while he is fully awake. The only time his tone changed was when he said "Tokyo!" This was, as I said,

influenced by Ken's talk. But being influenced by Ken's self-talk does not mean that he responded directly to Ken. Although Ted changed his way of talking, his talk was not directed toward Ken. He did not turn over toward Ken. Although Ted changed the tone of his voice, it was changed into a mimic of a train conductor, but not into the way he spoke to Ken. It is as if Ted responded to the situation of which Ken's self-talk was a part.

Compared to Ken's self-talk, Ted's response to the situation seems to be an important point. When Ken changed his way of talking ("What, Ted?"), his talk was directed to Ted. It was a response to Ted, not to the situation. In other words, even while he was self-talking, Ken was still aware of the existence of others (in this case Ted). Ken also stopped talking to himself, perhaps being surprised, when Ted suddenly uttered "Tokyo!", just like we grown-ups would stop talking to ourselves when we hear something unusual. Even during the self-talk in the process of falling asleep, Ken still came to himself and did not confuse others with the situation. Ted, on the other hand, did not come to himself and continued his self-talk. Perhaps his self, to which he might have come, is not yet defined clearly enough to enable him to differentiate a situation itself from components (others, things, events, and the like) of the situation. It could be said that his way of being is in a state of pre-communication, wherein "the other's intentions somehow play *across* my body while my intentions play across his" (Merleau-Ponty, 1964b, p.119). And when we see his way of being in this way, his utterance of "a big pumpkin!", in the story of Ted discussed in the Introduction, seems to be better understood.

"A big pumpkin!" was uttered by Ted when his classroom teacher and I were trying to show Ted a huge pumpkin, talking to him about how big it was and suggesting that he touch it. Ted did not touch the pumpkin although his hand was extended in the air, nor did he even look at it. Yet his way of saying "a big pumpkin!" somehow prevented me from considering it as a kind of echolalia.

It seems reasonable to say now, having reflected on his self-talk, that his utterance "a big pumpkin!" was also directed to the situation. Probably, for Ted the focus of our conversation was not on the pumpkin (the topic), but the conversational interaction itself. "A big pumpkin!" was a response Ted gave to the situation, just like his "Tokyo" was a response to the situation that evening.

Difference and Sameness

It might sound odd to speculate that a fifteen-year-old boy who has language may be in a state of pre-communication. But even a grown-up, at times, can be in a similar state. At least, reflecting on that evening, that is how I felt. I wonder if my experience can be clarified further at the hand of the notion of "syncretic sociability." Merleau-Ponty cites this term to refer to a special relation that can exist between self and other: "Syncretism here is the indistinction between me and the other, a confusion *at the core of a situation that is common to us both*. After that the objectification of the body intervenes to establish a sort of wall between me and the other: a partition. Henceforth," says Merleau-Ponty, "it will prevent me from confusing myself with what the other thinks..." (Merleau-Ponty, 1964b, p.120.

Emphasis added)

For the first several minutes after I had turned off the light that evening, I was fully awake and was trying to observe and supervise my students. But while hearing Ken's self-talk, I stopped it and was content to lie in bed with my eyes closed, dreamingly going over our trip that day. I no longer cared very much about who was talking or what they were talking about. It was as if I was held in a common atmosphere with my three students and all their chattering. For a short period (and even I was unaware of it at that time) what I experienced seems to have been a confusion "at the core of a situation that is common to us," or, at least, similar enough to it in order to imagine what it is like. And if I, a grown-up, could experience it, it would not be surprising for children to experience it, either.

A state of pre-communication or syncretic sociability may seem to be a remote, unfamiliar, and different way of being. But it is not, since ("non-handicapped") children, who seem to have established a fairly firm distinction between self and others, and grown-ups, at times, could experience it, although for us it might be only under special conditions, such as in the process of falling asleep.

I have tried to understand Ted's way of being, reflecting on Ted's self-talk while he was falling asleep and on the process of falling asleep itself. By so doing I have attempted to show his way of being as a state of pre-communication where the distinction between self and others is not clearly defined. But my intention is not to

say that everything in the world is boundless and mixed up for Ted, that Ted lives in a world in which everything is fuzzy. As we may suspect from the contents of his self-talk, Ted recognized certain events which made an impression on him, and he felt strong affection for his family and favorite friends, recognizing differences among others. The point here is that recognition and differentiation are formed in Ted's own way, and not in the way that we might expect it. "Ted's own way" may be better understood by us when we use the notion of pre-communication or syncretic sociability as an interpretive tool. We recognize his way of being as being open to the situation with fewer distinctions among others and things that surround him. It becomes possible now to understand his seemingly odd utterances, such as "a big pumpkin!" or "Tokyo!", as utterances which are directed toward each situation where Ted himself, others, things, and events co-exist.

"Seeing and Listening"

Anne -- a Student Teacher

Anne is a student teacher working at a daycare centre. She likes playing with small children and enjoys working at the centre. Children seem to like her, too. Sometimes she wonders if she is teaching these children or she is learning from them.

Anne works in Room C but, like other staff members, she also plays with children in three other rooms. Since Room C and D children get together for a stay-up programme which is for those children who do not need a long nap, Anne knows some children in Room D fairly well, and Karen is one of them. Anne does not know very much about Karen's handicaps nor does she know much about mentally handicapped children. Yet Karen attracts her attention. She, at times, finds herself watching Karen playing from afar. She does not miss the chance to play with Karen, either. Anne likes small children and Karen is, after all, one of them. Or, Anne sometimes wonders if she likes Karen partly because she is handicapped.

Anne knows Karen has a handicap, called CP -- cerebral palsy -- and that Karen wears a helmet when she plays outside in order to protect her head when she falls down abruptly due to a seizure that she may have. She also knows that Karen uses hearing aids, because Karen has come to Anne to ask her to put the aid on when it comes off, and because these aids sometimes "veep" when they catch high sounds.

Anne realizes that Karen cannot talk except saying "hi," "ya," and "bye," and is learning sign language. Anne does not know how to sign, which she regrets because she thinks she could communicate with Karen better if she knew how to sign.

On the other hand, however, Anne is not sure if she really needs the knowledge of signing especially when she sees Karen express herself with facial expressions, body movements and so forth. Just now, for instance, Karen came to Anne, showing her dissatisfaction and unhappiness on her face and in the tone of her voice. When Anne asked, "what's wrong, Karen?" Karen took Anne's hand, pulling her up to take her to where Karen wanted Anne to go, pointing with the other hand to the direction.

Karen took Anne to a girl who was playing with a toy lawn mower. She then pointed to the toy, looking up at Anne. Anne asked the girl, "Karen wants to play with the lawn mower, Sally. Could she play with it?" Sally replied that Karen could not because it was Sally's turn now to play with it after a long time of waiting. Karen, who had been quiet while Anne and Sally were talking, got a little upset and tried to take the lawn mower from Sally when Anne explained to Karen that she had to wait until her turn would come. Anne had to repeat the same explanation a few more times to Karen before Karen finally gave up the idea of playing with the lawn mower.

Looking at Karen who is leaving Anne and Sally, still discontentedly looking back toward the lawn mower, Anne realized how well Karen had expressed herself: Anne had no difficulty in understanding what Karen wanted to do, what Karen wanted

Anne to do; Karen expressed her intention and her feelings effectively. Of course, Anne thinks, there must be things that cannot be expressed only by gestures or facial expressions. In this sense learning how to sign is necessary for Karen. Yet, Anne cannot help being impressed by what Karen can communicate with others without spoken language, and how well she does this.

What amazes Anne most is Karen's tireless energy and curiosity. Karen falls down very often, sometimes tripping over the edge of the sand box or getting caught by a skipping rope on the ground, and at times with no obvious reasons. But she does not seem to be discouraged by it. She may cry when she skins her knee, but after being comforted by a staff member, she ventures out for another exploration. To Anne, Karen is a lovable, lively, and outgoing little girl. Even a temper tantrum that Karen sometimes throws, especially at her younger brother who is in Room C, seems to Anne to be natural. Karen is, after all, a four- and-a-half-year old girl.

Sarah -- a Staff Member

Sarah has recently been transferred from Room A to D. She has been working at the centre for some years and is enjoying working there. When she started working in Room D, Sarah asked Sandy, a special need worker who has been working with Karen, about Karen. Sarah thought it was helpful, and also her responsibility, to gain as much detailed information as possible about Karen. To know Karen's problems, difficulties, and training needs seemed to be indispensable to a responsible staff member, she thought.

Through talking with Sandy, Sarah was informed about Karen's problems: that Karen is diagnosed with a global developmental delay and hypotonia; that she has afebrile seizure, a mild form of CP which mainly affects the muscles around her mouth, poor balance and coordination, and low pain sensitivity; that Karen has a bilateral moderate sensorineural hearing loss; that she is diagnosed as legally blind with bilateral congenital cataracts and strabismus; and that she has depth perception problems with no convergence of the eyes, which consequently cause her lack of fear when jumping from a high place. Sarah also realized that what Sandy focuses on in terms of Karen's training are improving her matching skills, fine motor skills, and her eating skills --- that is to say, to encourage her to put a small amount of food at a time and to chew it instead of swallowing it.

Because Sarah has been working at the centre for quite a long time, Karen had been no stranger for her. She has seen Karen since she started coming here and has played with her without having any detailed information about her. But now that she knows Karen, or at least that is how she feels, she thinks she can see Karen in a different perspective and help her better. For example, Sarah used to see Karen as brave and outgoing when she saw Karen stand up quickly, without crying, after falling down. But now Sarah sees it as the indication of Karen's depth perception problems and of her insensitivity to pain. Or when Karen does not pick up all the blocks for tidying up, Sarah remembers about Karen's visual impairments and thinks to herself, "She can't see very well." Even when Karen is trying to jump down from the couch, Sarah cannot help saying, "Watch out, Karen!" instead of

watching her jump and saying "Good for you, Karen!" as she used to.

Sarah likes Karen, of course. She likes her even better now than before, for despite all of her difficulties Karen is outgoing, energetic and full of curiosity. Thinking about visual and auditory impairments, Karen is amazingly aware of what is going on around her. Above all, Sarah loves what she calls Karen's sense of humour -- Karen knows how to entertain other people, Sarah thinks -- and her openness to others.

Bead Threading

One afternoon during the stay-up time, Anne is with Karen who is making a necklace, putting half-an-inch wooden beads through a string. Anne is also making a necklace, telling Karen, "This necklace is for you, Karen." Then Karen puts the unfinished necklace around Anne's neck. "Oh, is it for me, Karen?" Anne asks. Replying "ya!" Karen continues to put beads through the string. It takes Karen a long time to put one bead through, but Karen does not stop trying and seems determined to make a necklace for Anne. Sometimes when Karen finds it difficult to put a bead through, she shows a bead and string to Anne, vocalizing, "ah!" "Do you want me to put it through?" Anne asks. "Yal" replies Karen, watching the bead and string that Anne takes from Karen. She does not avert her gaze from Anne's fingers while Anne is putting the bead through and smiles when Anne finishes and gives them back to Karen, saying, "Here we go, Karen. Now you try another bead." Of course Anne does not always put a bead through all by herself for Karen. Sometimes she gives Karen a

hand, helping her hold a bead firmly, adjusting the place of the string Karen holds, or putting a string into the edge of the hole and letting Karen do the rest, so that Karen can put a bead through more easily. But when Karen seems to be frustrated, Anne does not hesitate to do all the work for her. It is not an easy task to put a bead through because, Anne thinks, the string is not firm enough to go through the half-an-inch long hole. Despite the difficulties, Karen continues to make a necklace and Anne wants to let her finish it and feel confident about herself.

After a while when Karen has completed bead threading, Anne puts the necklace she made around Karen's neck, and Karen puts the one she made around Anne's neck. "Thank you, Karen. This is very pretty. Do you like your necklace I made for you?" Smiling with the utterance "ya!" Karen touches her necklace as well as Anne's. She looks happy and satisfied.

They are still admiring the necklaces when Sarah passes by. Sarah stops near them, noticing the necklace Karen puts on. "You have a very nice necklace on, Karen. Did Anne make it for you?" Karen, smiling and touching the necklace, replies, "ya!" Anne adds, showing the necklace around her neck, "Yes, and Karen made this for me." Karen made the necklace? Sarah is surprised. "You mean Karen made that necklace for you by herself?" "Yeah, most of it. I helped a little, because ..." "Oh yeah, it's difficult for Karen to put beads through, isn't it, because she can't see very well." Karen can't see very well? Now, Anne is surprised.

"Karen can't see?" Anne asks, partly to Sarah and partly to herself. "Oh,

didn't you know that?" "No!" "Well, she has cataracts and is diagnosed as legally blind." For a moment Anne cannot believe what she has just heard. "I didn't know Karen can't see ... " "She is doing very well for her handicap, isn't she? But you may notice that she can't see very well when you watch her carefully. You know she has tripped often, don't you, that's because she can't see very well. Of course she can see a little. She can see things when they are close to her. But she can't see things far away from her." "I didn't know that." Anne repeats. "Well, I didn't know that Karen could make a necklace, either." Then, noticing that Karen is looking up at Sarah and Anne, Sarah says to Karen, "You did a good job, Karen. That's a very nice necklace!"

Inconsistency

Anne is puzzled. She knew that Karen tends to fall down easily and quite often. She also knew that Karen sometimes could not find certain things -- toys, blocks, crayons, and so forth. But she never doubted Karen's vision. Karen likes reading picture books and she points to animals or flowers on a page when asked to do so by Anne. She enjoys playing with jigsaw puzzles. Of course she cannot put a piece in a correct place at times, but that happens to every child, or at least that is how Anne thought. But was that also because of her visual problems?..

Anne feels a little ashamed of herself since she had not noticed Karen's visual impairment for a few weeks until Sarah told her. She could have noticed if she had been more attentive to Karen's behavior, she thinks.

At the same time, however, Anne is not yet totally convinced. On the one hand, Sarah's remarks about Karen's visual impairments remind Anne of some happenings that may be explained by Karen's being legally blind. On the other hand, however, Anne can recall many other things that cannot be explained by it. For example, while playing "musical chair," one of her favorite games, Karen rarely fails to find the empty chair. She is almost always one out of the few children who survive the game. She also likes to play with a toy garage set, putting a toy car into a small elevator, closing and opening the door, and so on. How is it possible that a girl who cannot find a block on the floor because of her visual impairments can find a vacant chair which is far away from her, or manipulate those small toy cars and the door? And what about the necklace that she has just made for Anne? How is it possible that the same girl can see things at one time but cannot see them at another time? How can this inconsistency be possible? What does seeing mean?

Sarah, too, is a little confused. She did not expect Karen to be able to make such a necklace. She thought it was almost impossible for a legally blind girl like Karen to make one. She knows, of course, that Karen is not totally blind. That is why she actually worked with Karen on putting those beads through the string --- just like Anne did when she and Karen made necklaces --- as a part of training sessions to improve her eye-hand coordination. But most of the time Karen failed. It seemed to her, therefore, quite natural to infer that Karen could not see very well. But Karen could make a necklace with Anne. How is it possible? How can this inconsistency happen? What is seeing? Sarah asks herself.

Meaningfulness and Relevancy

We tend to think, when we are asked what is seeing, of the act of seeing in terms of organs: that we see, with our eyes, things that exist within the reach of our gaze; images of those things which are perceived by the eyes are then sent as visual stimuli to a certain part of the brain where those images are processed. We can see things because we have organs which make seeing possible. When we can't see, therefore, that is basically because of the dysfunction of one of those organs. You may have a dysfunction of the brain, nervous system, or you may have some functional problems with your eyes. In any case, having problems with sight is usually due to problems of organic functioning. Therefore the term "visual impairments" is applied to those who do not see very well. And when you have problems of organic functioning, you constantly fail to see certain things.

Questions about this view of seeing have been raised. Van den Berg (1972) shows us how one sees the same thing in different ways in different situations, that the meaning of what you see changes in contexts you live in. Von Uexkull, presenting various examples of how the same objects can be perceived differently by different individuals, emphasizes the importance of considering one's interaction with one's environment. And Buytendijk (1974) is one of those who share, with van den Berg and von Uexkull, Merleau-Ponty's notion of embodied perception.

It is certain that the body *founds each* perception, colors and shapes, far away and close by, above and below, rest and movement; but this foundation should not be understood as a mechanism or a structural function... "Organs" (sense organs, neural structures, muscles) only become a basis of

perception and action by the *meaning* of their actuality for a subject in the design of a behavior. (Buytendijk, 1974, p. 252)

He also stresses the significance of contexts where one as "bodily subjectivity" lives and experiences. This "being-in-a-context," or the contextuality seems to be the key to reflect on Karen's inconsistency in seeing that Anne and Sarah found.

In the same activity of bead threading, Karen shows different performance of seeing. Sometimes she puts beads through a string fairly well, and sometimes she does not. That is, sometimes she can see beads and a string fairly well but sometimes she cannot. This puzzles us, letting us wonder if she can see or not. That is because we tend to regard seeing as a purely organic action which we tend to think should be performed consistently. However, it becomes possible to reflect on Karen's inconsistency in seeing from a different point of view when we take contextuality into consideration.

Karen could not see beads and a string and therefore could not do bead threading very well when she was asked to do so in a training situation, whereas she could see them very well and, with some help by Anne, could do bead threading when she was making a necklace for Anne. Probably Karen was anxious to make a necklace for Anne, who was making one for her. She was also enjoying the situation with Anne, making necklaces for each other, talking and helping each other. Although there is no intention of indicating the difference in attitudes between Anne and Sarah (it would be enough here to point out the fact that Sarah is one of Karen's favorite

care givers), there seems to be an obvious situational difference between a training session and a play situation.

It is not only in the activity of bead threading that we notice Karen's inconsistency in seeing. Karen fails to pick up all the blocks on the floor to put them into the box at the end of the play, but she seldom fails to find a piece of a puzzle and puts it on the right place. But this would not be hard for us to see why when we recognize that the jigsaw puzzle is one of Karen's favorite games and that no children really like to clean up the toys after playing with them. The following incident shows how well Karen can see things sometimes.

Karen was playing on a little climber. She was climbing up the ladder from one side and then, changing her position by turning herself around, climbing down from the other side. At first she was a little scared of turning herself around at the top of the climber, but after a couple of trials with some help of mine, she looked confident and proud of herself in being able to do that. She climbed up and down several more times, with an eager interest.

Once when she was at the top and turning around, her saliva was drooling down to the ground. Since she was facing down, she happened to see her saliva drooling slowly to the ground. She was watching it for a while and then climbed down. As soon as she landed she went to the other side of the climber and started climbing up again. But this time Karen did not turn around when she came to the top and stayed still with her face down. Her saliva eventually poured from her mouth

and drooled down, again very slowly, to the ground as Karen watched this carefully. Then she waited for the next saliva to come down. It did not drool down, but stayed in the air, hanging from her mouth. For a while she watched it hanging and being blown by the wind. Then, to my surprise, she spitted it out and watched it fall down. When it finally went down to the ground she smiled a little, turned around, and climbed down.

It is undeniable that she was watching her saliva drooling slowly down to the ground, since it was always right after it reached the ground that Karen started moving. Probably the saliva, which came from her own mouth and fell slowly down must have attracted her attention. For Karen, at that time, there were no visual impairments, there were no depth perception problems.

Difference and Sameness

It is not unusual for us either to experience the inconsistency of perception. A girl who can color a picture very neatly without any overcoloring outside the line may not be able to find the right piece of a puzzle. A boy who can follow a ball to hit a big home run in a baseball game may not be able to spot a squirrel running from branch to branch. Or a toddler who cannot find a red block in the toy box may be good at Easter egg hunting.

Broadening the discussion to hearing, similar phenomena can be experienced. How many times does a parent sigh, complaining that the child is not listening when

he or she says, "Don't do that!" or "Be careful!" But the parent never doubts whether the child has a hearing impairment because he or she knows that the child is listening very carefully when they talk about dinosaurs. In all above cases, we simply say, "They are not seeing" or "They are not listening," but we never think about visual or hearing problems because, in a sense, we somehow know that the inconsistency is the expression of children's "I'm not listening to you," or "I'm not seeing" because "I'm not interested in" or "I don't want to." In other words, we all know that a child can sometimes be inconsistent one way or another.

Yet, when we know that a child has a visual or hearing impairment, the same inconsistency comes to have a different meaning. When a child with visual impairments fails to find the right piece of a puzzle, we tend to say, "Because he can't see very well." Or if a girl with hearing problems does not respond to our talk correctly, we tend to say, "Because she can't hear very well." When Karen does not stop playing with the toy garage set after being told to get ready for lunch, we tend to say, "Because she can't hear very well," and forget that she listened to a staff member telling her, "Scissors are in that shelf, Karen," when she was looking for them. When Karen trips over a small rock, this is "because she can't see very well," and the incident of drooling her saliva which indicates her ability to see is forgotten. The inconsistency that many "non-handicapped" children show and are admitted to show is nearly denied under the explanations of all these "because" for Karen.

It seems that when we know the diagnosis and other related problems of a child, we tend to seek the evidence for those problems in her behavior. The very

knowledge of the handicap may, at times, hinder us from seeing children as they are, and leave us to deprive them from being inconsistent in seeing and hearing, for instance.

It is not, of course, my intention here to say that we do not have to know about diagnoses or handicaps, let alone to say that Karen has no problems in seeing and hearing. It is true that Karen can find a yellow block more easily than a black one when they are placed on a dark brown carpet. It is also undeniable that Karen can hear much better with hearing aids than without them. The point here is not, therefore, to say that she does not have any hearing and visual impairments, but to point out the danger that the very knowledge of these impairments could prevent us from seeing her as she is.

We all, in a sense, listen to and see carefully what we want to, and ignore what we do not want to hear or see in various contexts. And most of the time we allow others to do so. We do so because we all live our own lives in our own ways, selecting what is meaningful and what is not. We are all situated in the world where we live in our own ways. Langeveld (1988) says that "the very subjective or personal lived experience of the child is more a decisive factor in the pedagogic relations and situations than what 'objectively' was, possibly, well intended." Let us not forget that "handicapped" children also have their own "subjective or personal lived experiences" and choose, in each particular situation, what is meaningful for them and what is not.

"Don't Touch Me"

Jeff

Jeff is playing in a corner of the playground. He is a quiet boy who prefers to be alone. He has pictures of toys which he cuts from catalogue books and folds into small pieces. Those are his treasures and no one is quite sure what kind of toys are on those pictures, because he gets upset when anyone even tries to touch them, let alone to unfold them to see what these pictures are about.

As usual, Jeff holds the pictures in his hand, sometimes unfolding and folding them again neatly. During all this time, he is roaming around, bending a little forward. He basically wanders around along the fence, skillfully avoiding other people without looking at them. At times he picks up a rock or two and examines them closely. Then he may put some into his pocket but he may throw others away according to criteria unknown to us. He does not initiate play with teachers or other students. He is a lonely, yet seemingly happy boy as long as we leave him alone.

I approach him slowly. "Hi, Jeff." I say to him in a low voice, trying not to startle him. He stops and glances at me for a moment. He may move away from me, showing his unwillingness to interact with me by uttering sounds in a low voice, which is usually what he would do. But today, he does not avoid me. Nor does he show signs of distress. Yet his body is a little withdrawn. He holds his right arm toward me as if he is protecting himself against me. But he does not totter away.

I move a little closer to him, probably some three meters from him. "Hi, Jeff. How are you doing?" "Hi," he whispers back to me. He retreats a little when I get closer to him, but he does not look afraid or annoyed by my presence. "Have you got nice little rocks, Jeff?" I talk to him, moving a little closer. He looks down at the rocks on his palm and looks up at me again. "Can I see them, Jeff?" I step forward. But now Jeff jumps back and starts retreating while his body is slightly bent forward. However he is laughing. "Come on, Jeff, show me your rocks," I say, walking after him. He starts to run away from me, yet his glance is directed toward me, smiling. I run after him. I must be careful to keep a certain distance between him and me, for if I get too close to him, he may turn distressed and declare an end to our interaction, even before it starts, by either running away from me or withdrawing into himself. I should never overtake him, for if I touch him he will get upset and may start either biting his arm or banging his head against the fence or the ground or whatever he can bang against. No touching, no getting too close even. But he does not seem to mind my chasing him. Instead, he even seems to wait for me to chase him every time he runs away from me a little, looking at me with a smile on his face. We continue to play this way for a while.

Danny

I notice Danny, a fourteen-year-old autistic boy, looking at me from a distance. But when I look at him, he averts his eyes from me. I walk slowly to him. He stands still to regard something else. But I feel that he is aware of my coming to him. I am about five meters away from him when Danny, as if he cannot stand my getting closer any

more, jumps several steps away from me and looks at me. I stop walking.

"Hi, Danny," I say quietly. He murmurs something which I cannot hear. Again he looks away but he is not looking at anything particular. I feel that all his attention is on me. We stand still for a while.

I advance a step or two after some time, talking to him calmly. Without looking at me, Danny jumps away from me. He seems determined not to let me get any closer to him. However, he does not run away from me any more, either.

I try to get closer to Danny a few more times, but his reaction is the same -- jumping away from me, but only far enough to keep a certain distance. I feel like I am chasing him -- not as a player, but like a hunter. Probably Danny does not want to play with me now. If he wants to be left alone, let him be for a while. He should not have to do what he does not want to at recess, I think. I turn my back toward him, sit down on the grass, and turn my attention to other students playing on the fields.

I have almost forgotten about Danny when I feel somebody sit behind me. It's Danny. He sits so close behind me that his chest almost touches my back. I tap his knee slightly without looking back at him. He sits still on his heels with his hands covering his face. But he does not run away when I touch him. I do not feel any tension in his body as at times I do when I touch him. We stay that way for a while.

What was this all about with Jeff and Danny? What was going on between

them and me? Did I play with them? One might almost say that I did not play; I could get to neither of them. I might have kept a certain contact with Jeff, but from a distance. But with Danny, I had to stop the interaction itself. Indeed, the message that both Jeff and Danny sent to me was: "Don't touch me." And I did not.

But is the message so unusual as it may sound? Does the moment one cries, "Don't touch me" seldom occur in one's everyday life? Does even a baby not tell, in his or her cry, "Don't touch me" to the mother when he or she is upset, rejecting to be hugged? And is there not the moment of "don't touch me" in the play of "come and get me," just like there was while I was chasing Jeff or Danny?

Karen

Karen is reading a picture book with a staff member, Sarah, at the day care centre. Karen signs "a lion" when they find a picture of a lion on a page. "Right, it's a lion," Sarah says and imitates a roar. She extends her hand to Karen's stomach and tickles her. Karen laughs. She stands up and roars too. She roars again and pretends to attack Sarah with her "paw." Sarah roars back and tries to catch Karen, who steps back then goes forward again like a lion. Sarah now stands up and pretends to sneak upon Karen. Karen runs away from Sarah, who is chasing her. "Wait, Karen. I'm gonna catch you!" Karen runs around in the class room, laughing and screaming. When Sarah finally catches Karen, Sarah tickles Karen and Karen rolls on the floor. After a while Karen stands up and pretends to attack Sarah. Then she stays back and watches if Sarah will start to chase her again. When Sarah does, Karen runs away

cheerfully.

Sophie.

Sophie, a thirteen-year-old girl with Cerebral Palsy, goes up to her teacher Harry. She touches his hand, but Harry is busy talking to another student. Sophie pulls his hand to attract his attention. Harry recognizes Sophie. "Oh, hi Sophie. How are you?" But he then goes back to his talk with the student. Sophie pulls Harry's hand several times more, which makes Harry put his arm around Sophie, but no more than that. He keeps talking to the student, with his arm around Sophie. After a while Sophie hits Harry on his back rather hard. "Ouch!" Harry cries and turns around to find Sophie. "It hurt, Sophie!" Harry almost seems to get really angry, but holds back when he recognizes Sophie's smile. He realizes that Sophie wants him to attend to her. Turning around toward Sophie, Harry nears his face to hers and says, seemingly angrily, "Oh! It hurt, Sophie!" Then pretending to catch Sophie, he says, "I'm gonna catch you, Sophie!" Sophie turns around quickly and starts running away. Harry chases after Sophie, screaming aloud. It may be easy for Harry to catch Sophie who is waddling like a toddler. But he takes his time. Making a lot of noise by stamping and shouting, he gradually reduces the distance between him and her. When he finally catches her at the other end of the gym, he tickles her and she lies down, giggling and rolling around on the floor.

Harry tries to change the role when Sophie stands up. "O-oh! I have to run away, because Sophie might be angry at me and chase me." He pretends to run away

from Sophie, stepping back a little yet still looking at her. It is only after Sophie starts chasing Harry that he actually runs away. He runs around slowly to keep a certain distance which can attract Sophie's attention, yet far enough not to be caught by her. Sophie chases after Harry, putting her hand forward and crying at him until she catches him and pulls him down to the floor. Both Sophie and Harry laugh when Sophie climbs on top of Harry.

Chris

Chris has just been caught by her father. Just before getting caught, Chris smiled, stepped aside and extended her arm toward her father, shouting, "No-o-o!" But her timid smile turns into open laughter when her father holds her up and twirls. As he turns around, Chris's laughter turns into screams of joy. As soon as her father puts her down after several spins, Chris tries to cling to her father again. Her father then starts running away from her, singing, "You can't catch me!" Chris runs after her father who is running only fast enough not to be caught by her. The carefree, joyful chasing on the playground continues until they get to the top of a small hill. While her father runs down the slope, Chris timidly walks down step by step. The distance between them becomes greater. Chris then cries, "Wait, daddy! Don't go too fast!"

Mark

Mark is quietly playing on the floor while his mom is reading a magazine. But the

little boy has begun to crawl speedily toward the door while chuckling with pleasure. Here he stops, sits up, and looks at his mother who casts a furtive glance. The next moment Mark is back on all fours and now his movements are even faster while his laughter turns into an excited panting. Mark stops again and looks back at his mom. The excitement is impossible to ignore and mother tears herself out of her reading and proceeds noisily and playfully into the direction of Mark. The chase is now fully on! And Mark is getting beyond himself with excitement, so that his laughter turns into high-pitched screams. "I'll get you! I'll get you!" laughs Mom and stamps her feet and claps her hands. Mark can hardly control himself. His delighted laughter virtually immobilizes him and instead of crawling faster his limbs now move awkwardly slowly. He just cannot get away from his mother -- who'll grab him in her next move. And then she fetches him and pulls him into a playful embrace. "I gotch'a!" This is all too much and the little boy shrieks with pure exaltation. It's good that Mom's kisses are so sweet because one gets the uncanny feeling that Mark's joyful excitement could have climaxed into a confused crying bout. Some more hugging and face-rubbing in Mom's hair and Mark is back on the floor. Mom sits down but she leaves the magazine alone. She knows the next "come and get me" is only a few seconds away. (van Manen, 1982, pp. 292, 293.)

Sameness and Difference

In the various images of chasing described above, we recognize some common features as well as features which make one form of chasing distinctive from others. It might be possible to eliminate those aspects which are rather atypical or unusual

and extract aspects which are common to all forms of chasing as features of chasing. But here we will try not to exclude those unusual aspects for the following two reasons. First, because, by raising the question of why we think one case is chasing and the other is not, it will become possible to see chasing from a broader and hopefully deeper perspective. Second, to reflect on the unusual cases in comparison with other examples will disclose the sameness as well as the differences in the experience of chasing of mentally handicapped children. If we choose only the forms of chasing which make a situation recognizable as a "come-and-get-me," then many handicapped children could be considered as unable to play the "come-and-get-me" game; they are not playing chasing, because they do not do this or they cannot do that. Understanding these children there, again, would be understanding of what is missing.

But if we see chasing from a broader perspective and try to take into consideration those apparently unusual, different manifestations, we can see the sameness as well as the differences of handicapped children's experience of chasing as they are lived, without overemphasizing the deficiency of their play. Besides, thinking about uncommon aspects is not only helpful to understand handicapped children's experience of chasing; it would also be suggestive in our reflection on the play of chasing.

For example, while Karen, Sophie, Chris and Mark allowed their partner to catch them after joyfully having run from them, Jeff and Danny did not let me touch them. By showing their determination to keep a certain distance they told me,

clearly, "Don't touch me!" In this sense their interaction was not the game of so called "come-and-get-me."

But why, then, did Jeff insist on staying within a certain distance from me? He could have run away or rejected my chasing; he could have started his arm-biting or head-banging at any moment during our interaction. And why did Danny come and even let me touch him afterwards? Did the message "don't touch me" really mean a total unwillingness to interact with me as it is usually supposed to? At least Jeff let me chase him. He did not mind that way of interaction with me. Although he did not want me to touch him, he liked my chasing him; chasing without catching, "come and get me," but "don't touch me."

The example of Jeff, therefore, tells us that there could be the game of come-and-get-me without the moment of catching or being caught. What, then, is the game come-and-get-me? What are children, handicapped as well as non-handicapped, experiencing during the game? And, above all, what is it that makes it so difficult for some "handicapped" children to be caught? I believe that searching for answers to these questions will provide us with some insights into both the game come-and-get-me and the experience of mentally handicapped children.

The Beginning

One of the features of come-and-get-me is the way it starts. That is, it starts rather abruptly. Players do not talk about playing the game the way they may talk about

playing, for example, "tag" or "hide and seek." They may say, "Let's play tag!" but we seldom hear them say, "Let's play come-and-get-me!"

There seem to be no particular rules to follow in order to start chasing, either, such as choosing the "it," counting up to fifty before the "it" starts chasing, and so on. In most of the cases players do not even discuss about which one chases which one. The words "I'll get you!" or "Catch me daddy!" can be, as seen in the examples above, moments for starting the game, but they are not absolutely necessary as "Ready or not, here I come!" is for playing hide and seek.

This sense of spontaneity and lack of rigid rules partly derives from the fact that come-and-get-me is usually played by only two persons (when there are three or more players, it will be a tag), and often one of them is an adult (or a bigger child) and the other is a small child. While games which are played by more than two people need certain rules to keep order, a game for two people may not need rigid rules. But the small number of players is not the only reason for spontaneity.

When a parent and child or a teacher and student start to play come-and-get-me, there is a mutual recognition of each other, usually by eye-contact. When they look at each other, something sparks between them which invites them to play come-and-get-me. Sometimes it may be a child, like Karen and Mark, who invites the play. He or she shows the intention of running away by trying to run (or crawl) a few steps. At other times it may be a grown-up, like Harry, who expresses the intention of chasing a child at any moment by a gesture or "I'll get

you!" An agreement on playing come-and-get-me is made instantly and mutually. No explicit negotiation upon which one starts the game is necessary for the agreement, since each of them embodies his or her role when it is decided to play. The play "happens, as it were, by itself" (Gadamer, 1985, p. 94).

This spontaneity, however, does not occur everywhere. For one thing, a child would not play come-and-get-me with strangers; it would not be a play of chasing but a real, and quite serious chasing if a stranger chases him or her. Children somehow know the difference between real chasing and make-believe chasing. Also, Chris and her father or Mark and his mother do not play come-and-get-me at any time. For the play to happen, there needs to exist a warm and playful atmosphere based on a trustful relationship between the child and his or her partner.

It is true that you can dare to ask someone to chase you only when your trust in that person is enough to ensure your safety. But on the other hand, if the person does not chase you when you invite him or her to do so, it could entail a feeling of rejection. "It would be more frightening if no one cared enough to come and claim you" (van Manen, 1982, p. 293). That a child can invite someone to chase him or her is an expression of trust in that person.

Expectation and Anticipation

As many other games played by a small child and adult, such as peekaboo, come-and-get-me can be played repeatedly, as examples of Karen, Sophie, Chris and

Mark suggest. But when the game is seen in terms of a sequence of actions, the moment of catching or being caught is the last moment of the sequence and also a climax of the play, even when it is repeated again and again. And this is the moment toward which all the expectation and anxiety are directed.

In a sense come-and-get-me is a play of expectation. Karen, Sophie and Mark all run away cheerfully from adults, not to really escape from them, but only to be caught. With the expectation of being hugged, kissed or tickled at the moment of being caught, children flee from adults. While running away, they enjoy the expectation. In this sense they are living in the future while being chased. Needless to say, this expectation is based on the trust children have in the partner. Furthermore, this trustful expectation for being caught is possible only when children know that this is make-believe, that is, this is a play.

Yet, this expectation is delicate and can turn into anxiety. Remember Chris got a little upset and acted like she was protecting herself from her father just before she got caught. She extended her arm forward as if she was trying to prevent herself from being touched, just like Jeff did when I tried to get closer to him. It was her father, one of her most trusted persons, who was about to get her. Chris knew it, of course. And five-year-old Chris also knew that it was a make-believe game of come-and-get-me. That is why she invited her father to chase her. Yet, once the moment of being caught arrived, her expectation for the pleasure of being held up and spinned around by her father somehow became ambiguous. Even for Chris who, like Sophie and Karen, fully enjoys chasing, the expectation for being caught can become

the anxiety of being caught.

We say that play is make-believe, pretending, which is to say that it is not real. When we play, we escape from the world of reality and go into, and live in, the world of play. For a small child who plays peekaboo, the distinction between the reality and the play may not be very clear since his or her self is not yet clearly established. But as the child grows and the self is more firmly formed, he or she comes to recognize the difference between the real and the make-believe. A boy pretends to be a bus driver when he sits on an ordinary chair. A girl pretends that the sand is flour or sugar when she "bakes" a cake in the sand box. That the girl knows it is a pretending is obvious because she only pretends to eat the "cake" instead of actually putting it into her mouth. Furthermore, when we play, this world of pretending is shared by those who play together. We play on the common, implicit, yet shared, agreement that the play is make-believe. That is why we can enjoy the play of come-and-get-me, for instance.

Usually this agreement on the shared world of pretending is attained without difficulty, mainly because we also share the fairly common idea of what is real and what is pretending. The father can pretend to chase Chris not only because both Chris and her father know that it is a pretense, but also because they basically share the idea of what is real and what is not. In other words, they can shift back-and-forth between the world of reality and that of playing together.

Perhaps for Danny and Jeff, the difficulty of pretense is not just the problem

of distinguishing what is real and what is not. The reality for them might be different from what it is for us adults to begin with. It would then be extremely difficult or even painful for them to pretend. When a child does not fully understand that chasing is a kind of play, or when he or she does not feel secure about the relationship with the partner, the anxiety of being 'caught' dominates the child. Therefore he or she cannot enjoy the anticipation. Probably for Jeff and Danny, the anxiety was overwhelming. That is why even Jeff, who was smiling when I was approaching him, had to keep a certain distance from me so as to feel that he was safe. He liked the attention he received from me, but he could enjoy it only when there was a certain distance between him and me. When the distance became shorter, however, my attention became painfully strong for him, and the anxiety prevailed. And for Danny, my attention was almost unbearable. He could not let me chase him as Jeff did. But that does not mean that Danny rejected physical closeness to others: He came and sat very close to me when I was not paying any attention to him.

Being the centre of attention is certainly a factor for the pleasure of being chased. "To play the game is to be accepted, not passively but actively to have your existence seconded by your partner" (Barrit et. al., 1983, p. 156). Probably that is why small children prefer to be chased, rather than to chase the partner. While they are being chased, they are the centre of the attention. They feel they are cared about. When they chase the partner, on the other hand, the attention somehow slips away from them. Bigger children, like Chris, or children who are more confident about the relation with the partner, like Sophie, may enjoy chasing the partner as well as being chased. But even Chris, when her father runs away too far from her,

cries, "Don't go too fast!"

Not only has the attention shifted from a child to the play itself, but also is there a possibility that he or she may not be able to catch the partner, which makes the child anxious. Of course there also is a possibility that the partner may not get you while you are being chased. But it is all right for you because you are still yourself and the partner is still a partner as far as he or she is still chasing you; the attention is still on you, you are still the centre of the play. But in the case of your chasing the partner, things are different. What if I cannot get the partner? Would she still care about me if I miss her? She might be gone forever, never paying any attention to me again. Would I be still me if I miss her? ... "Wait! Don't go too far!"

Grown-ups are powerful. They can easily catch up to a child, hold her up, give her a strong, though warm, embrace. When a child is caught by a grown-up, she is secured by the power of the partner. A child's expectation for being caught and protected becomes reality. Her trust is secured. For Jeff and Danny, however, this power might be overwhelmingly enormous. They cannot surrender themselves to the power. Although it is good to feel the power of the trusting person for most of the children, the same power that gives children the feelings of trust and security comes to have a different face when children chase grown-ups. They need to make sure that the partner is always within the reach. Otherwise to get this powerful partner is beyond their ability.

Thus, in the game of come-and-get-me, the expectation and anticipation are

interwoven toward the moment of catching or being caught. And the distance between the two players plays a significant role there.

Distance

When you play chasing, you eventually catch the partner or the partner catches you. Catching or being caught is, as mentioned before, the last action of chasing. However, you do not just catch the partner, especially when the partner is a small child. Remember how Mark's mother chased him. It would be easy for the mother to get Mark, "a small child" who seems to have just learned to walk. But she took time to get him. So did Harry, a teacher of Sophie who could not run fast but only waddle slowly. Both Mark's mother and Harry carefully chased their partners so that they did not get them too quickly. They signalled by clapping or stamping. Chris' father did not run away from her daughter too quickly, either. He ran around, probably looking back at Chris, only to make enough distance not to be caught too easily by Chris. The grown-ups all measured the distance, perhaps almost unconsciously, from their partners. When you play chasing with children like Jeff or Danny, keeping the distance becomes a more conscious act, since there the distance from the children plays a critical role: Jeff could play come-and-get-me only when there was a certain distance from the partner¹⁴.

In this sense the play of come-and-get-me is also a play of distance as well as a play of expectation. Or rather, the expectation is lived in the form of distance. Indeed, all the expectation, anxiety, trust, attention, and caring that both players

experience are expressed through the distance between the two players. The distance here is not merely what objectively exists between the two, but what these two create and live. The distance is not empty but filled with expectation, trust, and so on.

When a child is fully enjoying the distance, that is, when the distance between the child and the partner is lived only as the expression of the expectation, the distance is experienced by the players as the closeness to each other; you can enjoy the distance because you feel close to the partner. Here, the physical distance turns into a manifestation of the psychological closeness.

On the other hand, when the anxiety or ambivalence is more dominant in the experience of the child than the expectation, the physical distance may be experienced in a different manner. As a partner gets closer to the child, the decrease in physical distance prompts awareness of psychological distance. In such cases physical closeness indicates psychological distance instead of assuring the child of psychological closeness. This paradoxical relation between the physical and psychological distance (or closeness) is not unfamiliar to us "normal" adults either. We need a certain physical distance to have a conversation with someone. Any of us can remember the uncomfortable experience of being packed in a crowded elevator. And though strange as it may sound, we find it more uncomfortable to stand side by side with a person we know well with almost no distance than with a total stranger. We may try to make some room between our friend and ourselves while we may not mind actually touching the body of a stranger. The physical closeness somehow disturbs the psychological closeness in such a situation.

Although it must be uncomfortable to stay physically too close to a friend, usually we can manage to go through such an embarrassing situation because we somehow know that the physical distance (or closeness) does not literally correlate with the psychological distance (or closeness). But if one cannot distinguish the psychological distance from the physical distance, the situation would be upsetting, since for such a person the physical closeness to the other must occur only in accord with his or her psychological closeness to them. In other words, such a person cannot get close to the others unless he or she is psychologically close to them. It is, therefore, comprehensible that some handicapped children who cannot tolerate this dialectic of physical and psychological dimensions in the distance, like Jeff and Danny, get upset when someone comes too close to them. Such a situation would only accentuate the anxiety in those children.

Our bodies exist in space, occupying a certain place in space. Yet, as Langeveld suggests, our body also shapes the space. My body is "that through which I can shape the space of my world --- the path I am walking along, the space which I create, in which I wander, dance, or stagger toward an unreachable resting place" (Langeveld, 1983, p. 188). And the body sometimes creates the space with others when we play chasing, for instance. The distance in the game come-and-get-me is a shared space created and lived by two players.

When you play come-and-get-me with a child, the distance you create shows

that you care for and attend to the child. Through the body which is lived by the child, he or she speaks to you: "Get me! But don't Get me too soon!" "Don't get me. Just chase me!" "Don't go too fast! I can't get you!" You listen to and respond to these voiceless calls from a child by the distance you take.

Chapter 5

Reflections

(1) Sameness and Difference

A children's story by Leo Lionni (1964) tells about a little bird named Tico. Tico does not know how it happened, but he did not have wings, therefore he could not fly. Luckily, however, his friends loved him and took care of him by bringing him food every day. But Tico wanted to soar through the sky like his friends. So when a wishingbird came to him to grant a wish, Tico asked for wings. The wings he asked for were golden ones instead of black ones like his friends'. With golden wings he flew, first timidly up to the tree tops, then more freely high above the mountain tops.

But when Tico came back to his friends, what he received from them was resentment. "You think you are better than we are, don't you, with those golden wings. You wanted to be different," they said, and flew away. Tico did not know why his friends were angry and asked himself, "is it *bad* to be different?"

One day he saw a basketmaker and gave him one of his golden feathers because he had heard that the basketmaker was too poor to buy medicines for his sick child. Then he realized that the feather was replaced with an ordinary black one. From that day on, he gave away his golden feathers to the people in need --- a puppeteer, an old woman, fishermen and so forth --- until finally his wings became completely black. His friends all welcomed him when he flew back to them with black feathers. They

said, "Now you are just like us," and huddled closely around him...

Throughout the stories in the previous chapter, efforts were made to reflect on the notion of sameness and difference; how mentally handicapped children are different; what commonalities they have; and how we are to seek the sameness through the difference. The issue is closely related to the question of how we try to understand these mentally handicapped children. If and when we focus on the differences, our understanding of them will be based on a comparison between them and non-handicapped children with the obvious advantages of the latter over the former. A focus on difference easily leads to a form of understanding of what is lacking, what does not exist. In contrast, when we focus on commonality then our understanding will remain somewhat superficial without the recognition of the particularity, the difference. In this sense how to cope with the issue of sameness and difference seems to be one of the critical moments for the search for alternative ways of understanding mentally handicapped children.

It might be worth noting, however, that the issue of sameness and difference is not solely a concern for the area of special education. It is not difficult to notice that in Tico's story the issue came to the fore when Tico received the golden wings rather than when he had no wings at all. The difference became a manifest problem when Tico came to have those which others did not have, rather than when he did not have those which others did. Although it seems ironic, from the special education point of view, that Tico's being handicapped was not the source of conflict, Tico's story tells us that the issue of sameness and difference is not exclusively an issue for

special education, that it is a problem for all of us. It is interesting to notice in the current practices in education that while mainstreaming is widely approved in special education for disabled children, another side of special education, education for gifted children, seems to be heading toward separation in the form of academic challenge classes. It seems that while special education for disabled children emphasizes (officially at least) sameness, special education for gifted children draws its attention to difference. When we think of such phenomena, then Tico's story is not so ironic after all. Therefore, although the sameness and difference is discussed in terms of special education for mentally handicapped children in the present study, the issue concerns us all.

Same yet Different, Different yet Same -- Dialectic of Sameness and Difference

Since our understanding of mentally handicapped children tends to focus on, and therefore stress, the difference between handicapped and non-handicapped children, the study primarily looked for ways to see sameness through difference. In "Finger Play," for example, by comparing Matthew's finger play with Chris' swinging, similarities in both activities of children's experience were suggested in terms of the child's sense of spatiality, corporeality, and temporal experiences, whereas difference in their relationships with others and the world were suggested. In "Eating," it was reminded that we all eat differently, in which sense we are more or less the same, and suggested that what is necessary is to attend to each child as a whole person, not merely to the deficient "feeding skills" of this child. And in "Seeing and Listening," the recognition of our own inconsistency in seeing and

listening urged us to let handicapped children also be inconsistent at times, instead of always attributing their "not seeing" or "not listening" solely to their impairments. By thus trying to see their sameness through difference, it was hoped that we could see and understand these children as they are as whole persons.

Needless to say, however, to see sameness does not mean to ignore difference. I have tried to resist the tendency to see in mentally handicapped children either difference or sameness only. That is why I made the effort to see features of sameness *through* the differences among the children. Therefore, while one should attend to Karen as a whole person, who may have insufficient "feeding skills", one should not deny her the necessity and importance of feeding skill training. Or, while it is stressed that Karen can see and hear much better than we expect with the knowledge of her impairments, to say so does not mean that she has no problems in sight and hearing. And whereas the commonality of what Matthew and Chris are experiencing is presented in "Finger Play," it is also suggested that the difference between finger play and swinging might be the difference between *Matthew's* finger play and *Chris'* swinging, between the way Matthew *is* and the way Chris *is*. Likewise when the smiling and speaking are explored in the story of "Smiling," we came to notice that the different ways of smiling reflect the various ways of being, that is, the way Karen *is*, the way Jeffrey *is*, and the way Anthony *is*. In each story and with each child, the issue of sameness and difference is intricate and any simple explanation seems to be shortsighted.

In special education, maybe more so than in any other field of education, one

tends to categorize and taxonomize. In discussing the tendency to taxonomize, Gould (1981) presents two groups of taxonomists: "lumpers," who "concentrate on similarities and amalgamate groups with small differences into single species," and "splitters," who "focus on minute distinctions and establish species on the smallest peculiarities of design"(p.44). He also writes about two contrasting views of biological systems among biologists. The one is held by "dissectors" or "mechanists" who "believe that life is nothing more than the physics and chemistry of its component parts," and the other by "integrationists" or "vitalists" who "hold that life and life alone has that 'special something,' forever beyond the reach of chemistry and physics"(Gould, 1985, pp.377, 378). As these two examples by Gould suggest, together with the two main perspectives on special education reviewed in the second chapter, it might be simpler, and therefore easier to accept to focus on one characteristic and classify according to that characteristic.

However, this tendency of "oversimplified dichotomy" (Gould, 1985, p.377) prevents us from seeing reality as it is, and that is why I have tried, in the present study, to see the sameness *and* the difference as they are, without ignoring either of them. Karen, for example, has problems with eating habits, she needs special training to improve them, and for that matter she is different. Yet she is the same as any of the other handicapped or non-handicapped children in that her way of eating should be seen and treated as a part of herself. Also, Karen sees and listens to what is meaningful for her, but does not do so if things she sees and listens to do not attract her attention very much. For that matter she is like many of us, she is the same as we are. Yet she is different in terms of her obvious impairments in seeing and

listening. In short, Karen is different, yet she is the same. Likewise, Ted is different, yet he is the same. Or Matthew is the same as Chris, yet he is different... The issue of sameness and difference certainly seems to reject simple and straightforward explanations.

As has been mentioned several times before, the issue of sameness and difference occupies a vital place in the field of special education, because how to see and deal with differences strongly affects how we see and treat children with mental handicaps. In this sense difference tends to be the differences between handicapped and non-handicapped people, between "them" and "us."

However, as has also been mentioned, the issue of sameness and difference concerns us all at a most basic level in a most profound way; we are all the same as human beings, and yet, at the same time, we are all different as particular and unique individuals. One may be a man or a woman, an adult or a teenager. One may be a French Canadian or a Chinese, poor or rich. But we are all human beings, and we are all the same for that matter. And yet, we are all different from each other one way or another as individuals. We are all the same yet we are all different. We are all different yet we are all the same. We all have to deal with and live with this dialectic of sameness and difference as far as we live with others. So the theme of sameness and difference between handicapped and non-handicapped people needs to be considered within the scope of this basic dialectic of sameness and difference.

When we think about the issue of sameness and difference in the area of

special education, the tendency is to overemphasize either the differences or what is the same at the cost of belittlement of the other: when the difference of the handicapped from the non-handicapped is the focus of the research and education, the sameness is left out; when the stress is on sameness, then the differences tend to be forgotten. The unilaterality of these views is therefore shortsighted and inadequate. But what we need to reflect on is the meaning of difference and sameness that these views imply.

When the view of mentally handicapped children stresses difference, as does the traditional perspective on special education, then difference is articulated between handicapped and non-handicapped children. The focal point is the difference as a group, and the comparison of differences are made between the two groups. How to draw a line to determine the groups may vary, such as with the determination of educable mental retardation, developmental delay, Down syndrome, hyperactivity, and so on. But once the line is drawn, each child within each group tends to be assigned the collective difference only, and his or her difference as a particular individual is obliterated. So while the difference of the group becomes his or her identity, the "true" difference, the difference as a unique individual is lost from view. In contrast, yet in a similar sense, when the view of mentally handicapped children stresses sameness, as in the social perspective on special education, then the sameness stressed is more like the commonality between handicapped and non-handicapped, and the "true" sameness, the sameness as human beings which is based on individual difference is not fully understood. What is required is to see the "true" difference and the "true" sameness in each particular child, whether or not he

or she is handicapped, without overemphasizing the one or the other.

It is difficult to avoid being preoccupied with differences. A cinematographic image of the autistic person Raymond in the movie *Rain Man* shows us just how difficult it is not to notice the differences in the way the autistic person sits, the way he speaks, and even in the way he walks. Precisely because walking is such a common activity which is too natural to evoke our attention, the awkward and different way that Raymond walks pervades our perception of him and dominates our understanding of him. Because he walks in such a different way, he must be different in every respect. He must be different from us... Here the collective difference of his being autistic becomes his identity, leaving little, if any, room for the individual difference of his being Raymond.

But even in his way of walking which seems to be typically that of autistic persons, it is still possible to catch a glimpse of Raymond as an individual -- how he experiences his trip with his brother Charlie, how he has come to relate to Charlie. In the beginning of the story, Raymond usually walks beside or behind Charlie mainly, it seems, because Charlie has Raymond's knapsack in which everything important to Raymond is carried. So even though he walks behind Charlie, he is walking so as not to lose his knapsack which Charlie carries. Raymond is not walking with Charlie. Charlie walks purposefully, he is going somewhere while the striking feature of Raymond's walking is that he seems to have no particular purposes. He seems to have no destinations in mind. Neither does he seem to enjoy walking as one does when one takes a walk. As the trip together progresses, however, they do not

need the knapsack any more to stay together. Holding the knapsack tightly in his arms or carrying it on his back, Raymond still walks behind Charlie. He does not seem to walk *with* Charlie, but now he follows him. The meaning of Charlie has changed for Raymond. Now Charlie has become Raymond's "main man." (The term "main man" seems to Raymond to mean an important person for him. At the beginning of the story when Raymond is in the institution, he refers to a ward attendant as "main man." Near the end of the story he murmurs, "Charlie, main man.")

Raymond is autistic, of course, throughout the story. Awkwardness of body movements, stiffness of the upper body, no reflection of emotions on the face are always there in his walking. Yet through these collective differences that Raymond shows as an autistic person we can see, in his relation with his brother, his individual difference, the particularity that Raymond possesses as an individual.

Beyond Collective Difference

In a book about emotionally disturbed children, Mira Rothenberg (1977) writes that "sanity and insanity are part of the same continuum. The difference is only in degree"(p.14). The same thing can be said about being handicapped and non-handicapped. Where to draw the line between similarities and differences on the continuum of human beings basically depends on how one wants to see sameness and difference. There are many scales on the ruler and one can draw as many lines as one wishes to make distinctions. And most importantly, one can change the boundaries as

one changes one's view of other people. In a sense our efforts to live with each other is reflected in this ruler of continuity between difference and sameness.

Fred, with his little daughter Tasha, left the wading pool in Chapter One. The difference he experienced in observing the group of mentally handicapped children was overwhelming for him. Leaving the pool was the attitude he chose on the issue of sameness and difference. But what if he had stayed there and let Tasha play with the water? What might have happened then? Sitting at the edge of the pool with Tasha close by, Fred might have had some time to watch those mentally handicapped children more closely. Merely staying there and watching the children does not guarantee anything, of course. In everything he sees and hears, he might have detected further differences that would confirm the impression he had when he first realized that they were mentally handicapped children. On the other hand, there is a possibility that Fred would have discovered sameness as well in these children -- sameness like other (non-handicapped) children. By watching them closely and interacting with them a little, he might have been able to feel the excitement and happiness in these children again. Through the collective difference they represent as mentally handicapped children, he might have re-discovered the sameness in them as children as his own child. He might have even noticed the individual differences in these children -- a carefree, easy-going boy here, a timid girl there, a cautious boy over there, and so on. Through the process, Fred's sense of sameness and difference might have changed with regard to mentally handicapped and non-handicapped children. Such a change does not occur all the time. But at least there is always a possibility for it, which will eventually alter our understanding of these children.

Calling for the need to see individual differences (the "true" differences) instead of collective differences does not deny the collective differences altogether. As Blum put it so sensitively, a particular disability is that "which in his [a disabled person's] heart of hearts he knows contributing to his being the particular person he is" (Blum, 1982, p.77). It is hard to deny that being mentally handicapped is a part of the child's being himself or herself. But we must resist replacing individual differences with collective differences, because the latter is only a part of one's being oneself, however significant the part may be. To respect a child's individual difference is to try to understand him or her as he or she is, which ought to be based on "true" sameness as a human being.

Difference, Self, and Identity

There are many answers to the question of what education is for: To prepare young people to become independent, to provide them with knowledge and information they need in order to live fully in society, to socialize them so that they can be responsible members of society, to train them to take an effective part in society so that it can survive and prosper, or to cultivate them to become self-responsible persons, and so forth. Parents also have hope and expectations about what kind of persons their children will (and should) be: To be successful in their lives, to be responsible for themselves and for others, to pursue their dreams, to be sensitive to others, to be happy, and so on. Beneath all these objectives in education and parents' hopes, there is one of the most basic purposes of raising children: To help them

become themselves, to help them form their own identities. To the question of "What is the self?" Foucault answers as follows:

Self is a reflexive pronoun, and it has two meanings. *Auto* means "the same," but it also conveys the notion of identity. The latter meaning shifts the question from "What is this self?" to "What is the plateau on which I shall find my identity?" (Foucault, 1988, p.25)

No one lives alone in a vacuum. In the process of forming and searching for one's own self, one is influenced by social and historic positions one occupies in the world. One builds one's own self also through the relationships with others. There are many "sources" of the self (Taylor, 1989). But as Rothenberg says, an essentially "worthwhile commodity any human being has is himself" (1977, p.15). Of course this "himself" or "herself" does not form by itself. It is formed through one's experience in historical, cultural, and interpersonal situations. Ultimately, however, for an individual to have an identity is to identify one to oneself. A mentally handicapped girl ought to have an identity of her own, not one defined by what others tell, expect, or force her to be.

Throughout the course of life one changes, one's self changes. The person I was when I was three years old is not exactly who I am now. And yet there is something that is basically common between who I was and who I am, something that remains unchanged. There is this core of the self. It is this core that is the basis for individual differences and it needs to be respected and nurtured.

"You must be like that, for that is the way I love you: the secret of all

education" (Droysen, cited in Gadamer, 1985, p.205). Indeed, behind all the acts of teaching and parenting there are hopes, expectations, and desires about what and how we want children to be. In this sense education is basically "normative" (van Manen, in press). Through the interactions between teachers, parents and children, adults' hopes and desires sustain, nurture, and help form the core of the self. This influence we have on our children makes it all the more significant for us to respect their unique particularity, their individual difference, for what Droysen calls "the secret of all education" is double-edged. There are too many incidents in which unfortunate children suffer from disheartening acts by adults under the name of "for-the-sake-of-children."

Special education is said to be special in that it requires "special" curricula, instructional methods and techniques to educate "special" children. I have argued in this section that there are two kinds of differences, collective differences and individual differences, and that it is the latter that needs to be respected and nurtured. However, to respect individual differences by no means implies ignoring collective differences. There are groups of children who are mentally handicapped, there are people who are autistic. What is stressed here is a need not to lose sight of individual differences in each mentally handicapped child, which is not incompatible with "special-ness" that special education possesses as a specific area of education. But in a sense all education is special, because all children are special in their own ways. We are required to attend to each child with "special" thoughtfulness and sensitivity to help him or her become fully himself or herself. Tico's story ends with his words:

Now my wings are black,
and yet I am not like my friends.
We are *all* different.
Each for his own memories,
and his own invisible golden dreams.

(2) Reflections

a. Contextuality of Meaning

Intersubjectivity is not only one of the fundamental moments for child development, but also the basis for human experiences. One explores one's lifeworld through relationships with others: from a mother and father at the beginning, then sisters and brothers, friends, teachers, to other people with whom one learns and builds one's self, one's identity. We are all social beings, indeed. We cannot live alone. One of the reasons why Victor, the wild boy of Aveyron (Lane, 1979), has attracted our attention would be because the story of Victor and Itard paradoxically reminds us how significant it is to live with others. It is only natural, therefore, that interpersonal communication has been one of the significant areas of research in child development (Bullowa, 1979), and that "in empirical research the notion of a radical egocentricity at birth is being replaced by the concepts of primary intersubjectivity" (Schmidt, 1983, p.170). Broadening the importance of intersubjectivity and interpersonal activities, the interactions of an individual with his or her environment plays a vital role in his or her development and experiences (Bronfenbrenner, 1979), for interpersonal activities are experienced in specific environments or contexts. Or rather, environments or situations are part of the

experience.

Ted's utterance "A big pumpkin!" may be a good example of the situated-ness of our being. It would be hardly possible to understand the utterance if we hear it in terms of its accuracy or adequacy. But when we try to listen to it within the particular context in which it was uttered, then we can understand it as Ted's way of responding to the situation. The seemingly inappropriate utterance encloses its meaning within the context.

Smiling, too, comes to have its meaning within the context. Smiling becomes truly smiling when the one who smiles and the one who receives the other's smile share the intimate situation to which a phenomenon of smiling is a response. Smiling will not be smiling if one does not respond to the other who smiles. When a newborn baby smiles, or he or she makes a facial expression that looks like smiling, Japanese people used to say, "Look! An angel tickled the baby!" A newborn baby seems to be smiling and a mother does not know why or if her baby is smiling. But she thinks, or wants to think, that the baby is smiling, hence comes the old saying, "An angel tickled the baby." The mother smiles back to the baby in contentment and the situation is lived by the mother and daughter. The meaning of smiling does not exist solely either in the one who smiles or the other who perceives the smile. It emerges in the relationship of the two. The meaning is lived by the two persons. It comes to form itself by being lived.

We can also see how meaning comes to have its shape by being lived, in the

story of "Don't Touch Me." When come-and-get-me begins with the mutual spontaneity, it is a play of expectation and anticipation of catching and being caught, and it is also a play of distance between the two players. When all this spontaneity, expectation, anticipation, and distance are mutually lived by two players, the play becomes a play, it becomes meaningful. The meaning is neither in the one who runs away nor in the other who chases, it is between the two.

b. Continuous Nature of Hermeneutic and Pedagogical Inquiry

I am on the bed beside my daughter Asuka. We have already read a bed time story. We also have talked about what had happened today. Now she is about to fall asleep, fingering her favorite shabby blanket, and I am reading a book of my own beside her. Listening to the silence around her, I feel another day with her is close to the end and the time of my own is approaching again. My attention is gradually being shifted from my daughter to the book I am reading.

Suddenly she says in a quiet voice, "A piece of thread." She shows me a piece of thread on her blanket and I pick it up, replying, "Oh, yes, it's a piece of thread." I return to my reading when she turns her face toward me and says, "I found a piece of thread at daycare today." "Did you?" I reply, glancing at her only for a moment to return to the book again. "I found a piece of thread at daycare today," she repeats. Her voice is louder this time and she looks somewhat serious, but I have not yet realized the gravity of the situation. "Did you find a piece of thread on your blanket during the nap time at daycare today?" I ask. She nods and repeats again, "I found a

piece of thread at daycare today." Now her voice is trembling and, repeating it again, she starts sobbing. A moment of bewilderment. What is the matter with you, Asuka? Why does a piece of thread have to bother you so much? Tears keep on rolling down her cheeks. She can hardly speak, yet, still, she tries to repeat, "I ... found ..." Looking at her in such misery and having no idea of what it all is about and what to do, I am at a loss. Patting her on the back desperately, I try to make sense of it, but nothing comes up.

I do not know how long time has passed when a thought flashes through me. Ah, now I think I know why a piece of thread is so important to you, Asuka. But is that it?

I start talking to her, patting her back softly. "What did you do with the piece of thread, Asuka? Did you pick it up by yourself?" Hardly able to reply, she only nods. "But you wanted Mom to pick it up for you, didn't you?" Her sob now turns into a cry. "You wanted Mom to pick it up when you found it on your blanket at daycare, but Mom wasn't there, so you picked it up yourself. You remembered it when you found a piece of thread now. Is that what you wanted to tell me?" Crying even louder, she nods and clings to me.

Cuddling her gently, I continue. "Whenever you found a piece on your blanket, you just showed it to me and Mom picked it up for you. That's how we've been, haven't we?" Another nod. "But today you found a piece of thread on your blanket during the nap time at daycare. Mom wasn't there, so you picked it up. But

the truth is that you wanted Mom to pick it up for you, as I have always done." Asuka is still sobbing, but I can feel through my tapping hand that she is settling down.

"Well, Asuka, it's too bad I couldn't pick it up for you. But I am very glad you did it by yourself. You could do it because you are a big girl now. I'm going to pick it up whenever you find it when I'm with you. But, because you are a big girl now, will you do it by yourself when I'm not around?" When she nods the last time, I feel she is ready to lie down.

A small incident indeed. It all started with a little piece of thread. The whole incident took place probably in only a few minutes. And yet, this piece of thread told me about Asuka's lifeworld in such a vivid way. Once I understood what Asuka was saying, not just what she actually said, but what she was really trying to tell me, I could almost see how she was lying down with her favorite blanket in the darkened room at the daycare centre, and how she felt when she found a piece of thread on her blanket.

Asuka likes playing with her friends at the centre. She asks her parents to take her there every morning, and does not want to go home when her mom or dad picks her up. She always talks merrily about what has happened at the centre. On the whole, she enjoys going there. Yet, at times, there are moments when she remembers her home and misses her family. And it was a small piece of thread that helped me share a fragment of her experience.

This incident seems to show the importance of the context for our efforts of understanding. I could understand my daughter mainly because I knew her past experience with a piece of thread. She and I had a shared experience. A piece of thread had a particular meaning shared by both of us in the context of our living together. This shared context made it possible to understand what she was saying by interpreting what she said. What she said was crystal clear from the beginning: Asuka found a piece of thread at the daycare centre. Yet, only to understand the literal meaning of her statement did not lead to understanding of what she was saying. It was a context -- a piece of thread on a blanket, a daughter and mother, their past experience, and so on -- that made it possible to understand what she was saying.

This anecdote is about a three-and-a-half year old girl, whose ability to express herself is, of course, limited. If she was old enough to express exactly what she wanted to say, all the confusion, bewilderment, and efforts to understand might not be necessary. Yet, it seems that on many occasions what is being said is left unsaid behind what is said to some extent, and that seems to make our efforts to understand others difficult yet challenging.

Understanding is an adventure and, like any other adventure, is dangerous. Just because it is not satisfied with simply wanting to register what is there or said there but goes back to our guiding interests and questions, one has to concede that the hermeneutical experience has a far less degree of certainty than that attained by the methods of the natural sciences. But when one realizes that understanding is an adventure, this implies that it affords unique opportunities as well. It is capable of contributing in a special way to the broadening of our human experiences, our self-knowledge, and our horizon, for everything understanding mediates is mediated along with ourselves. (Gadamer, 1983, pp.109-110)

When we think about understanding, we tend to focus our attention on the object, be it a person or a thing. We tend to think that what is understood is in the object. But as Gadamer suggests above, understanding someone is also understanding ourselves. When a special needs worker Sandy and a student teacher Anne knew what they had not known about Karen's sight and hearing in "Seeing and Listening," that led them to a new understanding not only of Karen but also about themselves. By being struck by previously unknown knowledge about Karen, they started to wonder about Karen and themselves as well. Or when I realized what Asuka was saying, I not only understood what a piece of thread meant to her but also, with her, to myself -- how I was related to her by a piece of thread. And interestingly enough, it was not until I told her of my understanding of what she was saying that she started to settle down. She needed to be understood. Not only that understanding others is understanding ourselves, understanding is mutual: We understand others and they understand us, or rather, we understand each other, for "to speak of the encounter does not mean that we meet 'others,' but it means that we meet 'each other'" (Langeveld, 1983, p.6). And this mutuality of understanding makes all the more significant and responsible our place as teachers and parents in the lifeworlds of children.

We continually encounter pedagogical moments (van Manen, in press) that require our thoughtful and immediate response at any time. We never know when we encounter them. They may even strike you when you are totally unprepared, as it did when I thought the day as mother was just about over beside my daughter who was falling asleep. We cannot, upon encountering such moments, wait until we are ready to deal with them. So far as we live with children we always need to be ready.

In this sense our efforts at understanding are continuous. As a matter of fact, "the first guiding insight" in hermeneutic and pedagogical acts of understanding is "to admit of the endlessness of this task" (Gadamer, 1983, p.108). This is true not only in that pedagogical moments can strike us at any time, but also in that we always need to reflect on what we have understood about children and how we have responded to them. With a child like Jeffry who asks us to follow his rituals by repeating his song or story, the challenge we face is not so much to realize a pedagogical moment, because it is always there, as to continuously reflect on it and respond to it. "We need to act in the lives we live, side by side with our children, but then also *wonder*, always wonder whether we did it right" (van Manen, 1989, p.149). As Axline writes:

We don't give up easily. We don't write off a case as "hopeless" without trying just one more thing. Some people think this is very bad -- to keep hope alive when there is no basis for hope. But we are not looking for a miracle. We are seeking understanding, believing that understanding will lead us to the threshold of more effective ways of helping the person to develop and utilize his capacities more constructively. The inquiry goes on and on and we will continue to seek a way out of the wilderness of ignorance. (Axline, 1971, p.17)

And so the study toward understanding is still on its way. In the process of trying to understand more fully these mentally handicapped children, a question of how we could get closer to their reality always remains in the form of reflective dialogue with a question of to what extent we have now come to understand them. Yet as Gadamer's (1975) notion of application suggests, our way of responding to mentally handicapped children would change when understanding of them is deepened. The

present study is an effort in that direction.

Notes

1. Echolalia is "the literal repetition of a word or group of words just spoken by another person" (Roberts, 1989, p.272). While echolalia is "a feature of normal language development in many children," it is suggested that "prolonged echolalia is associated with some form of language retardation" (Roberts, 1989, pp.271-272).

2. This example is based on an event which actually happened to my daughter when she was three years and seven months old. She was going to visit her "best friend's" home by herself for the first time, without being accompanied by her parent, and was very excited about it. Her father asked her friend's father for their address and phone number next morning in the daycare, and my daughter was beside them, listening to them eagerly, I suppose. That evening when her father was about to call her friend's father, my daughter could tell her father the phone number and address -- although he did not need the latter --, which were correct.

This is not to mean to boast of my daughter. Lorenz(1961) provides similar examples of "talking birds" (p.86) which learned sentences immediately which were closely related to particular and very unusual contexts (pp. 85-88).

3. This statement, however, does not mean that Kirk denies labels altogether. For Kirk a diagnosis is an "assessment of a child in such a way that leads to some form of treatment, management or remediation" (1975, p.8), therefore labels based on biological and neurological significance do not make a great deal of sense from a management or treatment point of view. "I often wonder why we tend to use technical and complex labels, while it is more accurate and meaningful to describe behavior." (pp. 8,9.)

4. The point here is not, of course, that so many children suffer hyperactivity or inattention, but that we can see the danger in these studies of diagnosis or assessments. That is, many "normal" children could actually fall into these categories when they are examined with the intention of seeking problems. What is more problematic is that these amazingly high rates of frequency of hyperactivity or inattention seem to be accepted as a fact among many researchers, instead of being questioned in terms of the appropriateness of diagnosis.

5. It would be worth noting here that within the traditional perspective there are growing concerns for a reorientation of research. Siegel-Causey and Guess (1989), for example, stress the reciprocity between "service providers" and learners in communicative interactions and call for the sensitivity of service providers to learners' subtle nonsymbolic communication. Their arguments as follows are certainly novel and different from those from other, more traditional perspective: "Other [than pointing, smiling, a pat on the back and so forth] nonsymbolic communications ... may be less obviously communicative because they grow out of shared experience or are recognizable only with regard to the context in which they appear" (p.5); "For service providers to promote shared understanding, they must

view nonsymbolic communicative interaction, not only from their own perspective, but also from the perspective of the learner" (p.9); "Attaining a sense of interpersonal sharing is the real goal [of communication]" (p.11).

6. There are critiques on the labeling perspective. For example, Gove (1980) claims that evaluation of the labeling perspective "have not involved a careful sifting of the empirical evidence bearing on the adequacy of the social reaction formulation." (p.13.) See also Gordon's (1980) critique on Mercer (1973).

7. Blum's statement in a seminar at the Department of Secondary Education, University of Alberta, in May, 1985.

8. It is interesting to find a similar argument in the realm of new physics where Heisenberg's uncertainty principle called into question the relationship between the observer and the observed. "The electron does not *have* objective properties independent of my mind. In atomic physics the sharp Cartesian division between mind and nature, between the observer and the observed, can no longer be maintained. We can never speak about nature without, at the same time, speaking about ourselves." (Capra, 1983, p.87)

9. The term validity here does not refer to the so called universal validity in natural science, where criterion are predictability, replicability and quantitative measurability. In the article on the objectivity in human science, Bollnow (1974) asserts that objectivity in human science is assured by purifying subjectivity, instead of eliminating it. Bollnow also introduces three conditions for validity (or "truth") in human sciences: (1) the resistance of the subject-matter, which is to say that one's knowledge becomes true only when one is "struck" by the resistance of a subject-matter which urges one to go beyond the everyday understanding; (2) intersubjectivity and openness of dialogue. "Another man's understanding acceptance alone can confirm me in the truth of my thinking" (p.12); and (3) the connection between the truth known and the inner truthfulness of the knowing subject.

10. Throughout the stories, descriptions of diagnoses of children are limited to the minimum unless necessary for the argument in such a case as Karen in "Seeing and Listening" later in this chapter, since one of the purposes of this study is to see and describe mentally handicapped children as they are without prejudgements. However, here in case of Matthew, since finger play is observed mainly in autistic children, it seems necessary to tell that Matthew is *not* autistic. He is a boy with Down syndrome, not autistic.

11. Bettelheim's account of etiology of autism has been controversial and I do not necessarily agree with him either on the etiology or the psychoanalytic explanations of autistic children's behavior, as is mentioned in the text. This, however, does not discredit his approach to children per se. His search for understanding emotionally disturbed children, particularly efforts to understand their behavior from their perspectives, remains to be insightful.

12. The anecdote of Dr. Reed may remind us of Gold's competence-deviance hypothesis: "the more competence an individual has, the more deviance will be tolerated in him by others... Deviance is used here to mean aspects of an individual which cause negative attention. Competence is defined as attributes, skills, etc. which not everyone has, and which are appreciated and needed by someone else. Using work skill as an example, the Competence-Deviance Hypothesis would posit that if someone successfully performs a job task which is essential to the organization, and which no one else could perform without considerable training, that individual must exhibit considerable deviance before dismissal would be considered. Each individual who remains in society does so, more or less successfully, as a function of the balance between his competence and his deviance" (Gold, 1980, p.172).

13. As Orelove and Sobsey note, the similar view on undesirable behaviors is emerging as the "model of problem behaviors as a form of communication... In this model, bizarre, disruptive, or destructive behavior is analyzed in terms of its pragmatic function (control over environmental events)" (Orelove & Sobsey, 1987, p. 307). Although the focus here seems to be on non-verbal, problematic behaviors, the following statements are certainly applicable to verbal, "problematic" behavior as Jeffry's. "If the learner has no more appropriate requesting form in his or her repertoire, he or she should be taught one. If the learner already has one, he or she must be prompted to use it, and caregivers must be trained to respond to it. In doing so, both communication and behavior are improved" (p.308).

14. It is interesting to note that recent research in communication skills calls our attention to the developmental shift in forms of attachment from physical contact to physical distance. Some researchers develop programmes to help handicapped children direct communication outward to others by proceeding the following three steps (van Dijk, 1986; Orelove & Sobsey, 1987; Sternberg, 1988). (1) *Resonance*, "uses physical contact and motion to coordinate the behavior of the learner with that of the interventionist" (Orelove & Sobsey, 1987, p.307); (2) *Coactive movement*, in which parallel movements are made simultaneously, but without physical contact (e.g. hand clapping or jumping together); (3) *Deferred imitation*, in which there is separation in both space (physical contact) and time, in order to establish turn-taking. As Orelove and Sobsey writes, "these and other turn-taking routines can often be taught well through play" (p.307). The game of come-and-get-me seems to be one of those play activities.

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